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EDITOR'S NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS AND READERS

At long last, we have been able to come out with this edition of *ABIBISEM: Journal of African Culture and Civilisation*. In fact, it was a great worry to us when, due to circumstances beyond our control, we were unable to come out with Volume 5 in 2012. As a result, the Editorial Board decided to combine Volumes 5 and 6 in a single edition. We apologise to our numerous readers around the world and, especially, to all contributors who would have wished to add their articles in these volumes to their papers for promotion and other important purposes. We also apologise to people who would have wished to contribute papers to our esteemed journal but were uncertain of the state of the journal as a result of our inability to come out in 2012. We wish to inform our readers and potential contributors that *ABIBISEM* is still alive, and that arrangements have been made to ensure the frequent publication of all subsequent volumes of this scholarly journal. We wish you all the best.

Dr. K. Adu-Boahen
Head of Department and Editor

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EDITORIAL POLICY AND AUTHOR GUIDELINES

ABIBISEM: Journal of African Culture & Civilization (based in the Department of History, University of Cape Coast, Ghana) is a multidisciplinary journal committed to publishing well-researched general or technical articles in any of the fields pertaining to African history, African Philosophy, African culture and civilization, African relationship with the wider world, etc. The language of presentation is English.

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Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 150 words.

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Each article should be accompanied by a separate (cover) sheet indicating the title of the paper as well as the following information about the author: (i) Full name (family name last); (ii)address or institutional affiliation; and (iii) current status (e.g. Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Professor, etc.)

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The editor expects precision in presentation. Prospective contributors should therefore avoid unnecessary flowery language; write in simple easy-to-comprehend style. All articles should be sent as e-mail attachment to: The Editor, *ABIBISEM: Journal of African Culture & Civilization*, Department of History, University of Cape Coast, Ghana. **Email**: ucchistoryjournal@yahoo.com or journalabibisem@gmail.com **Enquiries**: obrimpono@gmail.com, boadisi@yahoo.com, ajayisa@yahoo.com

VOLUME SIX

VOLUME SIX, 2013

Strangers and Authorities in the Gold Coast: Immigration Control in Colonial Ghana, 1900–1957

Adjei ADJEPONG

Abstract
        Until the imposition of colonial rule on Africa, movements of people from one place to another were not restricted by national or regional borders, visa systems, or national security fears. The modern idea of immigration is related to the development of nation-states and nationality laws, which often distinguish between citizens and immigrants. Citizenship of a nation-state confers on nationals an inalienable right of residence, employment and free movement in that state, but the residence, employment and movement of immigrants are subject to conditions set by immigration regulations. Since it was the colonial authorities that introduced immigration regulations into Ghana, any attempt to gain a good understanding of the history of immigration control in the country must start from the colonial times. Therefore, using both primary and secondary documents, this study examines the measures which the colonial authorities devised to control the entry of immigrants into Ghana as well as their stay in and exit from the country, and assesses the relative effectiveness of their implementation. It argues that the colonial authorities had been generally liberal towards immigrants in Ghana. The study concludes that the manner in which immigration control had been handled in the colonial era was partly accountable for the frequent influx of many 'illegal' migrants into Ghana after independence.

Key words: Alien, citizen, citizenship, control, deportation, immigrant,
        immigration, regulation, repatriation

Introduction
        Available historical records indicate that as a result of both pull and push factors,[56] Ghana's average annual immigration figure reached 3500 by

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[56] Theories of migration that traditionally distinguish between push and pull factors assert that motives to migrate can be either incentives, attracting people to other lands, known as 'pull' factors, or circumstances encouraging people to leave their homelands, known as 'push' factors. 'Both the 'push' and 'pull' factors are economically, politically, culturally and environmentally based. For a detailed explanation of the two concepts, see Adjei Adjepong, "Immigration into Ghana, 1880s–1960s: An Examination of the Underlying Factors", in Eric Sakyi Nketiah, ed., *Distance Forum: A Multidisciplinary Book of Academic Articles*, Vol. II (Winneba: Department of Social Science Education, University of Education, Winneba, 2012), pp. 36–37.

1900 and after 1945, the influx of foreign elements picked momentum, thereby establishing a considerable immigrant population in the country.[57] When one considers that the presence of immigrants helped to increase unemployment, social vices and political insecurity for the country, it is tempting to contend that immigration regulations had altogether not been devised and effectively enforced. Certainly, the movement of migrants into Ghana was not a great concern to the colonial authorities during the colonial era. It is this relaxed immigration policy that led to an increase in both the number of migrants entering Ghana regularly as well as the stabilisation of a substantial immigrant population in the country.

The increased inflow of migrants must not, however, be construed that immigration into Ghana and activities of non-Ghanaians within the country had been left totally uncontrolled. Indeed, the colonial administration made determined efforts to regulate immigration and deal with issues relating to immigrants in Ghana. Some of these measures controlled the entry of migrants into Ghana and regulated their stay and movements within the country. There were measures which defined the political status of both nationals[58] and immigrants, regulated the economic activities of the latter within the country and specified the basis for the deportation of 'undesirable' immigrants.[59] The adoption of these measures indicates that the colonial authorities were not indifferent to immigration issues, but migrants continued to flock to Ghana. It is one thing devising immigration control policies and quite another implementing them to achieve the desired results. It appears then that immigration was not effectively regulated. This paper examines the immigration laws and other measures dealing with immigrants which were passed by the colonial government of Ghana and evaluates the effectiveness of their enforcement. The aim of the paper is to show that the colonial administration introduced numerous immigration policies, but these measures were generally not strictly enforced.

The Choice of the 1900–1957 Period

For purposes of clarity, the study specifically considers attempts at immigration control from the early 1900s to the end of the colonial administration in early 1957. In 1901 and 1902, Asante and the Northern

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[57] Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louis B. Sohn, "Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice", *International Studies in Human Rights*, (1994), p. 63.

[58] This study uses the terms *national(s)* and *citizen(s)* interchangeably.

[59] This does not imply that the economic activities of Ghanaians themselves were left uncontrolled. There were laws which affected the economic, social and political activities of indigenous Ghanaians. See discussions under "Regulations on Employment and Economic Activities".

Territories (the area now covered by the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions) were annexed to the Gold Coast Colony. The first decade of the twentieth century also witnessed the consummation of the process of European partition and conquest of Africa. This development was accompanied by the imposition of artificial boundaries on Africa to separate the various indigenous peoples and states and put them under the sovereignty of different European powers. This phenomenon put internal movements across the continent into an 'international context', and this came to involve the introduction of various regulations which impinged on the political, social and economic lives of immigrants who entered, lived and left Ghana. Accordingly, the 1900-1957 period is significant in the history of immigration control in Ghana.

Theoretical Orientation

Tomas Hammar defines immigration regulation in two senses. In one, he says it is "the control a sovereign state exercises over the entry of foreign citizens and their access to residence and employment".[60] In the other, Hammar conceives of immigration regulation as the set of rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens into a country.[61] In either sense, immigration regulation includes such rules which control foreign citizens (aliens) once they visit or take residence in another (the receiving) country, including control of their employment. Repatriation or deportation,[62] recruitment of foreign labour by private employers and the state, and the opening of official information and recruitment departments all fall under these regulations.[63] Immigration policies are often formulated for purposes of effective regulation. These policies can range from allowing no migration at all to allowing most types of migration, which may include free immigration. In general, immigration regulations require that non-citizens remain under some form of control until they become naturalised citizens. Since laws concerning immigrants usually entrust administrative bodies with great discretionary powers, it is considered unnecessary in most countries to make amendments to these laws each time a stricter or a more liberal immigration regulation is introduced. What is often needed is only a change in the application of existing provisions of the laws. In some

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[60] Tomas Hammar, "Immigration Regulation and Aliens Control", in Tomas Hammar, ed., *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 249.
[61] _____, "Introduction", in Tomas Hammar, ed., *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 7.
[62] In this study, the terms *repatriation, deportation* and *expulsion* are used interchangeably.
[63] Hammar, "Introduction", p. 7.

countries, however, new legislations are often introduced in order to limit the size of immigration.

Knowledge and experiences gathered from the movements of migrants has taught many important lessons. One lesson is that immigration has often been influenced by historical precedents and by culture or traditional patterns of behaviour.[64] At the same time, immigration regulations are, first of all, influenced by economic considerations, such as the current labour market situation at a particular time, and the profitability in the short and long term of immigrant labour.[65] During periods of acute unemployment or general economic difficulties, immigration control is often strictly applied to protect the national labour market. On the other hand, during periods of general economic growth or prosperity or labour shortages, a policy of economic liberalism which liberalises immigration control and open the way for a great increase in labour migration is pursued.[66] Immigration, it must be understood, is a social and political phenomenon.[66] It should be noted, also, that economic considerations sometimes conflict with nationalistic interests. Too sizeable an immigrant population is considered "over-foreignisation" in some countries, while locals in some countries normally react when immigration results in a heavy concentration of non-indigenous peoples in some residential areas.[67] Certainly, an increase in the size of immigrant families places burdens on social services and leads to demands from social workers for greater resources and pleas from local authorities for national assistance. In some countries, immigrant issues bring public protests or engender the fear of such protests. Sometimes, there are threats of disorders or actual riots. It needs to be pointed out that the ideologies and policies of a particular government in power can influence the nature of immigration control measures that are designed and the extent of effectiveness of their enforcement. Besides these aside, a country's geography, diplomatic policy, experience of policy-makers, their particular national needs, and other significant factors affect immigration into a country, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.[68]

In view of all this, a chronological-thematic or topical-chronological approach has been adopted. This means that the material has been composed and arranged both chronologically and topically, or thematically, to maintain a largely chronological structure, while categorising and discussing important themes. The main aim was to produce a work that takes account

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[64] Hammar, "Immigration Regulation and Aliens Control", p. 249.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

[66] Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, "Switzerland", in Tomas Hammar, ed., *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 234–235.

[67] Hammar, "Immigration Regulation and Aliens Control", p. 250.

[68] Hammar, "Introduction", p. 10.

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of the chronology of events and interprets facts based on themes in order to give the material coherence and meaning. Note, however, that the themes have not been organised into economic, social and political. They have rather been categorised into 'Regulations on Entry and Internal Movement', 'Definition of Citizenship', 'Regulations on Employment and Economic Activities', and 'Instances for Deportation'. This approach has been adopted with the view to establishing a 'chain-relationship' among the variables which would help depict, what may be called, 'from-entry-to-departure' perspective.

Regulations on Entry and Internal Movement

In general, all sovereign states reserve the right to determine whether foreign nationals will be permitted to enter their territory and reside there or not. In essence, the colonial authorities had the power to determine the entry and residence of foreign citizens in colonial Ghana. In relation to regulations on entry, the British colonial administration introduced measures such as the Immigrant Paupers Ordinance of 1909, 1912 and 1919; the European and Asiatic Passengers Restriction Ordinance of 1912; the Regulation of Immigrants Ordinance of 1914; the Immigration of Labourers Restriction Ordinance of 1916 and 1917; and the Former Enemy Aliens (Restriction on Immigration) Ordinance of 1919 to curtail the influx of immigrants into Ghana. Other legislations enacted by the colonial authorities for the same purpose included the Immigration Restriction Ordinance of 1925, 1926 and 1927; the Immigration Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance of 1937; the Immigrant British Subjects (Deportation) Ordinance of 1945; and the Immigration Ordinance of 1947. In fact, entry into Ghana during the colonial period appeared to have been quite difficult, at least in principle. The point is that the Former Enemy Aliens (Restriction on Immigration) Ordinance of 1919,[69] for example, prohibited the entry into Ghana of all citizens or subjects of a state with which Britain had been fighting in the First World War, particularly during the year 1918, unless they obtained entry permits from the Colonial Secretary. Failure to obtain immigration permits before entry was considered a grave offence which could lead to the summary trial and incarceration of offenders with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding £100, or both. Moreover, the Colonial Secretary could refuse to grant immigration permits to any former enemy alien without assigning any reasons for such refusal.[70] The Secretary

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[69] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "The Former Enemy Aliens (Restriction on Immigration) Ordinance, 1919", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1920)*, Vol. II (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1920), p. 1436.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 1438.

even had the power to cancel permits already issued to subjects of enemy states to Britain at any time he considered it necessary to do so.

Besides former enemy aliens, certain categories of people were labelled as *prohibited immigrants*, and, as a result, barred from entering Ghana. Generally, these were people described by the Governor or the Minister responsible for the Police Department as undesirable, "medically undesirable", destitute, and of "unsound mind" or lunatics. Other prohibited immigrants were prostitutes, paupers, convicts, agitators, non-native servants, and persons without passports.[71] In colonial Ghana legislation, an *agitator* was a person who, by sufficient evidence, was considered by the Governor to be likely to conduct himself in a manner that could be dangerous to the peace and good order of the country, or to excite enmity between the people of the country and the British Crown, or to undermine the power and authority of the British Crown in Ghana.[72] According to the provisions of the same laws, a *destitute person* was someone who was, or was likely to be, a burden on public funds by reason of mental or bodily health or unable to support himself and his dependants, if any; whereas an *undesirable person* was someone who was, or had been, conducting himself in a way that was dangerous to peace, good order, good government or public morals.[73] A prohibited immigrant who breached the law and entered Ghana, except in accordance with visiting or transit permit, was guilty of an offence and was, on conviction, liable to a fine of £50 or to imprisonment for six months, and might be deported.[74] Certificates issued to prohibited immigrants were cancelled when, within eighteen months, they were arrested and proofs adduced that they were indeed prohibited immigrants.[75]

Going strictly by the explanations given for the designations *agitator*, *destitute person*, and *undesirable person*, one may observe that the colonial authorities were justified in preventing such people from entering Ghana; for no serious government would entertain such persons in its territory. The problem, however, was the seemingly absolute power vested in the Governor to identify and classify people as agitators, destitute and undesirable and, for that matter, prohibited from entering the country. In any

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[71] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1925", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1928)*, Vol. I (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1928), pp. 51–52. See also in the same work, "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1926", pp. 773–775.

[72] Gold Coast Colony, "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1926", p. 774.

[73] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "Immigrant British Subjects (Deportation) Ordinance, 1945", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1951)*, Vol. II (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1954), p. 228.

[74] Gold Coast Colony, "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1926", pp. 776–777.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 777.

case, to ensure the effective implementation of the law, police and immigration officers were empowered by the law to prevent all prohibited immigrants from entering Ghana and could even without warrant arrest any person suspected to have acted in contravention of the law.[76]

Apart from dealing with citizens or subjects of enemy states and prohibited immigrants, the colonial authorities also devised measures which affected the entry of *ordinary immigrants*[77] into the country. In this case, every immigrant who entered the country, whether by land, sea or air, was required to report himself to an immigration officer for examination and to be issued with certificate of entry. Each immigrant was also required to deposit an amount of £25 with the Colonial Treasurer, or with any other official as might be directed by the Governor, for a one-year period.[78] The said money was returned to the owner when he was about to leave the country at the end of the stipulated period. Conversely, the money was forfeited and used to defray all costs that would be incurred in the course of repatriating the owner if he became destitute and was unable to support himself before the one-year period expired. The seriousness of the government in relation to restrictions on entry into the country could be understood from the fact that owners or captains of ships were required to sign bonds with the government and pay the required amount for those bonds, promising to return, at the end of a stipulated period, all passengers brought into the country who were not born in any part of West Africa.[79] Until such bonds were entered into to the satisfaction of the government, clearance was to be refused. Contravention of these provisions was considered as a misdemeanour, and Customs Officers or Police Constables were entrusted with the power to cause the arrest of those who breached the law.

On the basis of the contents of these measures alone, one would be tempted to conclude that regulations on entry into colonial Ghana had been very stringent and, for that matter, made entry almost impossible. However, a scrupulous examination of the situation on the ground reveals that the opposite was rather the case. These ordinances, in fact, did not help check

[76] See, for example, Clause (2) of Article 13 of "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1926", p. 777.

[77] The term *ordinary immigrants* is used here to refer to all immigrants who were neither citizens or subjects of enemies of the British in the First World War nor prohibited immigrants.

[78] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "The Regulation of Immigrants Ordinance, 1914", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1928)*, Vol. 1 (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1928), p. 1429.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 1430. Note that all people born in West Africa were considered citizens of Ghana and those not born in any part of West Africa regarded as aliens. See discussion on citizenship below for more details.

the influx of immigrants into Ghana to any significant degree. The point is that in British colonial citizenship laws, the indigenous people of a territory were referred to as 'natives'. Nevertheless, these laws regarded peoples in non-British territories also as 'natives'. So long as a person was considered a 'native', he had the same rights and duties as an indigenous Ghanaian. Hence, the restrictions imposed on immigration did not apply to such categories of people, and this entitled them to the right of entry into, residence and work in Ghana. Further, 'enemies of the British' in the First World War referred only to the Central Powers and their allies as well as colonies possessed by these powers. Germany and Turkey were the only countries among the Central Powers who had colonies in Africa, but by the start of the war, Turkey had lost all her colonial possessions in Africa. Germany still held hers, but they were seized from her at the end of the war when she was defeated. It implied that only citizens of countries of the Central Powers and their former colonies were prohibited from entering Ghana. Citizens of other countries were, thus, not restricted from entering territories under the British Crown, including Ghana. It could even be argued that after the war, citizens or subjects of the Central Powers and their allies would no longer be barred from entering Ghana, since the war ceased in 1918 and treaties were signed in 1919 between the Allies and the Central Powers. Moreover, the various immigration regulations made provision for prohibited immigrants to enter the country on certain conditions. Clause (1) of Article 11 of the 1926 Immigration Restriction Ordinance, for example, stipulated categorically that a prohibited immigrant could be allowed to enter Ghana on the condition that

> He shall deposit with the immigration officer the sum of sixty pounds: [sic] Provided that the immigration officer may in lieu of requiring the said deposit permit the intending immigrant to give security by bond in the prescribed form in the sum of sixty pounds with one or more sureties to be approved by the immigration officer conditional on the intending immigrant obtaining from an immigration officer within six months after entering the Colony a certificate that he is a fit and proper person to be received as an immigrant.

Even if such a prohibited immigrant was able to procure the aforesaid certificate, the money deposited was to be given back to him; it was only when he failed to obtain the necessary papers within the said period that he forfeited his deposit, which was to be used to defray all costs that would be

incurred in deporting him from the country.[80] In addition, the restrictions imposed on immigration did not apply to British consuls, members in the British military, air force, naval officers, diplomatic or consular services, unofficial members of the Legislative Council, government officials, foreign officials entering and passing through Ghana to or from other countries, and wives and children under sixteen years of non-prohibited immigrants.[81] Considering that the colonial administration was not really strict on the influx of foreign nationals into Ghana, one may wonder the extent to which Ghanaian citizenship and nationality were defined during the colonial period, and the degree to which the indigenous people of the country were distinguished from non-locals.

Definition of Citizenship
It is an important concern of every sovereign nation to clearly define nationality and citizenship with the view to giving its citizens identity and distinguishing them from non-citizens. In view of this, the British colonial administration of the Gold Coast paid much attention to nationality and citizenship legislations. The authorities, thus, adopted measures that dealt with citizenship and, thus, established the nationality of indigenous Ghanaians as against those who were not indigenes of the land. Such measures comprised the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914, 1918, 1922 and 1933; the Aliens Ordinance of 1925 and 1935; the Naturalisation Regulations of 1933; the Statute Law Revision Act of 1933; and the British Nationality Act of 1948. These measures made a distinction between *natives* and *non-natives*. The latter supposedly comprised members of groups whose areas of origin territorially lay outside the boundaries of Ghana. However, the term *native* was legally defined as "British subjects or protected persons", and, by implication, they included any persons born in territories under the dominion of or owing allegiance to the British Crown. The children and spouses of such persons were also considered British subjects and were, for that matter, citizens of Ghana.[82] The term *native* even referred to all persons ordinarily resident in any territory in West Africa

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[80] See subsections 2 and 3 of Clause (1) of Article 11 of "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1926", p. 776.
[81] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "Immigration Ordinance, 1947", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony* (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1954), p. 203.
[82] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1920)*, Vol. II (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1920), p. 299.

under Britain, France, Spain, Portugal as well as the Belgian Congo, the Mandated Territories in West Africa, Liberia, Fernando Po and Sao Tome.[83]

In addition, the colonial government made provision in its citizenship and nationality laws for people in colonial territories other than those of the British who wished to apply for naturalisation or registration to do so and be considered as citizens of Ghana. Important legislations in this direction were the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, and the Naturalisation Regulations, 1933. Aliens who had resided in a British dominion or had been in the service of the British Crown for a period of not less than five years could apply to the Secretary of State for certificate of naturalisation.[84] People who had been ordinarily resident in Ghana continuously for a period of seven years or more without changing their residence were given automatic Ghanaian citizenship and, as a result, did not need to apply for a certificate of naturalisation.[85] Meanwhile, persons to whom such certificates were granted were entitled to all political and other rights, powers and privileges, and were at the same time subject to all the obligations, duties, and liabilities to which citizens were entitled or subject.

Admittedly, although these nationality measures distinguished British subjects from others, they did not clearly define Ghanaian citizenship. They rather allowed any British subjects, irrespective of their race and country of origin, to freely and legally move to and reside as well as work in Ghana. However, under certain circumstances, including the acquisition of certificate "by false representation or fraud, or by concealment of material circumstances, or that the person to whom the certificate is granted has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to His Majesty", certificates granted could be withdrawn.[86] Other instances in which certificates of naturalisation could be revoked included being a subject of an enemy state to Britain or assisting an enemy against the British in war; being sentenced by a court in a British dominion to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year, or to a term of penal

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[83] Refer to Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "The Immigrant Paupers Ordinance, 1909, 1912 and 1919", pp. 1434-1435; "The European and Asiatic Passengers Restriction Ordinance, 1912", p. 1431; "The Regulation of Immigrants Ordinance, 1914", pp. 1429-1430; "The Immigration of Labourers Restriction Ordinance, 1916", pp. 1432-1433; and "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance of 1925, 1926 and 1927", pp. 55-61, 772-782, and 1423-1431, in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1928)*, Vol. 1 (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1928).

[84] Gold Coast Colony, "British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914", pp. 300–301.

[85] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "Immigration Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1937", in *Laws of the Gold Coast Colony*, Vol. II (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1954), p. 222.

[86] Gold Coast Colony, "British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914", p. 302.

servitude, or to a fine of not less than one hundred pound; not being of good character; and staying in a territory not under British dominion for a period of seven years after being granted the certificate.[87] Worse of all, Clause (3) of Article 2 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, stated emphatically that the Secretary of State had the absolute power to withhold any certificate granted without assigning any reason for the withdrawal.

The obvious inference one could make from all this is that the acquisition of certificate of naturalisation did not in any way confer permanent citizenship or guarantee permanent stay in the country. Indeed, the possession of a certificate of naturalisation could not be used as a foundation for planning a secure future in the country. In view of the discretionary powers of the Secretary of State, certificates could be revoked at any time, and whenever such a development occurred, those who lost their certificates would lose all rights and privileges previously enjoyed. It also implied that their movement within the country and their economic activities would be strictly regulated by all legislations which applied to aliens in colonial Ghana. For example, they would need to renegotiate for permission to engage in any economic venture in the country.

Regulations on Employment and Economic Activities

A major concern of all governments is the organisation of their economies for the maximum benefit of their countries and nationals, while regulating the economic activities of foreigners within their borders. Accordingly, in the economic arena, too, the colonial administration passed a number of legislations to regulate the economic activities of both local and foreign businesses. In the first place, it was illegal for any persons, other than those of European or West African origin, to take up jobs in Ghana without the written consent of the Governor.[88] Even where applications were officially made, the Governor could refuse them without giving any reasons for his refusal. Immigrants who entered the country to work and those who employed them in contravention of these ordinances could be arrested without warrant by any Customs Officer or Constable. People charged with a breach of the law could be summarily tried before a Police Magistrate or District Commissioner and on conviction thereof be liable to a term of imprisonment with or without hard labour for any period not exceeding one year or to be fined not exceeding £100, or both.[89]

Provisions relating to employment may be misinterpreted to mean that aliens were prohibited from undertaking any economic activity in colonial Ghana altogether. Nevertheless, as pointed out, it was only

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[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 302–303.
[88] Gold Coast Colony, "The Immigration of Labourers Restriction Ordinance, 1916", p. 1432.
[89] *Ibid.*, p. 1433.

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unlawful to start engaging oneself in economic enterprise without the prior knowledge and agreement of the Governor, although he had the power to refuse the grant of application for such purposes. It could also be reasoned from the statement: "Any person other than a West African native, who arrived in the [Gold Coast] Colony to serve any other person, firm, company or association in any capacity ..."[90] that some immigrants entered Ghana to take up jobs. The problem or condition, however, was that if within a period of eighteen months from the date of his arrival such a person or employee became destitute, it was the responsibility of the person, firm, company or association that employed him to pay for all expenses that would be incurred in the course of deporting such a destitute to his home country. However, if the employer had paid an amount of money not exceeding £100 to the Colonial Treasurer as security before the person became destitute, then the employer would not be under any further liability in respect of such a person.[91]

Interestingly, immigration regulations in colonial Ghana also affected company law. In this regard, much of the credit must be given to John Mensah Sarbah, for he may be said to have engineered the promulgation of the first legislation in this direction. Sarbah, appointed a member of the Legislative Council in 1901, used his membership of the Council to put forward several proposals for legislative reforms. One of the important matters for which Sarbah sought a legislation was limited liability companies. Eventually on December 11, 1906, the colonial government passed the Companies Ordinance, which sought to provide protection for all people, both foreign and local, who wanted to do business in Ghana.[92] In the end, however, the Ordinance favoured the foreigner more than the local investor, for whom Sarbah had proposed such a measure. The Ordinance, thus, fell short of the expectations of Ghanaians at the time. Continued agitation for a more up to date companies legislation led to the passing of the Registration of Business Names Ordinance of 1937.[93] This measure went a little way to meet some of the needs of the local people, but on the whole the law concerning companies remained substantially unchanged. The reason, it has been suggested, was that apart from few companies formed locally by Africans for the exportation of cocoa and the importation of general merchandise, most of which failed from one cause or the other, no

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[90] Gold Coast Colony, "The Immigrant Paupers Ordinance, 1909, 1912 and 1919", p. 1434.
[91] *Ibid.*, p. 1435.
[92] Justice Azu Crabbe, *John Mensah Sarbah 1864–1910* (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1971), p. 37.
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

African companies of substance were formed which could feel the benefits of the reform in the company law of the country.[94]

This apathetic attitude on the part of the British colonial administration became a matter of concern to some of the local people. Some Ghanaians could not remain silent over the continuous influx of foreigners into Ghana in particular and West Africa in general during the period. At its first congress in Accra in 1920, for instance, the National Congress of British West Africa asked for stricter immigration controls to exclude 'undesirable' Syrians and other nationals of Asian origin.[95] This request was inspired by their resentment at the overwhelming role these Asian immigrants had carved for themselves in the economy. Impliedly, unrestricted immigration was one of the causes of the 1948 disturbances in Ghana. In fact, the Watson Commission instituted to inquire into the riots found that there was widespread hostility among all sections of the local people towards the steady influx of both European, and Levantine and Asiatic peoples. The real complaint was, however, against the Levantine and Asiatic peoples "whose apparent rise from poverty to wealth in a comparatively short period of time has caused much heart-burning".[96] The Commission then recommended the adoption of measures that would strictly check immigration. In response to the peoples' grievances and the Commission's recommendations on unrestricted immigration, the British government promised to control immigration by introducing "immigration ... laws with the object of protecting the interests of the local inhabitants without discrimination against intending immigrants on grounds of race".[97]

Consequently, some of the earlier measures were amended in the early 1950s to satisfy the demands of the local people. A careful examination of immigration control after the 1948 riots clearly shows, however, that no serious effort was made to effectively implement immigration regulations. This situation allowed immigrants to continue to dominate certain fields of economic activity in the country, arousing protest from some Ghanaian interest groups. This is evidenced by the fact that the National Crusade for the Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises, presided over by Dankyi-Awere, in 1953 started writing letters to the colonial government

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[94] *Ibid.*
[95] Elizabeth Isichei, *History of West Africa Since 1800* (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1977), p. 268.
[96] Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), p. 33.
[97] _____, *Statement by His Majesty's Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), p. 10.

protesting against the extent of foreigners' trading in Ghana.[98] The government, nonetheless, remained the same in its approach to checking immigration. So unconcerned were the colonial authorities with immigration, and the consequent dominance of foreigners in certain sectors of the Ghanaian economy, that the National Crusade was compelled to state in its press releases that "we are waging a peaceful war of aggressiveness on the aliens".[99]

It is not clear from available documents whether the National Crusade actually carried out its 'threats'. However, considering the selfish and exploitative attitude of the colonial authorities,[100] it could be argued that not much was achieved for Ghanaians in terms of economic reforms. Being themselves Europeans, the authorities had so framed immigration policies in the economic sector to cater not only for the interest of the country, but also, and more especially, for the benefit of European merchants. In any case, why should they prevent all immigrants, "other than those of *European* (author's emphasis) and West African origin" from engaging in economic undertakings in the country?[101] Evidently, the Asians and other immigrants who, it would be assumed, were the targets of these economic regulations were not dealt with as desired.[102] No wonder that Osagyefo Dr. Kwame

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[98] According to Margaret Peil, the National Crusade for the Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises was launched to protect, assist and educate its members on the role of efficiency for productivity toward economic salvation as well as advise the government about the activities of corruptible officials in the country who encouraged bribery, smuggling, and other forms of anti-social practices. See her study, "The Expulsion of West African Aliens", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 9 (1971), p. 212.

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] The economic philosophy of all the European imperialist powers was the maximum exploitation of both the human and natural resources of the colonies for the benefit of the colonising powers. As a result, the health of the colonial economy was measured not in terms of how much the colonial peoples gained but more in terms of how much the colonising powers benefitted from the economy. It is in this context that the contemporary economic backwardness of Africa and the overwhelming economic advancement of the West should be examined and understood.

[101] Refer to Gold Coast Colony, "The Immigration of Labourers Restriction Ordinance, 1916", p. 1432.

[102] The Western banks and other large expatriate firms, like the United Africa Company, and financial institutions in Ghana were more liberal and generous in offering financial assistance to European and Asian merchants and businesses in Ghana, whereas they refused these privileges to African businessmen and companies. See Adjepong, "Immigration into Ghana", pp. 40–41; Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson and Co (Publishers) Ltd. and Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1968), pp. 293–297 and 411–412.

Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party assumed power in 1957 and inherited an economy heavily dominated by expatriate firms.[103]

Instances for Deportation

As pointed out above, nationality laws often distinguish between citizens, or nationals, and immigrants, or strangers. Citizenship of a nation-state confers on nationals an inalienable right of residence, employment and free movement in that state, but the residence, employment and movement of immigrants are subject to conditions set by immigration regulations. More importantly, the fact that nationality and citizenship laws distinguish between citizens and non-citizens is an indication that non-citizens can be deported from the country through deportation orders or legislations. In its efforts to regulate immigration, the British colonial government made provision for instances in which immigrants whose presence was considered unconducive to the good of the country could be deported. Measures such as the Deportation of Suspects Ordinance, 1916; the Aliens Ordinance, 1925; the Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1926; the Repatriation of Convicted Persons Ordinance, 1945; the Immigrant British Subjects (Deportation) Ordinance, 1945; the Immigration Ordinance, 1947; and many other deportation orders were promulgated for this purpose. For instance, the Deportation of Suspects Ordinance of 1916 empowered the Governor, during the course of the First World War, to order the deportation from Ghana of any persons suspected to have assisted an enemy of the British, "either by doing any act, or communication by any means, or in any way whatsoever, or to have attempted to render any such assistance, or to intend to render any such assistance ...."[104]

The other measures, on the other hand, empowered the Supreme Court or a Magistrate's Court to order the deportation from Ghana of immigrants convicted of punishable offences. The Repatriation of Convicted Persons Ordinance of 1945 made specific reference to people of African descent, but, in addition to the Deportation of Suspects Ordinance, all the other repatriation measures referred to "any person", that is, all people who, according to the citizenship and nationality laws of the land, were strictly not considered nationals of Ghana. Other categories of immigrants liable to

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[103] See Adjei Adjepong, "Immigration Control in Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, 1957–1966", in Olaniyi Rasheed, ed., *Ibadan Journal of History*, Vol. 1 (2013), pp. 94–95; A. Adu Boahen, *Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Accra: Sankofa Educational Publishers Ltd., 2000), p. 196–197.

[104] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "The Deportation of Suspects Ordinance, 1916", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1928)*, Vol. 1 (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1928), p. 603.

repatriation were those who contravened the immigration laws of the country, such as not possessing a valid passport or valid visa.[105]

From the 1930s, the colonial authorities passed several deportation orders against individual *aliens* whose presence in Ghana was deemed unconducive to the public good or who had been convicted of certain offences. In 1934, for instance, a deportation order was passed against a Bukari Grunshie, who was subsequently ordered to leave Ghana before the 20th of May, 1934. In 1938, I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, a Sierra Leonean, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, a Nigerian, were also deported under the Sedition Act of 1934 for allegedly carrying out activities calculated to overthrow the colonial system. Again in 1954, the colonial administration deported some Nigerians from Ghana.[106] Interestingly, provisions were made also for the expulsion of the dependents of people expelled.

A critical observation of the stipulations of these measures point clearly to the fact that the colonial authorities were really serious and quick to effect the repatriation of people sentenced to expulsion. In the first place, persons against whom deportation orders were issued were required to comply strictly with the dictates of these orders. Secondly, Article 3 of the Deportation of Suspects Ordinance stipulated that as soon as orders for the expulsion of any such suspects were issued, all public officers of the Colony were "hereby empowered and authorized to take all such necessary action, and to do all such things, as the efficient execution of such order or direction may require."[107] In cases where deportees were serving prison terms, they could either be repatriated outright, notwithstanding that the full term of imprisonment had not been served, or be kept in prison till the end of their terms and be deported after their release.[108] Moreover, deportees were not allowed to return to Ghana for as long as the repatriation orders against them were in force. Even some people were not permitted to move from their own regions of origin in the country to any other part of the country until the expiration of the duration specified by the orders against them.[109] Periods of

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[105] Government of the Gold Coast Colony, "Immigration Ordinance, 1937", in *The Laws of the Gold Coast Colony (1951)*, Vol. II (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1954), p. 218; "The Immigration Restrictions Ordinance" (1925), p. 56; "The Immigration Restrictions Ordinance" (1926), pp. 776–777; and "Immigration Ordinance" (1947), p. 204.

[106] Peil, "West African Aliens" p. 205.

[107] Gold Coast Colony, "The Deportation of Suspects Ordinance" (1916), p. 603.

[108] _____, "The Immigration Restriction Ordinance" (1926), p. 777. Note that the number of years for which deportees were to be out of the country was specified. Hence, those who were repatriated after serving their full prison terms suffered such fate only if they were released before the period specified in their deportation orders expired. However, if those years expired before they were released from prison, then they could not be expelled.

[109] _____, "Repatriation of Convicted Persons Ordinance", p. 236.

deportation varied from one expellee to another, but in cases where people were barred from moving from one area within the country to another, the period did not exceed three years.[110]

Evidently, these repatriations had political implications, and were not means of regulating immigration in the real sense. Moreover, they contained elements of arbitrariness, at least, to some degree. This assertion is strengthened when examined critically within the context of some of the provisions of the deportation laws. Clause (1) of Article 8 of the 1925 Aliens Ordinance, and Article 5 of the 1945 Repatriation of Convicted Persons Ordinance granted people against whom deportation orders were issued the right to appeal against their conviction in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, and if the Appeal ruled against the deportation, it would not carry any effect. Generally, deportation orders did not take effect until they had been certified by the Chief Justice and forwarded to the Governor in Council. These conditions, however, appeared to be more theoretical than practical because they could not override the Governor's determination to expel. Actually, the same measures empowered the Governor in Council to make an order, at any time he thought fit, requiring an alien to leave, particularly if he deemed it conducive to the public good. In furtherance, whereas Clause (2) of Article 3 of the Aliens Ordinance specified that a deportation order could be made "subject to any condition which the Governor in Council may think proper", Clause (3) of Article 8 of the same Ordinance stated firmly that the right to appeal against a deportation order could not "prejudice the power of the Governor in Council to make an order for deportation ...."[111]

Essentially, the power to expel rested with the Governor. But that was not all; any alien with respect to whom a deportation order was issued, or a certificate was given by a court with the view to the making of such an order, could be detained on the instructions of the Governor before being sent away. Even where expellees were placed on ships, aircrafts or vehicles about to leave Ghana, they were considered to be in legal custody whilst so detained until the ships, aircrafts or vehicles left the country.[112] Indeed, the powers wielded by the Governor in relation to repatriation considerably influenced the living conditions and attitudes of immigrants in the country. Additionally, the very existence of the possibility of deportation fostered a considerable degree of legal insecurity since decisions concerning the stay and expulsion of foreign citizens were made by administrative authorities who had much discretion in interpreting immigration regulations. Such legal insecurity was made worse when foreign citizens had no right to appeal against decisions of administrative authorities.

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[110] *Ibid.*

[111] Gold Coast Colony, "The Aliens Ordinance, 1925", pp. 64–65.

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

Assessment and Conclusion

Looking at the provisions of the measures examined above, one would contend that immigration regulations in colonial Ghana, other than those for political reasons, were not strictly enforced. First, citizenship and immigration regulations were alien to the African way of life in pre-colonial times. International boundaries separating one country from others were non-physical and not effectively patrolled. Added to these was the fact that movements across certain boundaries, such as those of the Ghana-Togo, Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana-Burkina Faso, Togo-Benin, Benin-Nigeria, Nigeria-Cameroun, Niger-Mauritania, and Senegal-Sierra Leone, were, to the local people, not considered international but internal in view of the fact that people of the same ethnic stock lived on both sides of the said boundaries. The scope of citizenship laws were, further, so wide that all people in both British and non-British colonial territories in West Africa could legally claim Ghanaian citizenship because all people under the authority of the British Crown were considered British subjects, while all West Africans were considered 'natives'. Neither were the authorities strict on ensuring that immigrants in Ghana either naturalised or registered as citizens of Ghana nor did they see to it that immigrants did not freely move from one area to another within Ghana as stipulated by existing regulations. It was also impossible for immigration officers to issue permits to all foreigners who entered Ghana since it would be difficult identifying all such people. In addition, some immigrants would feel reluctant to show themselves to immigration officers to be examined and be issued with certificates.

It can also be observed that most of the immigration regulations the administration passed remained dormant in the statute books because they needed more tax payers to enable them get more revenue for their administration. Moreover, the colonial authorities needed cheap labour force for the maximum exploitation of the resources of the country as well as people who were prepared to do the type of jobs Ghanaians despised. Apart from these, Europeans came to meet the principle of 'freedom of movement' well established in African culture, and they were prepared to maintain it for their ultimate benefit. For example, it would be easy for them to transport labourers from one region to another. The most important reason, it is argued, was that the original intention of the colonial powers in creating political boundaries in Africa was not to create political units that would determine the basis of future African nation-states. Neither did they have the idea of restricting the movement of Africans from one geographical area to another, nor protecting the resources of a territory for the sole enjoyment of the indigenous people. Those boundaries appear more to have been imposed only for the European imperial powers to distinguish between their

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possessions and those of rival nations in order to prevent any clashes among themselves.

Clearly, in spite of the numerous measures passed, which were expected to reduce the population of foreigners, the population of immigrants in the country rather increased. For instance, the 1913 Ghana population census indicated that there were 4,142 foreigners working in the country. By 1931, according to the census of that year, out of a total population of 3,163,464, there were 292,294 non-Ghanaians (3,078 non-Africans and 289,216 Africans of foreign-origin) in the country; the majority of non-Ghanaian Africans came from the French colonies, while Nigerians accounted for 95 percent of migrants from the British colonies.[113]

It should be noted, however, that the colonial authorities' indifferent attitude towards immigration control was not peculiar to Ghana alone. The situation was generally the same everywhere in Africa during the colonial period. The reclamation of independence, nevertheless, changed the pattern of migration and immigration control in Africa by reducing free international movements through elaborate development of visa and passport regulations, or customs and controls, of the need for foreign workers to obtain work permits, or restrictions on the repatriation of savings. As Akin L. Mabogunje rightly indicates, African migrants came to perceive the real significance of national independence to be, for the first time, governments' definition of who their citizens were and who were not.[114] The newly independent countries were zealous to reserve available employment opportunities for their nationals and raise the standard of living of their citizens. Consequently, a series of regulations were promulgated by the various governments to generally regulate immigration of foreigners but specifically to discourage the inflow of unskilled or unqualified persons into their territories for the purpose of taking up employment and to provide the independent nations the opportunity to get rid of illegal foreigners in their midst. In the case of Ghana, therefore, the Nkrumah administration which inherited power from the colonial government introduced a number of measures to regulate immigration. The implementation of these laws and orders were, expectedly, relatively stringent and effective in comparison with those adopted during the colonial era. Nevertheless, the policies of the Nkrumah administration, such as its pursuit of the policy of African

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[113] Micah Bump, "Ghana: Searching for Opportunities at Home and Abroad", in *Migration Information Source* (2006), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=3, (accessed 21 June, 2006).
[114] Akin L. Mabogunje, *Regional Mobility and Resource Development in West Africa* (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), p. 122.

brotherhood and the influence of the colonial administration, had a considerable impact on the execution of these measures.[115]

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[115] See Adjepong, "Immigration Control in Ghana", pp. 87–106.

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closed to women. As observed by Myers (2009), "the rules governing what jobs military women can hold often seem contradictory or muddled." For instance, women "can serve as machine gunners on Humvees but cannot operate Bradleys, the Army's armoured fighting vehicle. They can work with some long-range artillery but not short-range ones. Women can walk Iraq's dangerous streets as members of the military police but not as members of the infantry. And, they can lead combat engineers in war zones as officers, but cannot serve among them" (Myers, 2009). Besides, throughout the world, the role of women in combat has become a contentious issue in present militaries. The exclusion of women from many combat roles is seen by some as a form of sexual discrimination whilst the" alleged physical and mental differences of the two sexes, the effect of the presence of the opposite sex on the battlefield, and the traditional view of males as soldiers" are postulated as arguments for and against women engaging as soldiers under combat situations (http://www.newworldencyclo pedia.org/entry/women_in_the_military).

Indeed, "just as war is so often associated with generalized images of masculinity and femininity, women have become associated with life giving and men with life-taking" (Coulter, Persson and Utas, 2008: 7). This polarization of men and women as comparable with war and peace is common; depicting the image of the aggressive male and suggesting the representation of a propensity for conflict and aggression as something inherently male. Also, it effectively conceals how women are affected by and actively participate in violent conflicts and war. From this perception, war remains exclusively male concern, and women are seen maily as victims and are therefore denied agency. Unlike men, they are not perceived as critical actors in social, economic and political structures. Therefore, viewing women as more nurturing and peaceful both supports and reproduces patriarchal values, in war as in peace. As women endeavoured" to achieve equality with men and parity in employment, the military remained one of the professions that resisted opening its doors to them. Many men considered it unfitting for women to be placed in danger, regarding it as their responsibility to defend and protect women. (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/women_in_the_military).

However, the military today, isn't what it used to be. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the policies governing women in combat, whose roles have increased as steadily as the military and the very nature of war have changed. The military which is generally perceived to be a world of men is now slowly being penetrated by women. Indeed, the pressure on the military to change comes principally from the fact that women are being excluded from the top ranks, where those without combat ribbons generally need not apply. The hesitancy stems from fears – unsupported by experience or research – that women might prove physically or mentally unfit for

combat, or that their presence on the front lines might undermine morale (http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA379603).

Traditional restrictions on female employment in a number of societies have since been broken. As women demonstrated their capabilities in previously male-dominated civilian industries, women in the Army broke the stereotypes which restricted them from moving into areas well outside of customary roles. For instance, in September 2012, Israel's only co-ed combat unit, the Caracal battalion, thwarted an attack along Israel's border with Egypt. The media celebrated that a female soldier shot down one of the three attackers. Their victory earned the battalion recognition by countering skepticism about "female soldiers' ability to fight alongside men." Military officials praised the battalion, thereby supporting women's inclusion in combat forces (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/24/caracal-batallion-israel-co-ed-combat-unit_n_1909132.html).

Despite such feats, general debates about women joining combat forces usually inquire into how well women can perform in armed conflicts. Their ability to fight alongside men is the measure of their worth, and their worth is the predominant factor often considered when deciding whether to include women into combat forces. As soldiering has been included in the moral universe of men in ways that it has not for women, fighting women are frequently considered by their very existence to be transgressing accepted female behaviour, and the very act of fighting by definition makes women and girls less feminine and by extension 'unnatural' (Coulter, Persson and Utas, 2008: 8; Byrne, 1996).

In Nigeria, as other nation states, the defence of the state's national sovereignty, independence and interests was until recent times, the exclusive preserve of men (http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/WAC.HTM). As modern warfare and the institutions of military power began to change, so did the architecture of the military setup in Nigeria as evidenced in the Nigeria Defence Academy's training programme which provides the basis of the focus of this presentation. The Academy broke its traditional practice of enlisting only male military officers for its "Regular Combatant Course" by giving female cadets the opportunity to train with their male counterparts in all branches of commission.

This paper, therefore, interrogates the extent of inclusiveness in the Nigerian Army's operational outlook, and the promise women have shown in their participation in some of the operations, and the prospects of doing more if the talents and capabilities of women are properly harnessed in the army especially in combat operations.

Understanding National Security

Security is, generally, accepted to be about the condition or feeling of safety, the protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these values. It also has to do with freedom from danger or from threats to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests (Imobighe, 1990: 24). Security is crucial to the survival of any nation-state. Without adequate security of lives and property, society will be plunged into the Hobbesian state of nature manifesting lawlessness, chaos and eventual disintegration. This is why security is considered as a dynamic condition which involves the relative ability of a state to counter threats to its core values and interests (Pogoson, 2013).

Various attempts have thus been made to provide an adequate conceptualization of security; the traditional doctrine which identifies security with the possession of strong armed forces, built on high concentration of manpower and weapons and the argument that advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that extends beyond a military determination of threats to encompass a wider understanding of terms such as satisfaction of basic needs, protection of basic needs, protection of cultural and religious identity, etc.

The concept of national security has a plethora of definitions and it will continue to increase (Pogoson, 2013; Nwolise, 2012; Onuoha, 2009; Oche, 2005; Okodolor, 2004; Imobighe, 1998; Buzan, 1983; Mathews, 1989; and McNamara, 1968). This explains why the security architecture of most nations is quite flexible because what may not be of relevance to national security in one clime will be of great importance in another. Scholars have made attempts to conceptualize security by relying on the international trend and their immediate environment. For instance, during the era of cold war, the adherents of the doctrine of traditional security architecture believed that national security is measured by the possession of strong armed forces, built on high concentration of man power and a large arsenal of weapons. This security philosophy was predicated on the understanding that powerful military is required to safeguard national sovereignty, national independence and national interest (Alli, 2010). The spin-off of this security architecture brought about the phenomenon of arms race on the global scale especially between the two major power blocs that dominated the international security land scape before it eventual demise in 1989, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet era brought about the imperative for a new security architecture in the world that is more inclusive and also incorporate the myriad of challenges confronting states in the world especially the developing nation states such as Nigeria.

This explains why McNamara (1968: 149) postulated much earlier that security is not just military hard ware though it may include it, security

is not military force though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it may compass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security. This is the new thinking in national security design which has been embraced by some scholars such as Booth (1994), Imobighe (1998), Naidoo (2000), Jinadu (2000), Nnoli (2006), Alli (2010), Nwolise (2012) and Pogoson (2013). The conception or understanding of national security has changed fundamentally, and it is now people and development focused. Accordingly, national security is "human security which should be the bedrock of national security as it is the security of ordinary men and women in society (Imobighe, 1998).

Security in whatever form is a standard measurement of the viability of any state or nation. A state of insecurity means that the society concerned is on red alert and that a risk factor has been identified which must be contained. This largely may involve military and non-military activities. All nations have the right under international law to secure their territorial space and protect their citizens from any imminent attack in whatever form. Evidently, a powerful military is a crucial requirement of national security and the acquisition of national military power is a priority national goal.

Security is evidently the major concern of modern states all over the world, this explains why chapter 11 section 14 subjection (2) (b) of the constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended stated that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. In other words, the states exist for the purpose of security.

Women and the Military: An Overview

The role of women in the military has always been a controversial issue because the battlefield still remains largely the domain of men. The narrow definition of 'fighters' or 'combatants', where male soldiers are the norm, works to the detriment of women and girls within fighting forces. Women are generally considered not to be as physically strong or emotionally aggressive as men to cope with the brutalities of war. However, women have been engaged in the military for thousands of years all over the world. Although, they were frequently granted only supporting logistics roles in the military, they maintained continuous presence due to their proven skills, knowledge, courage, commitments and efforts.

Women have played many roles in the military, from ancient warrior women, to the women currently serving in conflicts, even though the vast majority of all combatants have been men in every culture. However, the fact that women are not permitted into certain arenas of battle does not make their role significantly less important than that of their male counterparts. The complimentary skills of both male and female personnel are essential for the operational effectiveness of such operations.

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In pre colonial Nigeria, women played a very significant role in the political history of ancient Zaria, Old Ife and Benin. The modern city of Zaria was founded in the first half of the 16th century, by a woman called Queen Bakwa Turuku. She had a daughter called Amina who later succeeded her as Queen. Queen Amina was a great and powerful warrior. She built a high wall around Zaria in order to protect the city from invasion and extended the boundaries of her territory beyond Bauchi. The story was not different in ancient Yorubaland. The significant role played by prominent women such as Moremi of Ife and Emotan of Benin in the precolonial history of Nigeria cannot be ignored. Moremi and Emotan were great amazons who displayed tremendous bravery and strength in the politics of Ife and Benin respectively (Omu and Makinwa, "1976).

Likewise, the Dahomey Amazons or Mino were a Fon all-female military regiment of the Kingdom of Dahomey in the present-day Republic of Benin which lasted until the end of the 19th century. They were so named by Western observers and historians due to their similarity to the semi-mythical Amazons of ancient Anatolia and the Black Sea. The women soldiers were rigorously trained. By the mid-19th century, they numbered between 1,000 and 6,000 women, about a third of the entire Dahomey army, according to reports written by visitors. The reports also noted variously that the women soldiers suffered several defeats, but that the women soldiers were consistently judged to be superior to the male soldiers in effectiveness and bravery (http://www.badassoftheweek.com/dahomey.html).

In the American Civil War, there were a few women who cross-dressed as men in order to fight. Fighting on the battle front as men was not the only way women involved themselves in war. Some women braved the battlefront as nurses and aides. More than 30,000 women served in World War I, mostly in the nursing corps, and more than 10 times that many in World War II, again mostly in nursing and administration, freeing men for combat. All the main nations used women in uniform. The great majority served as clerks, drivers, welfare workers, nurses, radio operators, flight controllers, ordnance personnel, and course instructors. or support roles. Over 500,000 had combat roles in anti-aircraft units in Britain and Germany, and front-line units in Russia.

Roles for women beyond technical and secretarial support started to open up in the late 1970s and early '80s. From the beginning of the 1970s, most Western armies began to admit women to serve active duty. Only some armies permit women to fill active combat roles, these are: New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Germany, Norway, Israel, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan (http://www.atyourlibrary.org/culture/women-combat-warriors-face-difficult-challenges). Israel is currently the only country in the world with a mandatory military service requirement for women. Mandatory conscription for single and married women without

children began in 1948 (http://www.your-krav-maga-expert.com/women-in-idf.html). In 2011 and 2012, the U.S. Defense Department began looking at loosening its near-universal ban on women serving in direct positions of combat, including ground combat, as opposed to other prominent but non-combat positions. In 2013, the United States Armed Forces overturned a 1994 rule banning women from serving in certain combat positions, potentially clearing the way for the presence of women in front-line units and elite commando teams (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/23/pentagon-overturn-ban-women-combat). The USA decided to consider women to serve in the most intense and physically hazardous combat positions in the military, including the Navy SEALs, the Army Rangers and the Marine infantry. The Navy SEAL, the special operations force is used for crucial military and anti-terror operations, this came after 71 years of the existence of Navy SEAL (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/us/elite-units-in-us-military-to-admit-women.html). The reality is that women have been fighting and dying alongside their male colleagues in the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Browder and Pflaeging, 2010). The United States' Department of Defense reports that women make up 15 percent of the military, and over the past decade, more than 280,000 women have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. 152 of these women have died (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119100).

Despite various, though limited roles in the armies of past societies, the role of women in the military, particularly in combat, is controversial and it is only recently that women have begun to be given a more prominent role in contemporary armed forces. As increasing numbers of countries begin to expand the role of women in their militaries, the debate continues.

Nigeria's National Security Architecture

Security policy deals with the broad issues of the management of the multiple threats to the core and context-specific values in the international system (Eze, 2010: 7). In this context, the national security policy of Nigeria provides the framework with which the calculation of instrumental responses (military, economic, social, health, etc.) to these multiple threats ensue (Alli, 2012:11).

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, the operational security architecture of the country is a reflection of the realist paradigm of projecting its powers within a state – centric system, and a clear separation between foreign and domestic policy, where by its internal security is directed at maintaining law and order, the external is directed at deterring external military threats (Pogoson, 2013:23). Nigeria has the largest, best equipped and trained armed forces in the West African sub-region (Alli, 2012;11). Accordingly, one of the realities of the political landscape of West Africa is the clear unquestionable and transparent preponderance of Nigeria

as the leading and hegemonic local actor in the sub-region (Akindele; 2003). Besides, the national security architecture of Nigeria as other nations is about the people and the development of the country. As observed by President Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's national security is the aggregation of the security interests of individuals, communities, ethnic groups, and entities, and institutions, which make up the nation. The objectives are to strengthen Nigeria and advance its national interests and goals; enhance human development; and contain instability and control crime (Obasanjo, 2001: 23).

Nigeria's national security architecture depends on three basic fundamental instruments for its design and operations: the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, the National Defence Policy and the Armed Forces Act. Sections 214 and 217 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended made provision for the establishment and maintenance of the Army, Navy, Air force and other security agencies that may be necessary for the purpose of "defending from external aggression; maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air; suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president and performing of such other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the national Assembly." The National Defence Policy on the other hand advances the protection of the country's interest as prescribed in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. The Armed Forces Acts 2004 made provisions for the constitution, operations and discipline of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The oldest arm of the armed forces is the Nigerian Army, which has a long history dating back to 1862 when Lt. Glover of the Royal Navy formed the very first force of 18 selected locals which became known as "Glover Hausas." The Nigerian Navy came much later in 1958, while the Nigerian Air Force was established by an act of Parliament in1964. The first Nigerian military unit, Glover's Hausas, was established in 1862 by Captain John Glover to defend Lagos. In addition to Glover's Hausas, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was raised in 1888 to protect British interests in Northern Nigeria. The Company Constabulary was recruited to serve an internal security role in Northern Nigeria. This constabulary formed the core of the Northern Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The third unit, the Oil Rivers Irregulars, was created predominantly of Igbo's in 1891. This unit was later designated the Niger Coast Constabulary, and formed the Southern Regiment of them WAFF. The two regiments became the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF on January 1, 1914 along with the consolidation of the Nigerian Protectorates (Dummar, 1989). Since then, the armed forces have undergone structural

and operational changes which were geared towards the achievement of professionalism, though these had been punctuated by military incursions into politics and governance. These changes have taken into cognizance the new awareness and appraisal of the potential threats (internal and external) to the nation.

Shortly after independence, the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) was established on 5 February 1964 as a reformation of the then British run Royal Military Force Training College (RMFTC) (http://www.nairaland.co m/1185783/nigeria-defence-academy-military-schools). The Academy was established in response to the defence needs of independent Nigeria to provide primary military officer training for the Nigerian Armed Forces. The Academy trains the officer corps of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air Force. The Vision of NDA is "to produce officers with broad based training in both military and academic subjects designed to serve as foundation for the future progressive development of officers of the Nigerian Armed Forces. " The mission of the academy is "to provide each officer cadet with the knowledge, skills and values necessary to meet the requirements of a military officer through military, academic and character development." In achieving its vision, the Academy conducts 3 types of primary officer military training. These are: the 5 year Regular Combatant Officer programme, the 9 month Short Service programme and the 9 month Direct Short Service programme (http://www.nda.edu.ng/).

The Academy has done fairly well in the training of female cadets for the Direct Short Service programme, but has no done so well in officers' training in the other tiers of Academy. The 5 year Regular Combatant Officer programme used to be an exclusive preserve of male cadets before the policy was reviewed in 2010. Indeed, "the story of the Academy is not new. What is new is the deviation from its traditional practice of enlisting only male military officers for its Regular Combatant Course" (Dada, 2013) when the first set of 20 female cadets were admitted into the 5 year Regular Combatant Officer programme and commenced training alongside their male counterparts in October 2011. Evidently, the prospects shown by female officers in the military impelled the federal government to order for the inclusion and recruitment of female into the Nigerian Defence Academy as regular combatant officers (C:\Users\user\Documents\NIGERIAN ARMY PAPER\Nigeria Inducts First Batch Of Women Into Military Academy - Ventures Africa.mht). Under the new policy, women, like their male counterparts, will also be able to command major units of the army, fly fighter jets in the air force and be "seamen officers who could command a combat sea-going vessel of the Nigerian Navy" (C:\Users\user\Documents\ NIGERIAN ARMY PAPER\Nigerian Army recruits first set of women into regular combatant commission.mht).

According to the Minister of Defence, the Presidential directive was given By Goodluck Jonathan to provide the female officers the same opportunity of rising to the pinnacle of their profession. The directive was "also aimed at providing women career opportunities that would allow them to compete with their male counterparts for the highest offices in the military" (C:\Users\user\Documents\NIGERIAN ARMY PAPER\Nigerian Army recruits first set of women into regular combatant commission.mht).

The changing nature of international relations and conflicts is positively teaming away from strength and physical prowess which had been the exclusive preserve of males. It is for these reasons and many more that NDA took the bold step to include female cadets in combat military training.

Promise and Prospects of Female Combatants in the Nigerian Army

The military, especially the army, which is the largest military arm in the country, was largely regarded as a male turf for a long time, until recently. More young women are now attracted to military life and are enlisting along with men to serve their country. From a mere 39 recruited by the army in 1986, nearly 1,000 females are now recruited yearly out of thousands of applicants (*Tell Magazine*, 2013).

Indeed, Nigerian women have shown great promise and have made wonderful statements in a matured and disciplined institution such as the Nigerian army. According to the Director Army Public relations Gen Attahiru Ibrahim, Nigerian women stated joining the army in the 1960s, immediately after independence, but they were mostly found in the corps such as medical, supplies and transport (see Appendices I and II). Even in these corps, the women had made remarkable contributions in the army which has become a source of pride to the army (*Tell Magazine*, 2013:48).

Some women that had made remarkable contributions in the army include Josephine Okwuekele Tofele who served with Army nursing service which is now known as medical corps holds the record of been the first woman to attain the rank captain in the Nigerian Army before she retired in 1967. Rtd Major General Aderonke Kale who retired in 1997, was the first woman to attain the rank of Two Star General in the West African Sub – region (http://www.abiyamo.com/aderonke-kale-the-first-female-two-star-general-in-the-nigerian-armed-forces/). Also Rear Admiral Itunu Honotu who was decorated by President Goodluck Jonathan in 2012 with the rank of Two Star General is the Managing Director of the Nigerian Navy Post Service Housing Scheme (http://www.nairaland.com/1295197/itunu-hotonu-first-female-rear-admiral). These women got their ranks and achievements through hard work, diligence and intelligence. They were not promoted on the basis of gender or through patronage network but on merit.

According to Gen. Attahiru Ibrahim the total number of officers in the army is 130,000 and women constitute a significant number which he did not disclose citing national security as the reason (*Tell*, 2013:48). The combatant corps is one area that did not include women much earlier, but due to the diversification going on in the army, women are now included in training for combat duties. Trained and disciplined military women are hardly differentiated in terms of appearance from the men, they are physically strong and athletic, very fit looking and mentally alert like their male counterparts and they handle rifles professionally. Augustina Madambo, a female combatant soldier who enlisted in the army in 1986, said, "in the army there is no female every one is a soldier because everyone is giving the same training under same condition not withstanding whether you are male or female" (*Tell Magazine*, 2013: 45).

Female military officers in Nigeria have shown great prospects which if properly harnessed and encouraged would go a long way to make our military greater and bigger. Nigerian female soldiers are record breakers in the sub region and by extension in Africa, women officers such as Josephine Tofele, Aderonke Kale, Itunu Honotu etc are remarkable officers. This explains why Mr. President, Goodluck Jonathan asked during the decoration of Itunu Honotu to the rank of Rear-Admiral "So when will I see Nigerian women flying jets." This statement by Mr. President found fulfillment in Blessing Liman of the Nigerian Air Force who is the first Female in Nigeria to fly a fighter Jet (*Tell Magazine*, 2013:50). Liman remarked, "As a first female pilot I would want to make a mark that would encourage other females to join the military because I believe that all females have equal opportunity to exercise their rights in whatever they choose to do, I believe that all female Nigerians who choose to become pilots can do it since I have done it" (C:\Users\user\Documents\NIGERIAN ARMY PAPER\BLESSING LIMAN, Nigerias First Female Military Pilot - nigeriafilms_com.mht).

For about five decades after independence women were not allowed to enlist in the combatant corps in spite of the fact that they all underwent the same rigorous military training. Whether it is climbing obstacles with backpacks, running a stretch or handling rifles during combat, there are no waivers for females – everyone got the same combat training. "When you're recruited as a soldier, you are trained together. Nobody cares whether you're female or male; you're just a soldier and you are expected to perform same way," explained Agha Okoro. an army lieutenant, and one of the few women in the officer cadre. (*Tell Magazine*, 2013) The recruitment of women at the NDA to train as regular combatant officers is a clear indication that the era of limitation for women in the military is over.

Female soldiers are serving the armies of their countries in a variety of ways, including going on domestic and international operations and

assisting their male counterparts at the frontlines during combats. Domestically, apart from working in the offices in various divisions and garrison commands in the country, female soldiers are also increasingly becoming part of domestic operations. In almost all states in the North where the Joint Military Task Force is fighting *Boko Haram* insurgents, female soldiers are noticeable in patrol vehicles and among gun-wielding, fully-armed male soldiers manning checkpoints in search of insurgents (*Tell Magazine*, 2013).

Some female soldiers like Gift Nwaobilor and Liman have scored firsts in their careers in the military. Nwaobilor became the first female tank crewman in the Nigerian Army in 2009 at the age of 22 years. She was the only female among the 59 soldiers that attended the basic crewman course for professional crewman in the Armoured Corps. On her own part, Liman, is not only the first female combatant pilot in the NAF, she is also the first in the entire West Africa. She achieved this feat at age 29 on April 27, 2012 after 12 months intensive flight training in various countries including the United States, Greece, Belarus, United Kingdom, Pakistan and Egypt. Before then, she was one of the 126 others who completed the Direct Short Service Course 2010/2011 cadets of the 325 Ground Training Group at the NAF Base, Kaduna.

Attahiru, observed that there is no discrimination of any type in the Army; "Every female soldier or officer can aspire to any position once she has the requisite qualifications and she has attended requisite courses in terms of professional military education", and insisted that.

> women have gotten to the warrant officer cadre, but they might not have the opportunity to be army warrant officers because even among warrant officers, there are still categories. If a woman has the qualification and all it takes to be army warrant officer, why not? The army does not discriminate because of gender. Our army is an equal opportunity army, and it does not in any way restrict those in service" (*Tell Magazine*, 2013).

The bottom line as observed by Augustina Madambo is that the 35 per cent quota the federal government is giving to women in appointive positions should be extended to the military. Applying this quota will encourage the women in the army. Some of those appointed as staff officers, military observers and attaches should be females. No woman has been appointed to those positions since inception of the army. Even at the Army Headquarters, where there are chief clerks, none of them is female. And it is not because women are not capable of holding the positions but discrimination on the basis of gender (*Tell Magazine*, 2013).

Challenges to the New Security Architecture

Despite the noted achievements on the part of female soldiers, it is apparent why a conservative outfit like the military will cautiously embrace changes that are considered fundamental. Presently, most societies are not ready for the participation of women in combat roles. Even in Israel, the only country where military service is mandatory for females, some combat positions are still closed for women. A number of countries accept females for almost all combat jobs, provided they meet the physical and psychological requirements. Others, like the United States and Britain, admit women to the Air Force and submarines but exclude them from the front lines of ground fighting.

The role of women and limited opportunities available to them in the Armed Forces particularly in several African countries can be largely deduced to the strong patriarchal dominance promoted by traditional, Islamic and Christianity religions in these countries. However, some countries have begun to realize the need for gender inclusiveness in their Armed Forces (Pregulman, 2011).

Some of the obvious difficulties in involving females in combat military training are said to have been: the general reluctance in most Nigerian societies to develop military mindset in females, family disturbances and religious taboos which are more common with the girl child. Although females can be more studious, diligent and better disciplined than their male counterparts; the physiological and hormonal differences between male and female children are said to have been a serious issue in the selection of females for combat military training. Other issues that could arise from the integration of women into fields previously dominated by men include career advancement of female regular officers, professional orientations, career-family trade-offs, buddy relationships in combat and non-combat environment, gender discrimination and role segregation, as well as sexual harassment. Indeed, most Armed Forces do not send females to the front lines because they are unprepared for the killing or mistreatment of women by enemy forces. Some also feel that the presence of women in the infantry and other combat units will affect discipline and unit cohesion and ultimately, operational readiness. There is also the fear of romantic or sexual relationships developing among men and women in the same combat unit (http://sistersinarms.ca/history/women-in-combat-pros-and-cons/).

In order to solve some of these problems, the Nigeria Defence Academy took some proactive steps towards encouraging and sustaining female cadets training in combat. Firstly, the Academy built a dedicated accommodation for female cadets and assembled a sizable trained manpower of female instructors to serve as counsellors and guardians to the female cadets. In order to ensure continuity, the female instructors posted to

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the Academy spend not less than 2 years for their tour of duty. Furthermore, deliberate policies were put in place to regulate physical training/exercises in favour of the female cadets so as to encourage participation and ability to endure the 5 years of military training. In the area of discipline; the relationship between male and female cadets in NDA is based on comradeship. Any act of intimacy or amorous dealing between opposite sexes is viewed seriously and meted with severe sanction (C:\Users\user\Documents\NIGERIAN ARMY PAPER\Nigerian Army recruits first set of women into regular combatant commission.mht).

These efforts reinforce woman's proven abilities and the reality that women have accepted the challenges, responsibilities, and dangers of military service, just as the men have. The official recognition of women in combat roles will strengthen the country both morally and militarily and enable more women to advance their careers to the senior ranks and increase the diversity of our military leadership.

Conclusion

Less than a century ago, it was rare to see women in the military, and yet now women fight in combat, command airstrikes, pilot fighter jets, and oversee medical operations. These women have saved lives in the operating room, rescued fellow service members while under enemy attack, set record times in triathlons and races, and come up with innovative ways to treat blast injuries, proving that women have places next to men on the battlefield.

The role of women in the military has received increasing attention in recent years. Extensive professional literature describes how women have served in all the nation's modern wars. As noted by Martha McSally, "Women are integral members of the armed forces, serving as airmen, soldiers, sailors and Marines," and "are here to stay." A pioneer among US Air Force combat pilots, she observed further that women are serving in real ground combat situations every day, and deserve to be fully integrated as "respected warriors" (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/us/history-of-women-in-combat-still-being-written-slowly.html).

As an emerging nation striving to build a strong military in line with 21st century global developments, the policy shift of the NDA programme to include females training as combatants is in consonance with this direction. Nigeria is being placed in the comity of nations that benefit from the considerable potentials that women offer in the military. Inclusiveness will bring stability, efficiency and strength to the military which is good for the country. Enrolling females in combat duties in the army is a right step in the right direction. It is all about how an environment that includes women. It is how to create an environment that appreciates what women can do uniquely and how women are organized to do these things and ensure that they are

promoted, supported, etc. It has much more to do with taking advantage of women's natural advantages.

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Islam and Traditions in Africa: Friends or Foes?

Jibrail Bin YUSUF

Abstract
        This paper examines the interplay of Islam and traditional African ideas, institutions and cultural practices. It reviews some cultural aspects of Islam and African traditions aiming to find-out how African cultural, i.e. religious, political, social and even linguistic values have either been accommodated by or have accommodated Islam. The framework involves the theories of inculturation, acculturation and enculturation. The method used was a critical analysis of some values of Africans and Muslims. Islam has accommodated and has been accommodated by some African traditions. Although, the two traditions have had some frictions such as the Muslim jihad which took away political power from some of the indigenous people, yet, they have generally coexisted peacefully as some African chiefs either became Muslims or African Muslims have become chiefs and sometimes even made Islam a state religion. The paper, therefore, concludes that Islam and African traditions have been friends and not foes.

Key words and phrases: Islam, Africa, traditions, inculturation, polygamy,
        divination, female circumcision

Introduction
        Islam, both as religion and culture, has had profound impact on many African societies. Like Christianity and Western education, Islam has shaped and, in fact, will continue shaping even the future of such African societies. African historians have tasked themselves to revisiting the impact of Islam, Christianity, and secular or Western education on the African continent.[116] Some of these scholars argue that Islam has tolerated African traditions more than Christianity.[117] However, a critical look at the Islamic tradition shows some, if not most, of its norms being in conflict with African practices. One, therefore, wonders about what really informs this view among some African writers. Using the constructs of inculturation,[118] acculturation[119] and enculturation,[120] this paper, through the method of

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[116] "Religion in Africa", http://eabaka.tripod.com/islam.htm, retrieved on 18/11/12.
[117] J.S. Trimingham, *Islam in West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976). See also: M. Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa* (New York and London: Longman, 1984), pp.1–23, passim.
[118] This is the process of adapting particular cultural values to another cultural background.
[119] This is the process of assimilating or absorbing the cultural values of a different group.

critical analysis, scrutinizes and attempts to understand the interplay between Islam, on the one hand, and indigenous African ideas, institutions and cultural practices on the other. It samples and teases-out some of the cultural aspects of Islam and some African traditions to find out how African cultural, i.e. religious, political, social and even linguistic values have either been accommodated by or have accommodated Islam. Islam is perceived to have coexisted with some African cultures or traditions for ages. While, in some continents, the Islamic presence has caused some discomfort and even 'clash of civilizations', the Islamic presence in Africa, especially, in its encounter with some African traditions and cultures, has been relatively calm. Have those African traditions found a friend or a foe in Islam? What has been the nature of relationship between Islam and the traditions of the African? In finding answers to these questions, this paper reviews the cultural romance between Islam and some African traditions. How did Africa come into contact with Islam?

Islam, Its Beginning, and the African Factor

Islam started after the religious experience of Muhammad with the Ultimate Reality, Allah, the experience Rudolph Otto would describe as *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*,[121] in his encounter with Angel Jibril in the cave of Hira.[122] This is reported to have happened in one of the odd nights of the last ten days of the month of Ramadhan in 610 CE. After this, Muhammad (hereafter, the Prophet) was commissioned as the universal prophet of humankind.[123] After narrating his experience back home in the house of his beloved wife, Khadijah, his initial converts were his household.[124] Later on, his friend, Abu Bakr joined him. As it often happens in history, no prophet is initially accepted in his own hometown. Therefore, when Muhammad started his prophetic preaching, his constant criticisms of the existing cultural, political, social, and economic order created what Leon Fetsinger would call "cognitive dissonance"[125] for the traditional Arabs of Makkah. This resulted in the painful persecution of his followers.

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[120] It is the process in which one gradually accepts the practices or values of another person's culture.

[121] R. Otto, "On Numinous Experience as *Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinas*", in L. Teugels and R. Ulmer, *Experience of the sacred: Readings in the phenomenology of religion* (Hanover, NH: New England University Press, 1992), pp. 77–85.

[122] J. Subhani, *The Message* (Tehran: Foreign Department of Be'that Foundation, 1984), p. 176.

[123] Qur'an 21:107, 7:158, and 34:28.

[124] Subhani, *The Message*, pp. 176 and 190.

[125] L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 9. Cognitive dissonance, according to Festinger, is an "antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented [behaviour] toward

This led to the first migration of the Muslims to Abyssinia in Ethiopia in 615 C.E.[126] for protection from the Negus (King of Abyssinia). It is reported that the king risked the chances of international diplomatic friction with the Makkan overlords, the Quraysh, and the possibility of foreign attack and welcomed the Muslim fugitives to his land.[127] It is also reported that when Negus died, *Janazah* (an Islamic funeral prayer) was organized by the Prophet in Madinah in absentia for him.[128] This presupposes that Negus converted to Islam. If this is correct, then it is possible that he gathered a following "that more than likely" propagated Islam in Eritrea and north-western Somalia.[129] This then makes Africa the first continent and, undoubtedly, the first land to have received Islam and Muslims without misgivings, although, as a matter of fact, this event was a flight for self-protection from religious persecution. According to Miran,

> Following their persecution by the Meccan Qurayyshi [conventionally spelt 'Qurayshi'] nobility, the Prophet Muhammad's *sahaba* (companions) crossed the Red Sea, landed on the Eritrean coast, and sought refuge in al-Habasha (Abyssinia) in 615 A.D.[130]

However, in 639 C.E, during the reign of the second Caliph,[131] a Muslim army invaded Egypt and two generations later, Islam spread across North Africa and the Maghreb.[132] Below the Sahelian belt, Islam was introduced between the 12th and the 15th centuries. During the 18th and the 19th centuries, the establishment of trade networks by Muslims connected by

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dissonance reduction" (p.3). This happens when feelings and facts are in conflict so that people find ways to reconcile them. This could result in an attack on the source of the conflict or dissonance. See also R.D. Graham, "Theory of Cognitive Dissonance as It Pertains to Morality", *Journal of Scientific Psychology* (2007), p. 20.

[126] W.M. Watt, *Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman* (London: O.U.P., 1969), p. 66.
[127] M.H. Haykal, *The Life of Muhammad* (USA: American Trust Pubs., 1976); Subhani, *The Message*, pp. 176 and 190; Watt, *Ibid*; P.K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present*, 10th Ed. (London and Bassingstoke: Macmillan), p. 106.
[128] Z. Awaleh, "The History of Islam in Africa: A Historical Overview" (2005), http: //www.islamawareness.net/Africa/afri_article001.html, retrieved on 20/11/2012.
[129] *Ibid*.
[130] J. Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea", *Die Welt des Islam*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2005), p. 180.
[131] Umar b. Al-Khattab.
[132] H.D. Hasan, "Islam in Africa", CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report for Congress, Library of Congress (2008), p. 2.

lineage, trade, and Sufi brotherhoods had reached West Africa making Muslims wield a high political influence. In Central Africa, Islam had been introduced by the 15th century. In East Africa, Islam had entered the hinterland by the 19th century. The spread of Islam led to the establishment of new societies and a reconfiguration of existing communities and empires based on Islamic values.[133] The introduction of Islam to the various parts of Africa is demonstrated in the figure below.

Spread of Islam Into Africa:7th-19th C.

Figure 1: The direction of the spread of Islam in Africa.

Source: Adapted from a document: "Islamization of Africa", http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/amcdouga/Hist347/autumn%202012/lectures/sept_26_rev.pdf, retrieved on 21/01/12.

Many scholars opine that the spread of Islam in Africa was basically through trade and not organized military warfare. In 641 C.E, it is reported that about three hundred clerics were dispatched into the heart of Africa, Eritrea, under the command of one Al-Kuma b. Mujazzar to engage in a

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[133] *Ibid.*

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missionary work in central Africa; although, the influence of Islam in this place was probably felt after 661 C.E when the Umayyad occupied the Dahlak islands off the Masawwa coast.[134]

Hence, Africa was one of the lands to which peaceful attempt was made to introduce Islam through, perhaps, formal *da'wah*.[135] Again, it was one of the lands that accepted Islam without misgivings. Hence, it is a no mean fact that Africa stands tall as the only continent with a majority Muslim population.[136] As at 2011, the percentage of Muslims in Africa was 52.39%, that of Asia, the continental home of Islam, was 32%, North and South America was 1.06%, Europe was 7.6% while Oceania (including Australia) was 1.5%.[137] Even more remarkable and fascinating is the fact that Africa produced Islam's first caller to prayers (*muazzin*), Bilal ibn Rabah,[138] a freed Abyssinian or Ethiopian slave of Umayyah Ibn Khalf.[139] All the more so intriguing is the fact that Africa was the birthplace of the greatest historian of Islam's memory, Ibn Khaldun (a Tunisian), and also the birthplace of Islam's most known traveler, Ibn Batuta (a Moroccan).[140] Africa was the home of the Almoravids (*Al-murabitun*), one of Islam's few mass movements in the world. It, again, supplied the human resource for injecting Muslim political and military power into southwestern Europe.[141] Also

> It bankrolled the Muslim world with treasures of gold in its historic struggles with the Crusaders and the Mongols and enriched Europe and Asia alike with its human energy and its rich heritage of music, art, culture and history.[142]

What relationship existed between Africa and south-western Asia, the geographical birthplace of Islam? What is the geographical limit of the Africa referred to in this paper?

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[134] Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea".

[135] Islamic Religious Propagation or 'Evangelism'.

[136] N. Ahmed, "Islam in Africa", in *History of Islam: An Encyclopedia of Islamic History*, http://historyofislam.com/contents/the-classical-period/islam-in-africa/, retrieved on 24/11/12.

[137] *Ibid.*

[138] P.B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century* (London: Edward Arnold, 1982), p. 40; Hitti, *History of the Arab*, pp.106 and 259.

[139] N. Ibrahim, A. 'Abdul Maajid and E. Darbaalah, trans. by A. Ibrahim and A. Ben Razzaq, *In pursuit of Allah's Pleasure* (London: Al-Firdous, 1997), p. 21.

[140] Ahmed, "Islam in Africa".

[141] *Ibid.*

[142] *Ibid.*

Conceptualizing Africa

The origin of the word *Africa* is controversial. At least seven origins have been suggested.[143] One hypothesis opines that the word is a Roman name for what the Greeks referred to as "Libya" (which is itself probably a Latin name for the Berber tribe known as Aourigha (possibly intoned as "Afarika"). Another says, it is derived from a Phoenician root, *pharika* that either refers to a land of corn or of fruit like it. The third hypothesis traces it from a Phoenician root, *faraqa*, which refers to "separation" or "diaspora"; a similar root is apparently found in some African languages including Bambara. Another root is deciphered from a Latin adjective, *aprica* (sunny) and the Greek, *aprikē* (free from cold), while the Sanskrit and Hindi root, *Apara* is argued to connote what, in geographical terms, comes "after", to the west, in which case, Africa is judged as a western continent. A sixth hypothesis attributes it to the name of a Yamani king, Africus, who invaded what is North Africa today in the second millennium B.C.E. and founded a town called Afrikiyah. A less convincing one also traces the name to Afer, a grandson of Abraham and a companion of Hercules.[144]

It is obvious that while a few of the hypotheses appear convincing, there is very little or, perhaps, no agreement on the original meaning of the word *Africa*. Its earliest geographical limit is even fraught with more complexities. However, it appears the term *Africa* was used widely from Roman times to refer initially to North Africa, originally called by the Greek or Egyptian word *Libya*, before it was extended to the whole continent from the end of the first century of the Common Era.[145] Hence,

> The Arabic term *Ifriqiya* most probably represents a transliteration [corruption] of the word *Africa*. In this sense, then, Africa was a European construct – as much as Europe itself was a construct inflicted by the idea of Africa (and Asia) – whose cartographic application was both gradual and contradictory in that as the name embraced the rest of the continent it increasingly came to be divorced from its original North African coding and became increasingly confined to the regions referred to in Eurocentric and sometimes Afrocentric conceptual mapping as 'sub-Saharan Africa,' seen as the pristine locus of the 'real' Africa or what the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) called 'Africa proper.'[146]

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[143] "Idea of Africa – Origins of the Name Africa", http://science.jrank.org/pages/8198/Africa-Idea-Origins-Name-Africa.html, retrieved on 15/01/13.

[144] *Ibid.*

[145] *Ibid.*

[146] *Ibid.*

According to Hiskett, *Ifriqiya* was the Arab name for part of what is now Tunisia.[147] However, what is now Sahel (an Arabic word meaning "fringe" or a "shore" of desert) was used by the Arabs for the narrow semi-arid land stretching about 5000 km across northern Africa from the Atlantic Ocean slightly eastward to the Red Sea Coast. It includes much of present-day Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chard, the Sudan and the northern fringes of Nigeria and Burkina Faso.[148] Today, Africa consists of more than fifty countries with a population of more than 600, 000,000 and close to 800 languages. Two main races inhabited early Africa. They were the Berbers of the Mediterranean coastlands and the Negroes of equatorial Africa. The Berbers were of Hamitic stock while the Negroes included the small statured pigmies whose descendants now inhabit the forests of Central Africa. A small number of a third race, the Bushmen, survived and they now inhabit the Kalahari Desert in the south. A mixture of the Berbers and the Negroes inhabited the Sahara, the fertile grassland lying between equatorial Africa and the northern coastlands.[149] The setting or landsite of a continent is the position of the natural environment that becomes the background for human activity and, therefore, it has more than simply scientific significance but as well even religious and political or cultural significance. How does religion manifest itself in African societies?

Religion and the African Society

Africans are very religious people. The dominant religions include the Traditional African Religion,[150] Christianity and Islam.

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[147] Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, p. 3.

[148] S.E. Nicholson, "Sahel, West Africa", *Encyclopaedia of Environmental Biology*, Vol. 3, Academy Press, p. 261, http://dweb.met.fsu.edupeoplenicholsonpaperssahel 95.pdf. 01/02/2013, retrieved on 01/02/13.

[149] "A Short History of Africa", http://aero-comlab.stanford.edu/jameson/world_ history/A_Short_History_of_ Africa.pdf., p. 3, retrieved on 21/01/13.

[150] This is the indigenous religion of the African which is perceived to have no known founder. It involves pacification of departed ancestors or heroes, and other supernatural entities.

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	Indigenous	Muslim	Christian	Other	Total
Eastern Africa	52,114,073	59,091,873	135,194,880	6,058,251	252,459,077
Middle Africa	21,001,056	13,528,373	61,821,241	437,688	96,788,358
Northern Africa	9,020,093	167,131,245	6,410,368	632,920	183,194,626
Southern Africa	14,089,672	871,722	34,202,095	1,087,807	50,251,296
Western Africa	41,617,613	130,835,929	66,685,296	1,601,876	240,740,714
Total	137,842,507	371,459,142	304,313,880	9,818,542	823,434,071
Percentage	16.7%	45.1%	36.9%	1.2%	99.9%

Figure 2. Religious statistics of Africa.

Source: Adapted from A.J. Kaba, "Spread of Christianity and Islam in Africa: A Survey and Analysis of the Numbers and Percentages of Christians, Muslims, and Those Who Practice Indigenous Religions", *Western Journal of Black Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 561.

Mbiti and Parrinder were, therefore, aptly right when they concurred that Africans are "incurably and notoriously religious."[151] The significance of this is seen in the way some Africans readily embraced Islam. There was a fervent religious consciousness and hence, to some, Islam was a welcome addition to what they already had. In some African countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, both Christians and Muslims express some support for democracy and advocate religious freedom. In spite of this, however, both religious traditions would strongly back a government based on the Bible or *Shari'ah*.[152] Indeed, the craving for the operation of *Shari'ah* in Nigeria has caused many interreligious fracases between the popularly Muslim north and the popularly Christian south. The President of Malawi once referred to his country as a 'Christian Country' and many Ghanaians have gone close to

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[151] J.S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989), p. 1; E.G. Parrinder, *African Traditional Religion* (London: Clowes & Sons, 1962), p. 9.
[152] M.E. Iheanyi, *A Dangerous Awakening: The Politicization of Religion in Nigeria* (Ibadan: IRFA, 1995), p. 13; F.N. Mvumbi, "Preaching with Islam in Mind, Thomas Aquinas: A model", *Peaching in Contemporary Nigeria*, No. 1 (2003), pp. 145–154.

referring to Ghana in a similar manner, while Joseph Kone of Uganda is still fighting to install a government premised on the Bible.

Islam's Relationship with Africa

Muslims have established diverse communities in Africa where they were welcome by rulers who were appreciative of their multiculturalism and pluralistic religious ideologies, trading expertise and Arabic literacy. A mention could be made of the Ancient Sudanese empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai. Many of the 14th to 16th century empires in the Western Sudan, including Mali and Songhai, had Muslim rulers who made pilgrimage to Makkah and came back to promote the religious and cultural influence of Islam in their respective empires.

Islam is perceived to cohabit well with some African traditional lifestyles and beliefs. Indeed, in some instances there has even been such a deep mix that one at times finds it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the Islamic religious prerogative and what is traditional to the people of Africa. In some African societies, Islam has little-by-little substituted itself for the culture of the people, with little or no disagreements. In spite of this, it must be noted that Islam was not massively adopted by all societies it found itself in on the African soil. In the ancient empires of Mali, Songhai and Ghana, for example, Islam continued to be a religion professed mostly by the ruling classes and urban dwellers.[153] In sub-Saharan Africa, Islam became popular among itinerant traders. Many people who converted in the outskirts still engaged in their indigenous practices. Where it became a dominant religion, it was preceded in some cases by a period of peaceful co-existence between Islam and the indigenous culture. This made it possible for the inter-mingling of the two cultures with virtually no difficulty.

A major factor responsible for the tolerance between some African traditions and the people, on one hand, and Islam was the attempt by Muslims to adapt some Islamic values or norms to environmental circumstances in some African communities and not necessarily because the practices of those Africans and Islam were similar, although, one could strongly argue for both being 'equal' factors, because for some black Africans, there was very little difference. Informed by the statements of Mbiti and Parrinder, one could argue that the religious consciousness in the Africans made some of them see Islam as a welcome presence. Further, the Islamic principle of '*Urf* (custom or tradition) made it easy for Muslims to see a lot of good in some African Customs. Hence, those Africans did not see themselves as committing 'a religious suicide' as compared to their initial views on Christianity. Islam, therefore, could be said to have tolerated

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[153] Clarke, *West Africa and Islam.*

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some African traditions more than Christianity. Therefore, although, Islam and such African traditions were not the same, in actual fact, some of the practices of the African and Islam were comparable, therefore, in many cases adaptation or indigenization of some Islamic cultural values did not pose much problem.

Inculturation: An Assessment of the Case of Islam and the Indigenous Africans

According to Pruitt, a number of concepts including indigenization, contextualization, and inculturation have been used to expound the process of movement of religious teachings across cultures.[154] Others include acculturation and enculturation. However, in his opinion, indigenization and contextualization are the methodological aspects of the adaptation of Christianity to new cultures but "inculturation, more adequately describes the ongoing interaction, or synthesis, between that faith and culture",[155] "Inculturation" as a term actually originated from the Catholic Church. According to Gerald Arbuckle, catholic theologians were disgruntled about the prevailing term, "contextualization", which denoted the attempt to relate the gospel to culture. The feeling was that "contextualization emphasized external connection between the gospel and the local culture. This is termed "acculturation" by Aylward Shorter.[156] However, acculturation is a necessary condition for inculturation because it defines an encounter between one culture and another, yet, it does not describe "the ongoing process of reciprocal and critical interaction and assimilation between them."[157] In other words, inculturation can be a good theory for explaining the two-fold process of Islam influencing some indigenous cultures while it also undergoes a certain indigenous transformation. Starkloff drew attention to this two-way process of inculturation.[158]

However, according to Andrew Byrne, the term inculturation first appeared in print after 1962 in the writings of Roest Crollius and J.S Masson

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[154] R.A. Pruitt, "The Inculturation of the Christian Gospel: Theory and Theology with Special Reference to the Igbo of Southern Nigeria", An M.A. thesis presented to the Graduate School, University of Missouri-Columbia (2007), p. 19.

[155] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[156] A. Shorter, *Toward a Theology of Inculturation* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Pubs, 1999), pp. 6–7.

[157] G. Arbuckle, "Inculturation and Evangelization: Realism Romanticism", *Missionaries Anthropologists and Cultural Change* (Williamsburgh, VA: College of William and Mary, 1984), pp. 171–214.

[158] C.F. Starkloff, "Inculturation and Cultural Systems (Part 1)", *Theological Studies,* Vol. 55, No. 1 (1994), pp. 66–69.

and that, after 1977, different concepts like acculturation and enculturation began to jostle for space.[159] Enculturation is

> The process where the culture that is currently established teaches an individual the accepted norms and values of the culture or society in which the individual lives .... Enculturation helps mould a person into an acceptable member of society.[160]

In the opinion of Washburn, enculturation modifies "cognitive associations" and some of these "modifications" take place outside individual thoughtful notice.[161] Some African Muslim families comprise units with numerous migration histories. In some African communities, some Muslim families were formed out of migration, including migrants whose ancestors entered Africa from Arabia after the 7th century. In northern Ghana, the people of Dagbon and Larabanga traditionally trace their ancestry to Arabs.[162] Similar is said of the Yoruba (Ya-Arab) of Nigeria, with others in Sudan, Mali, Cameroun, Libya and many others. There are many other families whose ancestors were converted by the activities of Muslim clerics and traders. It is an established fact that while professing Islam, many African Muslims still retain their African identity, culture and tradition. Hiskett puts it more succinctly in his observation about the Gonja people of northern Ghana:

> Gonja society then developed into the following classes. First, were the *gbanya*, ... They had become Muslims through their association with the Dyula Muslims .... They still continued to take part in the traditional Earth cult and consulted Earth priests as well as their advisors. ... The subjects of the *gbanya* were the *nyamase*, the commoners. They remained largely untouched by Islam, except that they took part in certain festivals that mixed Islam with the customs of the Earth cult. ... Islam in Gonja was, and still is, characterized by extensive mixing. A typical example is the *Damba*, a traditional festival that now takes place each year at the time of the *Maulud*, the Prophet's birthday. So much of the old Earth cult survives in it that it bears little semblance to the *Maulud* as this is celebrated in Sunni

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[159] A. Byrne, "Some ins and outs of inculturation", *Annals Theologici*, Vol. 4 (1990), p. 113.

[160] C.P. Kottak, *Window on Humanity: A Concise Introduction to Anthropology* (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2007), as quoted by D. Washburn, "Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle", *Contemporary Issues*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2008), p. 50.

[161] *Ibid.*

[162] Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, pp. 120–121, passim.

Islamic communities. Mixing also shows itself in the use of Islamic objects, especially those bearing Arabic writing, as medicine shrines. Chiefs habitually refer both to shrine priests and Muslim *imams*, requiring the traditional ritual from the former and Muslim prayers from the latter. These practices have always been regarded with tolerance by the *sakpare* and the *dogtes*.[163]

Contrary to this, however, in Hausaland, there had often been much zeal to reform Islam, and the entire *Jihad* of Shehu Uthman Dan Fodio of the Sokoto *Khilafah* was for the purpose of restoring Islam to its puritan state.[164] The fact is that the Africa Muslim culture constitutes a wide range of diversity to the extent of their acculturation into the customs of the dominant Islamic culture while, in some cases, retaining the norms of the African culture and tradition.[165] To understand this system of diversity among Islam and some African traditions or the extent of coexistence, the theories of acculturation, inculturation or enculturation will be used.

Acculturation as a term or theory was first defined by Redfield et-al as "… phenomena which result when groups of individuals sharing different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in original culture patterns of either or both groups."[166] In 1967, Graves used the term "psychological acculturation" to describe the effects of acculturation at the individual level.[167] According to Kim and Abreu, this process involves the transformation that individuals go through in terms of their attitudes, values and identity subsequent to their contact with other

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[163] Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, pp. 120–121. The *Sakpare* were a category of literate Muslims who primarily served as *Imams* and advisers to Gonja kings. They were a subdivision of the scholarly class known as *Karamos* who occupied a position between the *Gbanya*, the ruling class and the *Nyamase*, the subjects. The *sakpare* were believed to be the off-spring of Muhammad al-Abyad, the celebrated Muslim advisor of the Gonja war-hero, Jakpa (p. 120). The *Dogtes*, on the other hand were said to have come from the lineage of the invaders, the followers of Sumaila Ndwura Jakpa. They also sometimes acted as *Imams* (p. 121).
[164] Clarke, *West Africa and Islam*, pp. 113–114. See the Manifesto of the Jihad.
[165] F.N. Mvumbi, "Islam in Africa Today", A seminar paper delivered at 6th meeting of African-German Catholic Bishops, Volta Hotel, Akosombo October 10-16, 2004.
[166] R. Redfield, R. Linton, & M.J. Herskovits, "Memorandum on the Study of Acculturation", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56 (1936), p. 149; see also page 156 of B.S.K. Kim & J.M. Abreu, "Acculturation and Enculturation", in F.T.L Leong, et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Asian American Psychology*, 2nd Ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), pp. 141–158.
[167] T.D. Graves, "Psychological Acculturation in a Tri-ethnic Community", *Southwestern J. Anthropology*, Vol. 23 (1967), as cited by Kim & Abreu, "Acculturation and Enculturation".

cultures.[168] On the other hand, Hersokovits defined "enculturation" as "…
the process of socialization into the maintenance of the norms of one's
indigenous culture, including its salient ideas, concepts, and values."[169] Kim
and Abreu indicate that this process of "cultural maintenance" referred to in
the definition can be better represented with enculturation.[170] This
characterization of cultural maintenance accurately describes the cultural
experiences of Africans who were socialized in their indigenous cultural
norms or customs before conversion to Islam. However, some Africans born
as Muslims nonetheless may not necessarily have been brought up in an
'Islamic Culture' as such but 'African Traditional Society', and the
influence of the latter cannot be underestimated, therefore, the construct of
enculturation is more accurate for this group because they may not have had
any cultural assimilation in the true African context.[171]

Sometimes, there is a fusion between certain aspects of indigenous
and Muslim cultural life in Africa. For instance, in northern Ghana, some
traditional festivals are celebrated alongside Islamic ones while others that
go separately are celebrated by both. They include the following:

Id-ul-fitr: This festival is celebrated by all Muslims worldwide on the 1st of
Sha'wwal every lunar year to mark the end of the Ramadhan fast. It is
celebrated by the Muslims in virtually all traditional areas in northern
Ghana. Both the Muslims and the indigenous believers celebrate it together.
However, the traditional people of northern Ghana mark it as the 1st day of
the lunar month of *Konyurichugu*.[172]

Id-ul-adha: This festival commemorates the unsuccessful attempt by
prophet Ibrahim to sacrifice his son Ismail. It is also marked worldwide by
all Muslims on the 10th of *Dhul Hijjah* of the Arabic lunar year. Both
Muslims and traditional people of the Northern region celebrate it. In
northern Ghana, the traditional people mark it as the 10th of *Chimsi*, a
traditional lunar month.[173]

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[168] Kim & Abreu, "Acculturation and Enculturation", p. 146.

[169] *Ibid.*, pp. 141–158.

[170] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[171] B.S.K. Kim, A.J. Ahn, and N.A. Lam, "Theories and Research on Acculturation
and Enculturation Experiences among Asian American Families", In N.H. Trinh et
al. (eds.), *Handbook of Mental Health Acculturation in Asian American Families,
Current Clinical Psychiatry* (New York: Humana Press, 2009).

[172] This corresponds to March each year. The ethnic groups include the Dagbani, the
Gonja, the Mamprusi and the Nanumba, etc.

[173] See: M.E.K. Dakubu, "Personal Names of the Dagomba", *Research Review
(New Series)*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2000), p. 57.

Damba: This festival coincides with the birth of Prophet Mohammed. It is celebrated by some Muslims and is known as *maulud-un-nabi.* In Wa, for example, this festival has assumed a traditional significance and is characterized by a ritual in which the Wa Na (the paramount chief of Wa) prolongs his life by successfully jumping over a cow. It is a two-day festival that is full of pageantry, showmanship and horse riding. Muslims and the traditional people in Tamale/Yendi, the towns of Dagbon, Gonja, Mamprusi and the Nanumba celebrate it together every year.

Paare Gbiele: This is a festival celebrated by the people of Tumu in the Upper West region of Ghana. It is associated with the first nine days immediately following the holy month of Ramadhan every year. It is done to celebrate a bumper harvest and both Muslims and the indigenous traditional people partake in its celebration.

Bugum: This is also held by many ethnic groups in Northern Ghana. Most Muslims and Non-Muslims take part in its celebration. It was observed by the Muslims to mark the landing of Prophet Noah's (Nuhu) Ark after the flood but it has assumed traditional significance. Now, it is a fire (*Bugum*) festival and it is celebrated at night with bundles of grass used as torches. Another practice that both African traditions and Islam find friends in each other is polygamy.[174]

Polygamy:

Some African traditional people and Muslims do not only practice polygamy, but also both cultures frown on polyandry.[175] However, Muslims are restricted in terms of number which is a maximum of four.[176] Interestingly, even though, Africans are not restricted in terms of the number of women they can take as wives, men marrying two wives are more common in many African polygamous marriages.[177] In this case, therefore, if an African polygamous man became a Muslim he could still keep his wives without any religious inhibitions (provided they are not more than four which is uncommon). The competing Christian alternative would demand an unconditional adherence to monogamy, which more often than not, was inconvenient to some Africans. According to Fenske, in the cluster of countries stretching from Senegal to Tanzania which he refers to as the

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[174] However, there is an exception here; polygamy refers to the plurality of husbands (polyandry) or wives (polygyny), but in the case of Muslims and most African 'traditional' people, it refers strictly to multiple-wife marriage.
[175] This is multiple husband marriage.
[176] Qur'an 4:3.
[177] J.E. Brown, "Polygyny in and Family Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Studies in Family Planning,* Vol. 12, No. 8 and 9 (1981), pp. 322–326.

"polygamy belt", more than a third of women are contending with polygamy.[178] Tertilt asserts that several countries in Africa have more than 10% of women being in polygamous homes.[179] In this case, such Africans would see Islam as a friend to their tradition. Islam, therefore, became an alternative for some Africans in some cases.

In addition, the functional Islamic female experience is similar to that of the African people. Men dominate the African socio-economic and political machinery and organizations and are regarded as natural leaders, who are superior and born to rule over women. Muslims have a similar belief. In the Qur'an, Allah says:

> Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore, the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have let them guard.[180]

Furthermore, early marriage is also approved by both traditions. This early marriage has created some misconceptions due to the problem of application. In some African societies and Islam, girls are deemed to mature earlier for sexual intercourse than boys. The dominant cultural view is that since, realistically, girls are more vulnerable in their sexual manoeuvrings, to avoid the possibility of men taking advantage of them, they must marry as soon as they mature for sexual intercourse. This thought was favoured in the pre-secular education period of these societies. Today, secular education, "enlightenment", and the problem of women's socio-economic security have affected female sexual orientations. Sadly, however, this orientation has not blocked women's vulnerability in sexual matters in the African society.

The Islamic view, therefore, is that men and women should marry early when they have the craving for sexual intercourse, otherwise, they should fast. This is because fornication/adultery (*Zina*) has undesirable consequences for the individual, his family, and the society as a whole. In the Qur'an Allah says:

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[178] J. Fenske, "African Polygamy: Past and Present", Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) Working Paper, WPS/2012-20 (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2012), p. 1. Also citing H. Jacoby, "The Economics of Polygyny in Sub-Saharan Africa: Female Productivity and the Demand for Wives in C*ote d'Ivoire", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 103, No. 5 (1995), pp. 938–971.

[179] M. Tertilt, "Polygyny, Fertility, and Savings", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 113, No. 6 (2005), pp. 1341–1375.

[180] Qur'an 4:34.

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Nor come nigh adultery [*wa laa taqrabu-z-zina*[181]]: for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road (to other evils).[182] The adulterer cannot have sexual relations [i.e. marry] with any but an adulteress or an idolatress, and the adulteress, none can have sexual relations [marry] with her but an adulterer or idolater; to the believers such a thing is forbidden.[183]

Since women are more prone to early sexual exploitations than men, it is quite logical that women would marry earlier than men. For this reason, the Prophet emphasized that women should be married while they are virgins. This demand is not different for the men. However, some Muslim parents, in an attempt to dodge the responsibility of caring for their female children, marry them off under the pretence of fulfilling a religious obligation. This situation is no different among some indigenous Africans. Nonetheless, motivations may be different. Although, for the traditional African also, morality is a core issue, many parents are concerned with seeing their grandchildren early. Hence, sometimes the motivation is not merely to avoid the responsibility of caring for them.

Evil Spirits and Witchcraft

Another important belief among both Muslims and some of the African indigenous people is the belief in evil machinations from envious clan members and demons or the *jinn*. When the traditional African falls sick it is sometimes attributed to the nocturnal activities of envious clans men and women. There is also a category of living creatures of beastly nature known as demons or *jinn*. The Akan people of Ghana call these spirits, *Abosom* (Yoruba: *Alujonnu* and Swahili: *Majini*, etc). These dwell in the invisible world. Both the African indigenous people and Muslims believe in the existence of these spirits. Again, both Muslims and the African indigenous adherents believe that some of these spirits are kind while others are evil or unkind. The African world view is that the insufficiency of humanity is such that humankind needs protection from all corners. For this reason, some traditional Africans constantly establish a good relationship with these spirits to avert their evil machinations. Below is the result of a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre (a worldwide public-opinion surveys and reports centre) on Religion and Public Life in some African countries.

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[181] The word *Zina* is used in the Qur'an to refer to both adultery and fornication. Although conceptually, it refers to an unlawful act of sexual intercourse, if it involves a married person, it is known as 'adultery' but if it involves an unmarried person, then it is known as 'fornication.'

[182] Qur'an 17:32.

[183] Qur'an 24: 3.

Belief in the Protective Power of Sacrifices
to Spirits or Ancestors

*% who believe sacrifices to spirits or ancestors can
protect them from bad things happening*

Median results:

All countries	27
Christians	25
Muslims	30

Among general population in...

Tanzania	60
Mali	59
Senegal	58
South Africa	56
Cameroon	42
Guinea Bissau	41
Chad	41
Botswana	39
Liberia	31
Mozambique	27
Uganda	27
Ghana	26
Djibouti	22
DR Congo	21
Kenya	16
Ethiopia	11
Nigeria	11
Zambia	11
Rwanda	5

0   20   40   60   80   100

*Q51I. Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? That sacrifices to
spirits or ancestors can protect you from bad things happening.*

Figure 3. A Survey of Muslims and Christians who believe in the protective
power of sacrifice to spirits.

Source: Adapted from a document by the Pew Research Centre, http://www
.pewforum.org/executive-summary-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-
africa.aspx, retrieved on 10/02/13.

Many Muslims and Christians in Africa incorporate African
traditional religious or cultural elements into their daily lives. In the above
table, more than half of the people in the survey involving South Africa,
Senegal, Mali, and Tanzania believe that sacrifice to ancestors and spirits

could protect them from harm. This is confirmed among the Swahili Muslims in Mombasa:

> The religious life of the Swahili Muslims was blended with Islam.... For example, veneration of ancestors continued and also added Islamic saints. Swahili Muslims pay homage to their immediate ancestors, their leaders and also Muslim saints, for instance, the Sheikh at Mackinnon Road along Mombasa-Nairobi highway in Kenya. Paying homage to Islamic saints was seen to bring blessings (Baraka), the barren women are able to conceive and also mysterious ailments are cured....[184]

Such an extent of mixing is quite relevant and intriguing because the influence of Islam on Swahili culture is so high that it is not easy or perhaps it is impossible to "trace Swahili culture per se without referring to Islam today."[185] Among the Yoruba Muslims in Nigeria, swearing in the name of ancestors is a common practice. It is also common for one to hear a Yoruba Muslim pleading in the name of the mother, the father, or a great ancestor.[186] Indeed, one's intelligence dominates or rules one's life and represents one's fate in the life of religious people and so anything that happens to religious people is perceived as their share of fate (intelligence) bestowed on them by the creator. For this reason, their lucks or misfortunes are assessed in terms of wisdom or "the head" they possess. The Yoruba expression: *ori eni lawure eni* (one's head determines one's luck) elucidates this point.[187] In other words, the magnitude of one's success is determined by the quality of one's thought (head). The Akan expression *wo ti aye ngugo/ wo ti annye ngugo* (your head has been lucky/ your head has not been lucky) further clarifies this. Here, the head, a symbol of intelligence also symbolizes one's destiny.

The above concept closely relates to the Islamic concept of predestination (*Qadar*: divine decree). This is symbolized by the head. Thus, to say one's head as chosen for an individual is to say that is one's *Qadar* (i.e. one's share of nature). However, *Qadar* originates from the creator but the acculturated Yoruba Muslim worldview lacks this quality.[188]

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[184] E. Faki, E.M. Kasiera & M.J. Nandi, "The Belief and Practice among the Swahili Muslims in Mombasa District, Kenya", *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 2, No. 9 (2010), p. 216.
[185] *Ibid.*
[186] A.O. Omotosho, "Islam, Custom, Culture and Tradition: The Dilemma of the Nigerian Muslim", http://unilorin.edu.ng/publications/omotoshoao/Omitosho%20 ISLAM--Edited%20with%20title%20page%5B1%5DA7.pdf, retrieved on 17/01/13
[187] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[188] *Ibid.*

Hence, in spite of the predominance of Islam in Yoruba land, Nigeria, no success has been achieved in eliminating this from the thought of the non-literate Yoruba Muslims.[189] It is, however, worthy to emphasize that the veneration of saints is not peculiar to African Muslims. In Iraq, Abdul Qadir Jilani, the founder of the Qadiriyyah Muslim brotherhood, has for a long time running, been regarded by the Kurds as their guardian saint. The African traditional people, however, believe that nature is enlivened by spirits, either in the pantheistic form of an Omnipresent Being (God, *Mawu, Oldumare, Olorun, Nyankopon, Nyame, Chineke, Ebube Dike, Mulungu,* etc.) or in a polytheistic pro forma with a pantheon of spirits believed to originate from specific objects of nature e.g. trees, stones, mountains, and water.[190] This feature is known as *animism.*[191] They, therefore, believe in the sacredness of specific objects that merit only the contact of specific people held to be possessed by either the mentioned spirits or those of venerated ancestors: sometimes in a good way (whereby the possessed person exercises special powers), or in a bad way (whereby the victim is exorcised to return to normalcy).

They believe that certain members of the society could implore the unseen services of these hidden creatures to cause harm to the members of the society. Indeed, the Qur'an and the Muslim traditions fully acknowledge the existence of these living creatures, and this should be borne in mind when we attempt to understanding the African Muslim worldview on divination. A tradition of the Prophet says:

> There is no house of the Muslims that does not have a Muslim jinn living in its roof. If they serve their lunch, the jinn come down and eat with them. Allah (S.W.T.) uses them (the jinn) to protect them (the humans).[192]

Although, this tradition is inconsistent with Qur'an 13:11 and, therefore, may not pass the test of credibility, many Muslims also believe that some of the

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[189] *Ibid.*

[190] E.B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 8–19.

[191] G. George, "Animism in Theory and Practice: E.B. Tylor's Unpublished 'Notes on "Spiritualism"', *Man, New Series*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1971), pp. 289–307; J.S. Stuart-Glennie, "Queries as to Dr. Tylor's Views on Animism", *Folklore*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1992), pp. 289–307; N. David, "'Animism' Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational Epistemology", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 40 (1999), pp. 567–591.

[192] W.A. Bali, trans. by H. Kreidly., *Wiqayat al-'Insan min Al-Jinn wal-Schaytan (Man's Protection against Jinn and Satan)*, 3rd Ed. (Lebanon: Dar Al-Kotob Al-Ilmiyah, 2009), p. 13.

jinn can be harmful to human beings.[193] Faki, et-al make the following observation about the *jinn* among the Swahili Muslims of East Africa: "The Jinn can either be friendly or a nuisance to people. They can be captured through magic and used for different goals; ....[194] The dangerous and harm-perpetrating ones dwell at unclean and filthy sites like bathrooms and toilet places.[195] Others dwell in cracks and burrows. This offers the theological ground to understand the traditional African belief that the *jinn* even live in water bodies whether deep or shallow, including the sea and big trees with strange holes as well as burrowed mountains. In the Qur'an, Allah says,

> I have only created Jinns and men, that they may serve me.[196] And the Jinn race, We had created before, from the fire of a scorching wind."[197]

This means that the *jinn* or the *abosom* actually exist. However, the orthodox Islamic worldview is that these spirits were created for the same purpose as humans, *ibadah*. From the Muslim literature, also, there are categories of the *jinn*. Muslims also believe that some of the *jinn* are just or kind while others are unkind and inimical to human beings. The Qur'an quotes the following from the *jinn*:

> There are among us some that are righteous, and some the contrary: we follow divergent paths. Among us are some that submit their wills (to Allah), and some that swerve from justice ....[198]

Al-Shibli identifies five categories of the *jinn*.
1. The types that live in houses with humans are known as *Aamir* (plural *Ummaar*: dwellers).
2. There is the group that interacts with children, and are known as *Arwaah* (spirits).
3. Those that perpetrate wickedness are known as *Shayaateen* (devils).
4. The type that is worse in perpetrating wickedness is known as *maarid* (demon).
5. The most dangerous of the company of the *jinn* is known as *Ifreet*.[199]

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[193] *Ibid.*
[194] Faki, Kasiera & Nandi, "The Belief and Practice", p. 217.
[195] Bali, *Wiqayat al-'Insan min Al-Jinn wal-Schaytan*, p. 13.
[196] Qur'an 51:56.
[197] Qur'an 15:27.
[198] Qur'an 72:11 and 14.
[199] Al-Shibli, *Aakaam Al-Marjaan*, p.21, as cited by A.K.I. Ameen, *The Jinn and Human Sickness* (Riyadh: Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 2005).

The Qur'an and the Islamic religious tradition also affirm the belief in the existence of some category of human beings whose activities are as inimical to their fellow human beings as some of the *jinn*. These are known as the 'blowers of the knot.'[200] Allah's recognition of the ability of the evil ones among both the *jinn* and mankind led to the revelation of the twin chapters known as *Al-muawwidhatayn* (the two chapters from which refuge is sought: the Chapters of the "Dawn" and "Mankind"). They read as follows:

> Say: I seek refuge in the Lord of the Dawn, from the mischief of created things; from the mischief of Darkness as it overspreads; from the mischief of those who practice Secret Arts [Blowers of the knot]: and from the mischief of the envious one as he practices envy (*hasad*).[201]

> Say: I seek refuge with the Lord and Cherisher of Mankind, the King of Mankind, the God of Mankind, from the mischief of the Whisperer (of Evil), who withdraws (after his whisper), (the same) who whispers into the hearts of Mankind, among Jinns and among Men.[202]

With this common belief, therefore, some of the African traditional people and some non-literate Muslims tie objects containing such verses of the Qur'an that could possibly ward-off the evil attacks of the unkind creatures among the *jinn* and mankind round their waists. This is perhaps the origin of the association of Muslim clerics with talismans, amulets, and charms, although, in actual fact, Muslims were not the originators of these objects.[203] Many people think that amulets for warding off evil spirits always contain Arabic inscriptions or verses of the Qur'an. However, the following extract points to the contrary:

> ... the jinn are afraid of wolves, and they cannot appear in wolf form. Many people believe that wolves have power over the jinn when they appear in physical form, and are able to attack and devour them. They also believe that the jinn flee from the scent of the wolves. Hence some of those in ... remote mountain villages

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[200] Qur'an 113:4.
[201] Qur'an 113.
[202] Qur'an 114.
[203] S.I. Mustapha, *Prohibitions that are taken too Lightly: Based on the Works of Shaikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjib* (Sydney: Islam Publication International, 2001), pp. 34–35.

like to wear an amulet containing something from the wolf, be it hair, a tooth, a bone or a piece of skin.[204]

From the above it is possible that charms, amulets, and talismans that are often attributed in some traditional African communities to Muslim clerics may be a misconception, although, more often than not, it is designed by herbalists or medicine men some of whom might combine as Muslims clerics. The reason is that in many African communities, Islam spread through scholars who were trained in Sufism or the esoteric sciences (*ilmul asrar*). As a result they offered spiritual assistance to non-Muslim aristocrats and leaders. This association of Islamic ritual specialists with esoteric wisdom made practices like divination and amulets manufacturing (through which most of such services were rendered) connected with Islam and indeed as an attestation of Islam's mystical powers.[205]

Hence, Islam itself played a role in rationalizing divination when it recognized that there are forces in the world of the unseen that could be inimical to mortals, although, it offered a remedy in its own way. By enculturating themselves into the traditions of their people, therefore, some African Muslims think that divination is the only way to know the events of the invisible world, and hence, the use of even Qur'anic verses in this spiritual adventure. Truly, this granted them harmony in the state they lived in. Many rulers in West Africa either surrounded themselves with Muslim clerics who manufactured these objects for them or they trooped to the Muslim clerics for divination and spiritual protection. The instances of this among the Asante kings of Ghana, ancient Ghana, Mali, and Songhai are well recorded in history. It is also amply reflected in Leo Africanus' observation in Timbuktu that "… here are great stores of doctors, judges, priests, and other learned men, that are bountifully maintained at the king's cost and charges."[206] This situation gave birth to a breed of scholars in Africa whose activities were occasioned by the situations of their times,[207] i.e. demand for protective objects. Hiskett relates a strange story of a mysterious staff planted by one Muslim cleric, Muhammad al-Abyad, during a warfare involving a Gonja king and his enemies which resulted in the sudden retreat of the said enemies.[208]

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[204] Mustapha, *Prohibitions that are taken too Lightly*, pp. 34–35.
[205] K. Graw, "Culture of Hope in West Africa", *ISIM Review*, Vol. 16 (2005), p. 28.
[206] C. Goucher, C. LeGuin & L. Walton, *In the Balance: Themes in Global H*₁ ᵛ (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998), see chapter 13.
[207] Mvumbi, "Islam in Africa Today", p. 2.
[208] Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, p. 120.

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Divination:

In African societies, orthodox health care delivery is more complicated than simply offering organic substances for medical treatment. According to Twumasi, "the diagnosis of illness is largely viewed as a diagnosis of a social offence and the curing of illness requires the establishment of normal social relationships."[209] For this reason, the non-material causes of ill-health are as relevant in the African traditional medical diagnosis as the biological or material causes. In traditional African medical systems, the medicine men determine the exact causes of illnesses and their remedies through the application of a mechanical law of nature called divination. The word 'divination' means different thing to different people as it means different things to different scholars.[210] In the worldview of the indigenous Africans, the door to a person's choices in life is not closed by fate, and perhaps the facility of divination could make it possible to alter the course of one's fate. According to Dime, African understanding of divination is somewhat different from a European notion.[211] For him, the European notion of divination is simply identifying the wishes of a deity and acting on it to bring about equilibrium in life. However, if that is the case, then it is not that Europeans have a different understanding of divination, but rather, that there are different types of divination. In any case, he defines divination as "...the communication to a consultant of his [one's] prenatal choices by a divinity through the instrumentality of ... [a] (diviner)."[212] In the view of Gehman, "Today, despite scientific knowledge, there is still a revival of witchcraft, spiritism and the occult in the West and a persistence of belief in mystical powers worldwide."[213] This means that divination still stands as a traditional medical activity that scientific advancement has not been able to eradicate, and this is because of its role in discovering the unknown.[214] It is a process by which one obtains the knowledge about the

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[209] P.A. Twumasi, *Medical Systems in Ghana: A Study in Medical Sociology* (Accra: Assembly Press, 1975), p. 64.

[210] W.A. Lessa and Z.W. Evon, *Reader in Comparative Religion: Anthropological Approach* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); N. Fodor, "Divination", *Encyclopaedia of Psychic Science* (USA: University Books, 1966), pp. 1–20; P.M. Peek, *African Divination Systems: Ways of Knowing* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1991), p. 2; W.R. Bascom, *Ifa Divination: Communication between Gods and Men in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969); V. Turner, *Revelation and Divination in Ndembu ritual Ithaca* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 1–10.

[211] C.A. Dime, "Divination: The Penumbra of African Traditional Religion", *Orita: Journal of Religious Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1982), p. 93.

[212] *Ibid.*

[213] Gehman (1998), p. 98, as cited by Faki, Kasiera and Nandi, "The Belief and Practice", p. 213.

[214] *Ibid.*

cause of one's misfortunes, be it past, present, or future and it gives one the chance to revoke this cause to better one's fortunes.[215]

It must be emphasized, however, that divination is forbidden in orthodox Islam. In Qur'an 5: 90, Allah says:

> Oh you who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, sacrificing to stones, and (divination by) arrows, are an abomination, of Satan's handiwork: eschew such (abominations), that you may prosper.

The Islamic view of divination is that it ascribes Allah's attribute of Knowing the past, present and the future to the diviner. Divination sows the seed of hatred between family relations and is therefore described as *amal-ish-shaytan* (Satan's handiwork). According to a tradition of the prophet, whoever consults a diviner and believes in what is divulged to him or her will have his or her prayers rejected for forty days. However, it must be emphasized that Islam is a religion and culture that has been acculturated to social, economic and political milieus over the years depending on what set up any group of Muslims finds itself in. As it was indicated earlier, the perceived spiritual challenges of the African, both Muslim and non-Muslim, occasioned the upsurge of a certain breed of Muslim scholars and medicine men influenced by the demands of their times. Islam has its own rules and regulations but, at the same time, it exists as a religion when people practice it. Both Qur'an and hadith talk about witchcraft and sorcery as real and call on humanity to seek protection against them. This means that one needs the knowledge of their existence at any particular moment to merit looking for protection. Since human beings do not have the power of the knowledge of the unknown, one needs another facility to access this knowledge, and hence rationalizing the use of divination as the path to the unknown and to dealing with this reality recognized by both the Qur'an and the traditions. Hence, as already indicated earlier, Islam itself played a role in rationalizing divination when it recognized the existence of forces of invisibility that have powers to cause harm to humans.

Consulting diviners is a popular practice among the Swahili Muslims of Mombasa in Kenya. This, according to Faki et-al, is seen by the Swahili Muslims not as contradiction to Islamic norms "... but a perfect blend of Islam with their culture."[216] However, divination by Muslim cleric among the Swahili of Mombasa appears to be a borrowed practice. This is because,

> ..., most of the advanced in the Arabic language among the Swahili Muslims were the Islamic priests and teachers. They were poorly

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[215] *Ibid.*
[216] *Ibid.*

paid for their services and some took to divination and other healing practices to supplement their income.[217]

This involvement of the Swahili Muslim clergy now justifies the thought of the ordinary Muslims that it is allowed. Most of these clerics were known as *Sherifs* (clerics who were believed to have descended from the family of the Prophet).[218] In South Africa, many herbalists prefer geomantic or sand divination.[219] The overall friendship and the extent of acculturation between African traditions and Islam is well demonstrated in the following extract:

> Although there is – as we shall see-an overwhelming scholarly consensus that the latter – day *Ifa* and *'Sixteen Cowries'* in West Africa derive directly and demonstrably from the Islamic prototypes, an early, original North West African input into the overall geomantic system is suggested by the early circulation of Berber names for the sixteen basic geomantic configurations, and by the performance of proto-geomantic cultural forms in the latter-day North West African material.[220]

In Senegal and Gambia, according to Graw, "…rather than being practised at the margins of Islamic orthodoxy, Senegambian divination is embedded in and integrating other forms of Islamic ritual."[221] In northern Ghana, by adapting to traditional methods of divination, Muslims are gradually introducing a future perspective and expanding the possibilities of preventive action. By so doing, it is bringing about a religio-epistemological transformation that is, among other things, helping people to understand and make better use of Western bio-medicine and primary health care programs. Hence, the traditional medicine will only lose its grip on the indigenous African only when Western medicine incorporates divination in its practice.

Female Circumcision

This is known to many as female genital mutilation (FGM) and it is also known as female circumcision. The former, however, seems to pass a value judgment on the practice and so the latter is preferred. Some cultures

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[217] *Ibid.*, p. 219.

[218] *Ibid.*

[219] W.V. Binsbergen, "Islam as a Constitutive Factor in African 'Traditional' Religion: Evidence from Geomantic Divination", in A. Breedveld, J. van Santen and W.M.J. van Binsbergen, eds., *Islam and Transformation in Africa*, http://www.shikanda.net/african_religion/islampaper_def_2003_RTF.pdf, retrieved on 27/11/12.

[220] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[221] Graw, "Culture of Hope in West Africa", p. 28.

have insisted, in one way or the other, on circumcision, whether male or female. This is the removal of the foreskin from the grand penis. In females, this process entails the partial or total removal of the vulva. The most widespread places include Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, and Sudan.

Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Data and Trends

	Data Source		Prevalence by Age (%)		
			15-49	15-19	35-39
Benin	DHS	2006	12.9	7.9	16.3
Burkina Faso	MICS	2006	72.5	59.7	79.8
Cameroon	DHS	2004	1.4	0.4	1.2
Central African Rep.	MICS	2008	25.7	18.7	29.8
Chad	DHS	2004	44.9	43.4	46.2
Côte d'Ivoire	MICS	2006	36.4	28.0	43.8
Djibouti	MICS	2006	93.1	—	—
Egypt	DHS	2008	91.1	80.7	96.4
Eritrea	DHS	2002	88.7	78.3	92.6
Ethiopia	DHS	2005	74.3	62.1	81.2
Gambia	MICS	2005/06	78.3	79.9	79.5
Ghana	MICS	2006	3.8	1.4	5.7
Guinea	DHS	2005	95.6	89.3	98.6
Guinea-Bissau	MICS	2006	44.5	43.5	48.6
Kenya	DHS	2008-09	27.1	14.6	35.1
Liberia	DHS	2007	58.2	35.9	66.7
Mali	DHS	2006	85.2	84.7	84.9
Mauritania	MICS	2007	72.2	68.0	75.4
Niger	DHS	2006	2.2	1.9	2.9
Nigeria	DHS	2008[d]	29.6	21.7	33.9
Senegal	DHS	2005	28.2	24.8	30.5
Sierra Leone	MICS	2006	94.0	81.1	97.5
Somalia	MICS	2006	97.9	96.7	98.9
Tanzania	DHS	2004/05	14.6	9.1	16.0
Togo	MICS	2006	5.8	1.3	9.4
Uganda	DHS	2006	0.6	0.5	0.8
Yemen	PAPFAM	2003	38.2	—	—

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Figure 4. Statistics on female circumcision in Africa.

Prevalence of FGM/C Among Younger and Older Women

While in some countries there is little difference in prevalence between older women (ages 35 to 39) and younger women (ages 15 to 19), in others—such as Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Kenya—the difference is significant. This may be a sign that the practice is being abandoned.

Percent

■ Ages 35-39   ▣ Ages 15-19

Country	Ages 35-39	Ages 15-19
Somalia	99	97
Egypt	96	81
Gambia	80	80
Ethiopia	81	62
Côte d'Ivoire	44	28
Kenya	35	15

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Figure 5. Statistics on female circumcision in Africa.

Circumcision operations could be grouped into three categories.
   a. Male circumcision for purification or hygiene purposes. This is non-religious and medical.

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b. Male circumcision after birth. This is a religious or cultural rite and it is also for purification purposes. This is practiced among some religious traditions including Islam.

c. Male circumcision and clitori-dectomy: this sometimes marks a transition from childhood to adulthood.[222]

The practice of female circumcision must have started and spread from Egypt.[223] By the middle of the 8th century B.C. when Egyptian political influence began to wane, Ethiopian kings began to assert themselves in the ruins of the Egyptian civilization after almost 1800 years of dominion by the Egyptians. By this time, the Egyptian social ideas which ultimately influenced the Sudan must have spread to as far as Ivory Coast. The Yoruba who might have migrated from the coast of the Upper Nile somewhere in the first century A.D. bear tribal marks of Egyptian impact.[224]

There are eight types of female circumcisions practiced in Africa. They include: scarification (which involves making four cuts on the clitoris without severing any flesh), wrenching or Nipping (ripping off the tip of the clitoris), *sunnah* (performed by removing the prepuce of the clitoris). Others include: clitori-dectomy (ripping off the entire clitoris); excision (removal of the clitoris together with the labia minora); intermediate (ripping off the clitoris with the labia minora and the labia majora leaving a vulva opening); infibulations (scrapping off either the two edges of the labia majora or the clitoris and both the minora and the majora and stitching together of the two ends of the vulva), and introcision (scrapping deep into the vaginal orifice or splitting the perineum lengthwise).[225]

Now let us state the Islamic blueprint on the practice of female circumcision. There is no known reliable tradition on the practice of female circumcision. However, Imam Bukhari reports an *Athar* tradition (a tradition that traces its origin not to the Prophet but to the companions) which refers to what is known in Arabic as *Khafad*. The word *Khafad* means to "diminish" or "suppress." It was a process used to suppress the growth of the clitoris. This process cannot be translated as female circumcision. This is because the Arabic word for circumcision involving the cutting of a flesh is

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[222] B.D. Rachewiltz, *Black Eros: The Sexual Customs of Africa from Pre-historic Times to the Present Day* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), pp. 162–163.
[223] *Ibid.*
[224] *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.
[225] E.J. Dingwall, *Male Infibulations* (London: J. Beale & Sons, 1925), p. 35; E.J. Dingwall, *Woman: An Historical, Gynaecological and Anthropological Compendium*, Vol. 1 (London: Heinemann, 1935), pp. 359, 342, 352, 358, and 351; C. O. Knudson, *The Falling Dawadawa Tree* (Denmark: Intervention Press, 1994), pp. 31–37.

Khitan. This is used only for male circumcision.[226] However, the patrons of female circumcision translate *Khitan*, which appears in many religious texts, to refer to both female and male circumcisions,[227] but this is incorrect. This is because the only sound report that refers to a circumcision operation on the female genitalia in a tradition mentions *Khafad*.[228] *Khafad* does not involve cutting-off any flesh but it was only a portion of the clitoral hood or prepuce that was stitched to suppress the over-growth of that organ as it was popular among especially Southern Arabians who may have inherited it from the Ethiopian emigrants from Abyssinia and Yemen. Whenever female circumcision is mentioned in respect of Islam, it stands for this practice.[229] In spite of this, there was no report to suggest that it was even applied by the Prophet or whether it was applied to all women. Some Muslims have enculturated or accustomed themselves to the prevalent practice of cutting the clitoris or even other part of the genitalia as a compelling necessity for all Muslim girls. The traditional African practice of circumcision has, therefore, found a friend in enculturated African Muslims in this regard.

Really, as a religion whose principles apply to all environments, time and space, Islam has confronted indigenous cultural tradition whose solutions to problems of explanation, social structure, and fertility have often appeared more effective to the local community.[230] The relevance and immediacy of masked cults and the figurative art of shrines which, at least in theory, Islam rejects, have clearly not diminished under the impact of Muslim practice in Africa. In effect, that means that these traditions were integral or very essential to the existence of the people and their worldview. Indigenous traditions, embedded in particular social formations and economic activities, have therefore rarely been eliminated from the African whether Muslim or traditional in his contact with Islam. As a matter of fact, the entire African Islamization process was fraught with creative inculturation of some Islamic and African traditional norms and an attempt to find an Islamic meaning to these ideas in brilliant African perspectives.

Of course, Islam did not reject as false all the beliefs and practices of the indigenous African people. It concurred 100% with the African notion of the spirit world and sanctioned the belief in mystical powers. In

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[226] L.I. Asmani and M.S. Abdi, "De-linking Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting from Islam", http://unfa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2011/De-linking%20FGM%20fromIslam%final%20report.pdf, retrieved on 14/02/13.

[227] *Ibid*.

[228] *Ibid*.

[229] A.A.M.I. Al-Bukhari, trans. by R. A. Rehman, *Al-adab al-mufrad (Manners in Islam)* (Pakistan: Darul Ishaat, n.d.), p. 761.

[230] "Islam and African Traditional Religion in Nigeria", http://www.africaworld.net/afrel/islam-atr-nigeria.htm, retrieved on 14/02/13.

consequence, therefore, it has accommodated itself with the numerous notions of spirit forces within the primordial religious philosophy of the African people. Sadly, however, it appears the complexity of this course of action and the various dimensions of individuals applying a certain degree of religious pluralism or diversity is unpopular in Muslim discourse which tends towards normative assertions. For this reason, in the past, some Muslim clerics insisted on the duty of conscientious Muslims to declare *Jihad* on "pagans" and convert "polytheists" and Shehu Uthman Dan Fodio's declaration of *Jihad* on the Hausa rulers could be understood in this context. The question, however, lingers as to who the "polytheists" really are to merit the declaration of a *Jihad* and who has the moral right to execute that job. Indeed, the history of Islam in Africa with special emphasis on the sub-continent West of the Sahara, could be understood in three stages: containment (kings checking Muslim influence by isolating them in *zongos* (Hausa word for ethnic quarters)); mixing (kings blending Islam with local traditions); and reform (whereby conscientious scholars moved for reforms in order to free their society of unIslamic practices and pave the way for implementing *Shari'ah*).[231]

The above tripartite framework facilitates the understanding of the development of Islam and its relationship with the medieval empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, the 19th century *Jihad* that led to the establishment of the Sokoto *Khilafah* in Hausaland and the Umarian state in the Senegambia. Some African Muslim clerics and leaders who went on pilgrimage to Makkah did not only absorb the ideas of *Jihad* and conversion to Islam. They also cleverly took advantage of this to transform socio-political unrests into Islamic reform movements and the *Jihad* in Senegambia that finally established the Bundu state in the 1690s[232] as well as the factors that resulted in the formation of the Al-Moravid Movement among the Berbers in 1076 are clear cases in point. In spite of this *petit larceny*, and other societal dissonances fuelled by aggressive orthodox scholars, Islam is still deemed as cohabiting well with African traditions and some African chiefs either became Muslims or African Muslims have become chiefs and sometimes even made Islam a state religion; hence the two are friends not foes.

Conclusion

This paper examined the relationship between African traditions and Islam to find-out whether the two traditions find friends in each other. The constructs of inculturation, acculturation and enculturation were used as the scientific principles to explain this phenomenon. It was found that Islam has

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[231] Goucher, LeGuin and Walton, *In the Balance*.
[232] *Ibid*.

tolerated and has been tolerated by African traditions. Islam tolerated traditional values such as polygamy which, for some, made conversion to Islam easier than perhaps conversion to Christianity. The early African Muslims creatively combined Islamic and indigenous beliefs to give rise to African Muslim traditions of incorporation, toleration, and mutual respect. Of course, at a certain period of its existence, African Islam had a turbulent history with reform movements and dynasties replacing some indigenous leadership or even crushing and succeeding themselves. Nonetheless, they provided a breed of Islam that gave a certain sense of cultural security to the indigenous Africans. The real proximity of Islam to African traditions is more than simply both of them having religious underscoring but as well in the substance of dealing with both the relationship of humanity to the transcendental metaphysical and socio-cultural aspects. The history of Islam in Africa has examples of a wide range of interaction or inculturation with African traditions and practices. At certain times, particularly when Muslims constitute a minority, a pluralist response to other cultures and traditions has occurred. Muslims took the view that different forms of primal religion could exist side by side with them in the same society. This combined with the recognition that the social and political structure of the wider society could be accommodated, individual Muslims, and sometimes Muslim communities, in some parts of Africa have incorporated into Islam different aspects of traditional life to varied degrees without any significant disagreements, hence to a very large extent, Islam and traditions in Africa are friends and not foes.

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Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations and the Headmaster complex in Nigerian Federalism 1999-2007

Olumide Victor EKANADE

Abstract

Between 1960 and 1999, the Nigerian 'federal' state had had twenty eight years of military leadership. Thus rather than being ruled as a federal state, the military ruled it as a unitary state with total disregard for the fine tenets of federalism. However, the post 1999 military period provided a conducive climate for robust debates and discourses in the political and legal climes on issues of allocation of tax powers and expenditure responsibilities and the custody of the federation's funds. Here the state governments contested the overbearing influence and jurisdictional competence of the centre in matters of the "commonwealth". These contests have had serious implications for intergovernmental relations in contemporary Nigeria. Using the longitudinal approach, the paper examines the various contours of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. The study relied essentially on primary sources from the national archives for the reconstruction of the historical background of this piece. The paper also analyses the post 1999 contestation between the centre and federating units on revenue sharing. Secondly it evaluates the role of the Judiciary in adjudicating between the centre and component units particularly on the issues of apportionment of oil revenue in the fourth republic. The central problem of this paper is that why has the contest over revenue allocation been so intense? Much more importantly, why did the central leadership in that dispensation (personified by the President) have so much challenges with intergovernmental relations? Also why did the regime engage in acts which undermined the ethos of federalism and reinforce the unitary traditions of the preceding military regime? This article contends that given long years of military rule, the administrators and politicians in Nigeria have not internalized the sacred ethos of federalism and the federation has to all intents and purposes remained a unitary state in the garb of a federal state. The paper affirms that the challenge is first and foremost a constitutional problem. It suggests ways by which the dominance of the centre can be diluted towards a coordinated relationship fostered between the centre and the federating units.

Introduction

On the 29th of May 1999, Nigeria reverted back to civil rule after long years of military rule. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state was elected as the second executive President of Nigeria. Vertical

intergovernmental relations in the Nigerian Fourth Republic was marked by stiff competition and conflict rather than cooperation especially on revenue sharing matters. Probable reasons for conflict were the long years of military rule (which destroyed every fabric of orthodox federalism) and personalist style of the president who had a military background.

The arena of revenue allocation was a seriously contested terrain in this period due to certain reasons. For one federally collected oil revenues is the main stay of the finances of federal and state governments, accounting for a little over 90% of their (states') total revenue. Upon this revenue therefore depends the ability of the state governments to maintain their services, remunerate their staff, pay for essential goods and execute their developmental and infrastructural projects. Their financial viability and creditability as autonomous governmental units hang upon it. As far as these states are concerned, the driving force for its sharing (revenues) is understandably one of self survival. For them sharing is almost like a matter of life and death, exciting their deepest concern and their strongest emotions.[233]

What obtained in the fourth republic contrasted much with what obtained in the first republic where revenue distribution arrangement allowed each region to retain much of what it generated in revenue. This subsequently gave the regions the wherewithal to compete among themselves and to initiate major socio economic and development projects.[234] Quite apart from general agitations for by all the component units, the oil producing states which provided the revenues that sustained the Nigerian federation were in the fourth republic, subjected to federal government's politics an intrigues. These states were progressively denied their fair share of revenues from their oil resources. Discouraging policies included the institution of repressive acts such as the onshore- off shore dichotomy Act and the 200metres Isobath Act. Other unpopular policies of the regime included the invasion of states' jurisdictions and deliberate withholding of budgetary entitlements of some subunits in a democratic federal state.

Be that as it may in the view of Carol Leff, federalism, after all, is generally understood as an institutional arrangement whereby authority and functional competencies are shared among different levels of government. Federalism has also been associated with other virtues such as promoting, Justice, equity, equality, Stability, freedom, self determination and democracy. The acclaimed mechanisms through which federalism achieves

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[233] Ben Nwabueze, *Federalism in Nigeria under the Presidential constitution* (London: Sweet Maxwell, 1983), p. 181.

[234] Francis Emenuo, "Power Devolution in a Federal State: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations", in Tunde Babawale et.al, (eds.), *Devolution of Powers in a Federal State*, (Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2000), p .74.

these goals are two-fold: "sharing of authority and competencies between levels of government"; and protecting identity and autonomy against domination[235].

However these two planks are absent in the Nigerian federal system (which is basically a constitutional problem) and their absence has perpetually maintained the federation as a pseudo federal state. With the transition from military rule to a democratic regime in 1999, it was expected that the civilian regime in the fourth republic would adapt itself to the theoretical demands of federalism and its accoutrement fiscal federalism. Eight years on however the civil regime has neglected the fine tenets of robust, growth oriented federalism and inter governmental fiscal relations in the governance of the federation. To start with we would attempt a synoptic definition of core terms.

Conceptual Issues

Federalism is an unsettled concept. It has been defined in different ways and manifested in divergent institutional forms. However, the consensus is that the essence of federalism is the constitutional sharing of powers of government between a central government and a number of constituent units. The extent to which each tier of government enjoys autonomy within its area of competence is usually taken as a valid measure of a true federation.[236] According to Bolaji Akinyemi however federalism is an acknowledgement of diverse interests that need to be accommodated. All it really resolves is that these interests will be accommodated within one sovereign nation.[237] Graham Smith sheds more light on federalism with his definition. He sees federalism as an institutional arrangement designed to secure within deeply divided societies, social unity and stability[238]. A much more precise and definitive definition is that by Nwabueze which affirms that federalism is an arrangement whereby powers of government within a country are shared between a country wide government and a number of regionalized (i.e territorially localized) governments in such a way that each exists as a government separately and independently from the others, operating directly on persons and property within its territorial area, with a

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[235] Fred Onyeoziri, "Federalism and the Theory of State", in Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi T. Suberu (eds.), *Nigerian Federalism in Crisis: Critical Perspectives and Political Options* (Ibadan: John Archers, 2005), p. 17.

[236] Emenuo, "Power Devolution in a Federal State, p. 68.

[237] Akinyemi Bolaji, *Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience* (Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria, 1986), p. 1.

[238] Graham Smith, "Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice", in Graham Smith, (ed.), *Federalism: The Multi-Ethnic Challenge* (London: Longman, 1995). pp. 3–4.

will of its own and its own apparatus for the conduct of its affairs, and with an authority in some matters exclusive of all others. Federalism is thus essentially an arrangement between governments, a constitutional device by which powers within a country are shared among two tiers of government rather than among geographical entities comprising different peoples.[239] The key denominators in these definitions are the existence of two levels of sovereign governments, which are coordinate, possessing adequate authorities to conduct their affairs, independent of other coordinate powers but still belonging to the same union.

Fiscal Federalism

This is the allocation of revenues, tax powers and expenditure responsibilities among the different tiers of government in a federation in a fair, just and efficient manner, taking into cognizance the various levels of contributions of component parts to the federal purse.

Intergovernmental Relations

Contextually, this refers to the vertical fiscal relationship that exists between the centre and federating units. Deil Wright defines intergovernmental relations as "comprising all permutations and combinations of relations among the units of government in a federal system".[240] However, despite formal division of responsibilities, intergovernmental fiscal relations within federations are often marked by cooperation, competition and conflict.

Headmaster Complex

This term is used here as a euphemism for the President (Philosopher king) with pre-eminent authority and over bearing influence of the centre in the affairs of the commonwealth (federation). In the Nigerian state, the long years of military rule has eroded the practice of the fine tenets of fiscal federalism. Hence fiscal centralism has been the order of financial relations between the federal government and the federating units. The robust sources of the federation's wealth are managed by the central government with constitutional backing while the states and local governments have to make do with meagre statutory allocations from the centre and receipts gotten from paltry source such as market tolls, court fines, vehicle licenses and other miscellaneous resources. In addition the military styled constitution has invested the office of the President with enormous powers such that the no single state governor or group of governors can rival the influence of the President in fiscal matters.

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[239] Nwabueze, "Federalism in Nigeria under the Presidential Constitution", p. 1; Emenuo, "Power Devolution in a Federal State", p. 72.

[240] Emenuo, "Power Devolution in a Federal State", p. 72.

Understanding federalism and Intergovernmental relations:

According to Ronald Watts, federalism is essentially the combination of collective rule for some purposes and regional self rule for others within a single political system so that neither is subordinate to the other. Furthermore, the function of the federations is not to eliminate internal differences or conflicts, but rather to manage it in such a way that regional differences are accommodated.[241] Also the federal system of government is one in which the expenditure and revenue functions are divided among different levels of government. The essence of this division is to facilitate the provision of certain goods and services at different levels which is justified on the existence of public goods which may be consumed nationwide or whose benefits are restricted to a particular geographical area.[242] But how well this is done has in practice depended on the particular form of the institutions adopted within the federation. Thus intergovernmental relations is a strong component in this regard. Its workings[243] in any one federation in fundamental to the effective functioning of the mechanics of that federation as it has the ability to make or mar such federal political entities. Following from this, the main issues of intergovernmental fiscal relations concern the spending responsibilities, revenue raising responsibility, intergovernmental transfers and administrative aspects of fiscal decentralization. There is a consensus in literature that decentralization of spending responsibilities to lower levels of government will ensure efficient allocation of resources for the provision of local public goods and services which most closely represent the aspirations of the people at that level. The proper coordination and implementation at the different stages of the allocation of taxing powers and expenditure responsibilities helps to ensure macro stability[244] in the federation.

A Historical Synopsis of Vertical Revenue Allocation in Nigeria

The apportionment of revenues among different tiers of government in Nigeria dates back to the Richards constitution of 1946 which granted internal autonomy to the regions and shared fiscal responsibilities between

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[241] Onyeoziri, "Federalism and the Theory of the State", p. 16–17.

[242] J.O. Ebajemito and M.I.Abudu, "Intergovermental Fiscal Relations in a Federal System: The Nigerian Experience", in Ben Aigbokhan (ed.), *Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development: Proceedings of the NES 1999 Annual Conference, Ibadan* (Ibadan: 1999), pp. 216–217.

[243] Onyeoziri, "Federalism and the Theory of the State", p. 16–17.

[244] Ebajemito and Abudu, "Intergovermental Fiscal Relations in a Federal System", p. 217.

the federal and regional governments.[245] Since 1946, ad-hoc commissions and military decrees had dominated the revenue sharing process. The initial commission was the Philipson commission of 1946 which allocated to the regional governments a little portion of the budgetary needs of the centre. The distribution of independent regional revenue was based on derivation and even progress.[246] The principles provoked inter regional hostility.[247] The next commission was the Hicks Philipson commission of 1951. Hicks recommended three principles of Derivation, Needs and National interest for sharing interregional revenues. Hicks admitted that financial relations between the regions and the centre were distinctly unfair. He thus strengthened fiscal autonomy of regions by opening the window of independent taxes which regions could control and calibrate while still relying on grants from the centre through the formula system.[248] Louis Chick commission of 1953 recommended the reallocation of a substantial proportion of centrally collected revenues on the basis of regional derivation or consumption. This was institutionalized and adhered to.[249] The centre's unbridled use of derivation caused some interregional conflict but ensured that the bulk of the nation's revenue from import duties and export duties went to the region's of origin.[250] The last colonial commission, the Raisman - Tress Commission, introduced the Distributable pool account (DPA) and enhanced fiscal autonomy of the regions by broadening the scope of independent regional revenues.[251]

One discernible fact here is that the colonial commissions sought for ways and means of enhancing the fiscal efficiency and autonomy of the federating units within the framework of a "federal state" but equity was not at the heart of the apportionment of national revenues.

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[245] Mbanefo Gini, "Public Finance", in M.O Kayode and Y.B Usman (eds.), *The Economy: Nigeria Since Independence, The First Twenty-Five Years*, Vol. 11 (Ibadan: Heinemann books, 1986), p. 191.

[246] Pius Okigbo, *Nigerian Public Finance* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp 22-23.

[247] N.A.I. NC / N12, Record of Proceedings. The resumed constitutional conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in Lagos between January and February 1954, p. 187.

[248] N.A.I. CE/H6 J. R. Hicks and S. Philipson, *Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1951), p. 55.

[249] N.A.I. Jabez Smith, Draft Report of Nigerian Constitutional Conferences Lagos (1954), Jabez Smith's Review Note p.205.

[250] *Ibid.*

[251] N.A.I. NC/B14, *Report of the Nigerian Constitutional Conference held in May/June, 1957 in Lagos* (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1957), pp. 18–19.

Post-Colonial Fiscal Commissions

It is interesting to note that post colonial commissions from Binns commission onwards have progressively sought for ways to reallocate substantial amount of the nation's revenues in favour of the centre to the detriment of the states. The first in line was the Binns commission of 1964 which hiked the share of distributable pool account from 30% to 35%.[252] In 1968 the Dina commission under the regime of General Yakubu Gowon gave a higher proportion of total national revenues to the federal military government with the most lucrative sources of revenue going to the federal government.[253] In 1970, Decree no 13 of 1970 was promulgated and this further reduced mining rents and export duties that went to states from 100% to 60%.[254] Other decrees promulgated were decrees no 9 of 1971 and no 6 of 1975. The former removed from the states' pool, the entire rents and royalties from offshore petroleum mining.[255] The later reduced the states' share of the onshore oil revenues from 45% to 20%.[256] In 1977 the Aboyade commission under General Murtala/Obasanjo regime recommended the establishment of a federation account for all federally collected revenue with the centre taking and controlling 60%, with 40% for lower tiers of government.[257] Aboyade's recommendations was rejected by the Constituent assembly and seen as too complicated.[258] The civilian regime of Alhaji Sheu Shagari in 1980 commissioned the Okigbo revenue commission which recommended 53% of national revenues for the federal government and 40% for the lower tiers and 2% for special areas.[259] The government white paper took 2% from the lower tiers to make 55% for the central government.[260] The Shagari regime eventually used the 1981 revenue

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[252] A G. Adebayo, *Embattled Federalism: History of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria 1946-1990* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1993), p. 126.

[253] *Ibid.,* p. 137.

[254] Ogunyemi A.O, "Federal Budgets in Nigeria, 1954-2000: A History of Process Policies and Problems", A Ph.D. Seminar Paper, Department of History, University of Lagos (July 2005), p. 12.

[255] *The Guardian* (Lagos) (Wednesday 24,January, 2004), p. 8.

[256] *Daily Times* (Lagos) (10th March, 1975), p. 1. See also, Billy Dudley, *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 260.

[257] T.Y Danjuma, "Revenue Sharing and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism", in J. Isawa Eliagwu et al., (eds.), *Federalism and Nation-Building in Nigeria: Challenges of the 21st Century* (Abuja: Intergovernmental Resources Publishers, 1994), p. 91–92.

[258] *Ibid.,* p. 92.

[259] Dudley, *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics,* p. 262.

[260] Emenuga Chidozie, "Nigeria: The Search for an Acceptable Revenue Allocation Formula", Paper presented at the *Nigerian Economic Society (NES) 1993 Annual Conference* (Ibadan: NES, 1993), p. 86.

allocation Act to share national revenues with 55% for the center and 45% going to the lower tiers.[261]

In 1984, the Muhammadu Buhari through decree no 36 of 1984 modified the 1981 act by reducing special funds from 4.5%to 2.5%. By implication it reduced revenues to oil producing states.[262] In 1989 the federal military government (FMG) of General Ibrahim bBabangida established a permanent commission- Revenue mobilization and fiscal Commission (NRMAFC) recommended a substantial slash in federal share of of national revenue that is federal 47% and lower tiers with special funds-53%. However in January 1991 the FMG subsequently increased the FMG's share of national revenue from 47% to 50% while down grading special funds' derivation component to 1%.[263] Recentralisation of governmental financial relations was a defining feature of the FMG in 1992. The positive measure here was the improvement in revenues allocated to the development of oil producing areas from 1.5% to 3%.[264] This arrangement of federal dominance in revenue sharing subsisted 1999 when the fourth republic was inaugurated.

Certain deductions that can be made from this section is that between 1946 and 1964 when the colonial commissions operated, the enhanced financial status of the regions did not really derive from any significant expansion in the regions' independent revenues. Rather it derived from an increase in their constitutionally mandated shares of federally collected revenues. From the latter part of the 1960s however, federal funds began to dwarf sub-units' funds in a supposedly federal state where the levels of government ought to be coordinate.

Certain factors informed the monumental ascendance of federal funds over those of component units. These factors are, the inception of military rule in 1966, the unitary, centrist character of military rule, the notable impact of oil on public finance (funds) and the urgent need of the centre to secure enough funds to help finance the war effort (Nigerian civil war) as well as run the corporate Nigerian economy. These factors have till date left a culture of massive fiscal centralization and federating units' perpetual fiscal dependence on the centre from which states are yet to recover.

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[261] R.N. Okoh and P.C. Egbon, "Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation", in Ben Aigbokhan (ed.), *Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development*, Proceedings of the NES 1999 Annual Conference (Ibadan: NES, 1999), p. 410.

[262] Chidozie, "Nigeria: The search for an Acceptable Revenue Allocation Formula", p. 87.

[263] *Ibid.*, p. 87. See also *Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report, 1996* (Lagos: CBN, 1996), p. 52.

[264] Danjuma, "Revenue Sharing and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism", p. 101.

The Contest over Vertical Revenue Allocation 1999-2007

With the inception of civilian rule in 1999 an enabling environment was created for robust debates and discourses in political and court circles over revenue allocation, allocation of tax powers and expenditure responsibilities in the Nigerian federation. The contentious questions ranged from, what proportion of the national revenue should go to each tier of government, what principle and percentages should guide the sharing of these resources and who exercises the right to determine each tier's share of national income?

Much more importantly, from 1999 there emerged a robust political and legal resistance to the centre's monopoly of the federation account. This is a far cry from what obtained in the military era where unquestionable obedience secured for the military regimes enough enough room to maneuver monpolise and unilaterally misappropriate the country's national resources.

On intergovernmental fiscal relations, in June 2000 the thirty six state governors condemned the subsisting revenue allocation formula as being unduly favourable to the federal government and called for a reduction of federal government's share from 48% to 30%.[265] Also in October 2000 the seventeen in the new democratic dispensation met and unanimously endorsed total control of their resources.[266] They accused the federal government of operating a first charge system (which is true) whereby 50-60% of federal revenue is unilaterally withdrawn from the nation's purse leaving 40% to 45% to be shared among the tiers of government and out of which the federal government takes not less than 48% as its own share. The governors further threatened to take the federal government to court (which they did) if it continued with these illegal deductions and other unconstitutional acts[267] which only served to perpetuate vertical fiscal imbalance. The federal government did not respond until August 2001 when in conjunction with Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), it sent its proposed revenue allocation formula to the National Assembly for study and possible ratification. The proposed percentages for the sharing of the federation account which hiked some and reduced the other were as follows, federal government, formerly 48.5% now 41.3%, states 24% now 31%, Local governments 20% now 16% and special funds 2.8% now 11.7%, which was also to be retained by the federal government.[268]

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[265] *The Guardian*, Lagos (June 23, 2000).

[266] *Post Express*, Lagos (Wednesday, October 11, 2002), p. 2.

[267]*The Guardian*, Lagos (Sunday, January 14, 2001), p. 14.

[268] *Daily Times*, Lagos (Friday, August 31, 2001), p. 9.

Meanwhile in February 2001, the Attorney General of the Nigerian federation initiated a legal dispute in the Supreme Court between the federal government and the littoral oil- producing states over the control of off shore oil revenues. The Supreme Court in April 2002 passed its judgement. A fall out of that judgement (which is relevant here) is the court's declaration that the federal government's deductions of certain revenues from the federation account (before the allocation of the account to the three levels of government) are unconstitutional.[269] This declaration vindicated the earlier stance of the southern governors who had initially in October 2000 declared as unconstitutional, the centre's "first line" charges on the federation account.

In September 2001, the fourth summit of southern governors at Ibadan, rejected the proposed changes and affirmed that it was unrealistic as it negated the principles of fairness and equity. They in turn proposed that the federal government should instead retain 36%, give the states 36% also, and allocate to the local governments 25%, Federal Capital Territory 1% and Ecology 2%. This according to the governors reflected equity and fairness.[270] Quite obviously, one reason why the governors rejected the new formula was because, they believed that the expected slash in central government's share of the federation account would be compensated for with the proposed expansion in the size of centrally controlled special funds (2.8% now 11.7%).

While RMAFC was waiting for parliamentary response on the proposed revenue formula changes (which took over two years to prepare), the Nigerian president in an executive order unilaterally amended the allocation of revenue (federation account etc) act in May 2002 and backdated it to May 29, 1999. This was done without the consent of the National Assembly. This is reminiscent of the years of military and dictatorial rule when decrees were rolled out unilaterally and backdated to whichever date to suit the whims and caprices of the maximum ruler. In the amendment, the president increased the federal government's allocation from 48.5% to 56% while states and local governments were left stagnant with 24% and 20% respectively. The civilian president affirmed that the federal government's increased allocation was arrived at by the additional allocation of the 7.5% previously standing to the benefit of the special funds (meant for the littoral states) but now appropriated by the federal government because of the supreme court's ruling of April 2002 on the onshore - offshore dichotomy matter. The House of Representatives in its response said that the president's action constituted a breach of the 1999

[269] Rotimi Suberu, "The Politics of Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria", Conference paper presented at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA (2002), pp. 10–11.

[270] *Daily Times*, Lagos (Tuesday, September 11, 2001), p. 58.

constitution which states that "such matters (revenues allocation) must be processed in the National Assembly through the due legislative and parliamentary procedures.[271] Not until after this that such amendment can become law".[272]

Other breaches of the Olusegun Obasanjo regime were the misapplication of budgets, illegal withdrawal of funds from the consolidated accounts to fund extra budgetary projects like the Niger Delta Power Project, NPR conference, Paris club debt exit payments and extension of the enumeration exercise for the National Population Census.[273] All of these acts contravene the 1999 constitution, section 80 (1-4) which explicitly states that the National Assembly should approve every expenditure from the consolidated Revenue fund of the federation. It states: "No monies shall be withdrawn from the consolidated revenue fund of the federation or any other public fund of the federation, except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly[274] (see 1999 constitution). The president rationalized his unilateral action of illegal withdrawals by saying that "the withdrawal was a last minute measure to save the 2006 national population census from being a total failure. Two extra days were allocated for the exercise outside the originally planned period, thus requiring emergency expenditure." Rationalising the breaches further, Dr. Okonjo Iweala, the then finance minister said "... although the senate appropriated the Paris club exit payment from the consolidated revenue fund, the actual payment was sourced from the excess crude and PPT accounts. As there was no money in the consolidated revenue funds "Mr. President sought for and obtained the full consent of governors and other stakeholders (sidelining federal legislators) to fund the exit payments with a loan from the excess crude[275] account. The most worrisome situation here is that against the ruling of the Supreme Court judgment of April 5, 2002, which ruled that each debtor state should pay its own debt, the central government forcefully assumed this jurisdiction of the states. In addition states such as Kaduna and Nasarawa that were not owing the Paris club any debts had their portions of the excess proceeds not disbursed to them.[276]

These were arbitrary acts of the central government which were unconstitutional, so much so that the executive sought to usurp the duties of

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[271] *The Guardian*, Lagos (Sunday, July 28, 2007), p. 18.

[272] *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999*, Section 162 on Public Revenues, Subsection 2 (Lagos, Government Printer, 1999).

[273] "Illegal Withdrawals from Excess Crude Funds", *The Guardian*, Lagos (Sunday, June 18, 2006), pp. 20 and 57; *The Guardian*, Lagos (Thursday, August 24, 2006), p. 8.

[274] *The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, Section 80 (1–4).

[275] *The Guardian*, Lagos (Sunday, June 18, 2006), p. 57.

[276] *Ibid.*

other arms of government. This also runs contrary to the ideals of federalism which is only compatible with the tenets of shared rule and diversity.[277]

The Judiciary, Federal and State Governments and Oil Revenues in the Fourth Republic

Profound developments too have occurred in the legal dimes in the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian administration between the thirty six states (especially the littoral states) and the federal government. On the 11th of July 2001, the Supreme Court declared in a case between the state and the Federal government that "there can be no boundary dispute between the federation and individual states whether littoral or otherwise, since the boundaries are the same.[278] Another case came up again between the federal government and littoral states over the on-shore—offshore issue.

Oil dichotomy in the application of resource control (an euphemism for control of oil resources by littoral states). The Attorney General of the federation took the matter to the Supreme Court for adjudication. Thus on April 5, 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the federal government positing that, "the seaward boundary of the littoral states do not extend to the exclusive zone or continental shelf of Nigeria" and that only the federal government has control over the resources in the area".[279] That judgment smacks of inconsistency on the part of the Supreme Court if the former ruling of 11th July 2001 is juxtaposed with the ruling of April 5, 2002.

Consequently, revenues from oil mineral in that area (offshore) were not considered in the computation of revenues due to such littoral states from the federation account. It also meant that the 13% derivation fund would not be paid to the littoral states in full. This was a huge loss in revenue terms to oil producing states especially Akwa Ibom whose crude oil resources are mostly off-shore.

It is also instructive to note that the nature of oil as a wasting asset implies that states with on shore oil stand to also lose out in the future when the oil runs out, by which period oil firms operating in the present on shore location would have relocated elsewhere. Oloibiri is a classic example as that was the first place in 1958 that crude oil was discovered in large quantities. However as it stands today the Oloibiri community does not benefit from the 13% derivation fund as it has ceased from bearing crude oil. In Ben Nwabueze's condemnation of the federal government's attitude to the rights of the littoral states he said… "if international law accords these special rights to coastal states, because of the vulnerability of their

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[277] Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi Suberu, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Nigerian Federalism", in Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi Suberu, (eds.), *Nigerian Federalism in Crisis*, p. 4.

[278] *This Day*, Lagos (Sunday, May 5, 2007), p. 23.

[279] *The Nigerian Tribune*, Ibadan (Friday, May 6, 2005), p. 18.

proximity to the sea, it smacks of meanness, insensitivity, injustice, inconsolableness and oppression for the federal government of Nigeria, a beneficiary of the kind indulgent concession of international law, to deny to the country's littoral states a paltry 13% of the revenue derived from mineral resources located in their territorial waters, continental shelf or exclusive economic zone contiguous to their territory.[280]

The oil producing states subsequently renewed their agitation and this development exacerbated crisis in the Niger Delta region again. The National Assembly too had prior to the ruling (of April 2002) revoked the dichotomy Act which the president refused to sign into law.[281] With the pressures from the Niger Delta and, knowing fully well that the Supreme Court judgment would not enhance fiscal federalism and fairness (but would rather enhance the neglect and restiveness in the Niger Delta region), the president proposed a political solution which was contained in the allocation of revenue Act 2004. The Act abolished the dichotomy in the application of Derivation and provided also that 13% of the revenue derived from oil should go fully to the oil producing states. A controversial clause added to the Act was that the 200 metre depth isobath contiguous to a state of the federation shall be deemed to be part of that state for the purposes of computing the revenue accruing to the federation account from the state.[282] Furthermore the president unilaterally gave ₦600 million and ₦210 million to Akwa Ibom and Ondo states respectively as part of the political solution.[283] In actual fact the inclusion of the 200 metre isobath clause made of no effect (rubbished) the abrogation of the dichotomy law because most of the mega oil funds are no longer onshore or in shallow offshore (within 200 metres) but in the deep offshore measuring between 3,673 and 3,745 feet deep, like Erha and Bonga oil fields[284] Erha will produce 210,000 barrels of oil a day and 300 million Cubic feet of gas daily.[285] The Nigerian coastal states, off whose shores these tremendous finds are being made, will not enjoy any derivative rights in these deep sea areas since derivation is limited to 200m isobath. In fact the deep off shore will progressively yield an increasing proportion of Nigerian oil and gas. As the land and shallow offshore (200m) reserves are getting exhausted, the deep offshore reserves beyond 200metres will keep increasing. In short the future of Nigerian oil and gas exploration and exploitation is in the deep offshore, outside the

[280] *The Guardian*, Lagos (Thursday, April 14, 2005), p. 8.
[281] "Threats in the Delta", *The Punch*, Lagos (Thursday, June 5, 2003), p. 16.
[282] "Supreme Court on the Revenue Allocation Act", *The Guardian*, Lagos (Wednesday, January 4, 2006), p. 12.
[283] *The Guardian*, Lagos (Sunday, July 28, 2007), p. 18.
[284] *The Punch*, Lagos (Thursday, March 28, 2002), p. 23.
[285] *The Punch*, Lagos (Thursday, May 11, 2006), p. 28.

derivation zone granted to the littoral states under the 200 meters isobath Act.[286]

While the oil producing states were still pondering on their fate in the Nigerian federation, the nineteen Northern states' governors in collaboration with their south-western counterparts of Ekiti, Osun and Oyo (to reflect federal character) challenged the constitutionality of the allocation of revenue Act 2004 and the payment from the federation account of 13% of funds based on derivation to the oil producing states at the supreme court. Thus on December 16, 2005 the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the suit of the twenty-two state governors, as lacking in merit and upheld the passage and contents of the Allocation of revenues Act 2004 as legal and constitutional.[287]

Another matter that came up between the Federal government and another federating unit for adjudication before the supreme court and which reinforced the unitary nature of the federal government was the seizure of Lagos state local councils' funds from 2003. The fund was over ₦10 billion. The Supreme Court in its judgment in 2005 declared the President's action as illegal, a breach of federalist principles which emphasized federating units' autonomy in internal affairs. The federal government was asked by the court to release the funds but the President, Olusegun Obasanjo, never complied with this ruling affirming he will not release the funds until Lagos state reverted to the former twenty local councils that subsisted before it broke into fifty seven.[288] The President never released the funds till he exited the government on May 29, 2007.

With regard to the executive's handling of the issue of restiveness in the Niger Delta, the President in the year 2000 created the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). The NDDC'S efforts at turning around the socio economic fortunes of the Niger Delta region have been at best cosmetic as it has become a conduit for disbursing largesse to political jobbers and this has not stopped the people of the region from complaining about inadequacy of infrastructural facilities and the likes. This has resulted in continued restiveness in the region with kidnapping of oil workers and vandalisation of oil companies' equipments.

The government too had responded in kind, by sending military expedition forces against the people in the oil bearing communities. The massacres at Odi and Choba bear eloquent testimonies to this assertion. To underlie NDDC'S inefficiency, the president on April 18, 2006 unveiled a multimillion dollar initiative to create 20,000 jobs and build infrastructure in the Niger Delta. This would include drilling of hundreds of wells and

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[286] *The Guardian*, Lagos (Thursday, April 14, 2005), p. 8.

[287] *The Guardian*, Lagos (Wednesday, January 4, 2006).

[288] *The Punch*, Lagos (Friday, June 24, 2005), p. 15.

building of a $1.75 billion highway. This entire package is in a bid to quiet separatist voices and bring peace to Africa's biggest oil export industry.[289]

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing challenges there is the urgent need to mend fault lines in intergovernmental relations in the Nigerian federation. The first in the series of recommendations is the constitutional amendment. There should be a constitutional review of the power relations between the central and state governments. The present constitution is a military document. A situation whereby the centre has exclusive legislative powers over thirty items[290] is not healthy for a federal system of government where the two levels of government ought to be co-ordinate and non subordinate to the other. Historically the big bang approach (wholesale constitutional amendment) has not worked for Nigeria, thus a gradualist approach to constitutional amendment as a more expedient and feasible option. Existing states should be merged into geo political zones and given autonomy in internal affairs including the generation and management of revenues while they pay appropriate taxes to the centre. This would check duplication of government activities, make governance much more cost effective, compact and encourage efficiency in the delivery of government services. This rationalization process would also help diffuse the currencies of power and discourage the intense rush by politicians to the centre as the centre would no longer hold much attraction for politicians as it currently does. The centre should only concentrate on evolution and implementation of macro-economic policies, foreign affairs, defence and currency. Derivation and special funds should be paid to the local councils and not extra ministerial agencies like NNDC. In addition the citizens should massively mobilize mass movements around issue based civil society institutions. This would perpetually checkmate the illicit use (abuse) of federal power and resources- a challenge that has plagued the federation from inception and checkmated the attainment of the fine tenets of federalism and fiscal federalism.

Conclusion

The preceding critique of the Nigerian intergovernmental fiscal relations should not make us lose sight of some of the dispensation's somewhat redemptive features. These include a democracy, constitutional government, vibrant judiciary, articulate press and combative state governments which are still evolving. Federalism in its elements is incompatible with authoritarianism. The former gives diverse territorial

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[289] *The Punch*, Lagos (Thursday, April 20, 2006), p. 1.
[290] See *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999*, 2nd Schedule.

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regional groups and economic agents the relative autonomy to create their opportunities and resources as well as manage them. The latter constricts such opportunities. This paper contends that authoritarian rule was what obtained in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. This attitude has stagnated social change, truncated the qualitative and quantitative transformation of productive and physical structures of the federation. Here the federal funds were not rationally distributed and utilized as decisions were based on "the ruler's supposed infallible wisdom and what were calculated to please him".[291] The federal government in this democratic dispensation continued, to all intents and purposes in the unitary tradition of government handed down by the preceding military regimes. In addition the government at the federal level has been overbearing, at times with brazen contempt for court orders and disregard for the Nigerian constitution on revenue matters. The Niger Delta region did not also get a fair deal under this democratic regime as national revenues were still highly centralized. The only redeeming feature here is that the regime has attempted to compensate oil the oil bearing states through partial restoration and expansion of the derivation principle.

The judiciary was very visible in this dispensation of contest over the custody and control of national revenues. The Supreme Court's arbitration most times in these constitutional matters has always favoured the federal government against the federating units. This scenario re-echoes the Australian experience where the Supreme Court has historically been in support of the commonwealth government (Central government) against the federating units in matters of taxing powers and revenue administration.[292] Interestingly too, in Nigeria's second republic, the Supreme court ruled in favour of Bendel and Rivers states in a suit they brought against the federal government on revenue allocation matters.[293] In this dispensation, it is a reversal of judgments.

This period also witnessed the shifting of the boundaries of allegiance on revenue matters (back & forth) between the thirty six states and the federal government. We have seen the federal government against

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[291]   Adewoye Omoniyi, "Constitutionalism: The Inescapable Route to Development". A public lecture in commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of Osun State, (Osogbo: Paramount Ventures Press, 2006), p. 11.

[292]   Jeffrey D. Petchey and Perry Shapiro, "One People One Destiny: Centralisation and Conflicts of Interest in Australian Federalism", in David E. Wildasin (ed.), *Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 207–209.

[293]   Samuel G. Egwu, *Ethnicity, Economic Crisis and National Development: An Investigation on the Social, Economic and Political Crisis in Nigeria* (Dakar: Anthony Rowe, (Cordesria), 1993), pp. 58–59.

the littoral states, the other twenty two states against the federal government and littoral states with utter disregard for party lines and North-South dichotomy. Revenue allocation had been a determining factor in the shifting boundaries of allegiance.

On a final note these challenges would remain intractable and reforms impossible until the political elite and general citizenry internalize the culture of 'give and take' and also learn to organize their activities within the ambit of the laws of the land. This done , it should then be possible to develop a Nigerian federation as one of equal rights and opportunities which is also run in consonance with our culture and diversities and keeping with our aspiration for accelerated development and a harmonious society.

"The Plague of Pebbles/Stones': River Goddess, Black Stool And Re-Writing Adawso–Akuapem History"[294]

Ebenezer AYESU

Introduction: A Plague of Pebbles/Stones

In 1982 a strange occurrence frightened the people of Adawso-Akuapem, a farming community and a market center in south-eastern Ghana. For five months (January to May), a number of houses including the chief's palace; and the only monument in the town were inexplicably pelted with pebbles (stones). As it turned out, the occurrence was the handy work of the river goddess of the town that was avenging the spiteful treatment meted out to her by the elders of the town.[295] Consequently, the elders embarked upon a process to make amends; the outcome of which in the view of this paper constituted the re-writing of the history of Adawso.[296] In this context, events in Adawso gave credibility to the assertion that in ancient Africa, matriarchy had preceded patriarchal kinship and inheritance system in Africa; and that it was colonialism that distorted and supplanted indigenous African kinship system.[297]

Was matriarchy fundamental to the ideals of kinship system in ancient and traditional Africa? Ifi Amadiume has strongly advocated for a re-interpretation of African history whereby the historical place of womanhood is restored to its rightful place. In doing this she rejects any attempt at "imitating" Eurocentric feminism to "construct" new structures arguing that, "we already have a history and legacy of a woman's culture" and that there is therefore the need to highlight it in a social enquiry.[298] This article, in agreeing with Amadiume's argument, stresses that whatever pre-eminence or domination men exercise in African societies should not be

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[294] As a citizen of Adawso and someone who witnessed and participated extensively in activities to unravel the episode under discussion, I write this article as a means of recording an aspect of the town's social history; and to contribute to discourse on gender relations in Africa.

[295] Nana Adu Amoah III (1979-1986), chief of Adawso; Okyeame Awuku, principal elder of Adawso; and A A Anti, former High School history teacher and a descendant of Abraham Adu.

[296] Ibid.

[297] Ifi Amadiume, 1997: 165.

[300] Amadiume's work generally speaks to the brilliant studies of Cheikh Anta Diop on Africa under the titles, *Precolonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems of Europe and Black Africa from Antiquity to the Formation of Modern States*, Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1987; and *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa: The Domains of Patriarchy and Matriarchy in Classical Antiquity*, London: Karnak House, 1989.

construed that their women counterparts tacitly accept the "status quo," but at least, as the Adawso case will shortly demonstrate, that women's willingly "subordinate" their influence and authority to those of men for the greater good of society. This notwithstanding, they have every right to reassert themselves when things "go bad."[299]

Similarly, the paper speaks to the tendency by men in African societies to refer to women as "wicked."[300] African women in their individual and collective endeavors have "pushed" the boundaries of "acceptable" and "respectable behavior" that has brought about profound changes in the reconfiguration of gender relations in Africa. In effect, African women "have always been key to processes of gender production and transformation". Their achievement though laudable, is erroneously perceived as disrupting "the web of social relations..." a development that may be seen as "wicked".[301] They are therefore stigmatized as "wayward," "unruly," or immoral. But however defined, this paper would argue that women in the interest of social harmony are prepared to keep to acceptable order. This notwithstanding, they can be "wicked" albeit when provoked by society.

Additionally, the Adawso episode and its aftermath showcased a religiosity characterized by a revealing difference in paradigm shift from that discussed brilliantly by Paul Gifford in his work on Ghana's new Christianity.[302] Incidentally, Adawso population was predominantly Christian with both mainline ("orthodox") and Pentecostal churches conspicuously present.[303] As a result, at the onset of the episode, the churches took steps to stop the occurrence but to no avail. Faced with the portentous failure of the churches, the chief and elders of the town approached the Akonodi shrine at Larteh for help. Following this development, this paper would broaden Gifford's "paradigm shift" with its

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[299] This article agrees effectively with Amadiume that "... patriarchy and matriarchy have always been contesting systems which have been articulated and manipulated in the power struggle between interest groups in indigenous Africa" (*Reinventing Africa*, 163).

[300] Dorothy L. Hodgson and Shirley A. McCurdy, eds., *"Wicked" Women and the Reconfiguration of Gender in Africa*. Portsmouth, N. H.: Heinemann, 2001.

[301] Ibid.

[302] Paul Gifford, *Ghana's New Christianity: Pentecostalism in a Globalising African Economy*. London: Hurst and Company, 2004 (the focus here is on chapter 2: 20-43).

[303] Ebenezer Ayesu, "Conflict of Institutions: Chieftaincy, Church and State, A Case Study of Adawso Akuapem, 1960-1980,"in I Odotei and A Awedoba, eds., *Chieftaincy in Ghana: Culture, Governance and Development*. Accra, Ghana: Sub Saharan Publishers, 2006, 493-504.

focus on the "Orthodox" and Pentecostal churches to include traditional religious practices.[304]

A Profile of Adawso

Adawso lies 10 miles on the Mamfe-Koforidua highway in the Eastern Region of Ghana. It was once a farming village first settled by one Opanin Adu (a.k.a. Abraham Adu) from the Amoakade clan of Amanokrom.[305]Opanin Adu stayed at Amanokrom and visited his farm at 'Apasare', which was later renamed Adawso.[306] Opanin Adu together with his three sisters- Afoa, Amanimaa and Aboraa, eventually decided to settle permanently at Adawso.[307]

With time, two other people, Opanin Fugyaw, from Larteh and Opanin Ofei Angua, from Mampong, also came to settle at Adawso.[308] The three men subsequently initiated moves to the Akan political system based on chieftaincy in the town. Opanin Adu, who was the first to settle at Adawso, was installed the Odekro ("Ode" – owner, "Kro" –town/village. Odekro means the owner of the town or village); Opanin Fuguyaw was made the Mankrado;[309] Opanin Ofei Angua became the Okycame (linguist). They each perpetuated their office through their descendants. Significantly, a dual system of succession to office emerged. As an Akan Opanin Adu was succeeded through his sisters' descendants, Opanin Fuguyaw and Ofei

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[304] This was synonymous with the popular Ghanaian saying, "we shall put the bible aside," made often in the face of problems that defy Christian solution.

[305] It was not clear if the *Amoakade* clan is part of the Akan family structure. This was because none of my informants was able to tell me the origin of the clan.

[306] Interview with A A. Anti, Okyeame Awuku, Opanin Adu Mfum and Nana Akua Ansaa (May 1997- June1999). Any time Opanin Adu was visiting his farm, he would tell his relations *"mereko adow no so"*- (I am visiting the farmstead) the place then became "Adawso." Meanwhile, Opanin Adu Mfum was a CPP activist and principal elder of Adawso; while Nana Akua Ansaa was retired trader and citizen of Adawso.

[307] Interview with Opanin Adu Mfum. According to Adawso traditions, Abraham Adu later banished his sister, Aboraa from Adawso for refusing to become a Christian and for an alleged misconduct which my informants including Opanin Adu Mfum declined to disclose.

[308] Ankobea Kwame Fosu is a transport owner and an elder from the Mampong group in Adawso. Moreover, he was a key supporter of the Session of Adawso Presbyterian Church in their litigation with Abraham Adu's family. He later changed course and actively supported Nana Adu Amoah III and his elders in the administration of Adawso. Opanin Kwame Doi, Presbyter, Adawso Presbyterian Church. Like Ankobea Kwame Fosu, supported the church but later became a principal elder at Adawso palace. Moreover, he was a retired cocoa clerk.

[309] *Mankrado* - "man"- state, "krado," – a lock. He initiates and closes matters between the chief and the Oman.

Angua, who were Guans, were succeeded through their sons and their male descendants. The right to elect and install a successor to any of the offices was reserved for the respective families subject to the public approval of the candidate so proposed Interview, A. A. Anti and Nana Osae Ntow.

Opanin Adu's citizenship of Amanokrom placed Adawso under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Amanokrom, the Gyaasehene of the Akuapem state. It was through the Gyaasehene that Adawso served the Okuapehene (the paramount Chief of the Akuapem state) at Akropong. It is however not clear if the office of Odekro of Adawso had a family stool attached to it from the beginning. Nevertheless, there is a tradition which claims that Opanin Adu originally brought a chieftaincy stool from Amanokrom but later returned it.[310] Another tradition also claims that Opanin Adu never had a stool, since he was not even a stool occupant before he left his original home (Amanokrom).

Interestingly, the foundation of Adawso coincided with the extension of the Basel mission evangelical activities beyond Akropong. Opanin Adu consequently became interested in the teachings of the mission and got baptized at Mamfe and was christened Abraham.[311] Abraham Adu later encouraged the Basel mission to establish a station at Adawso. The journey from Adawso to Mamfe at the time was made on foot, and covered a distance of over ten kilometers. It was thus a daunting task for a man like Adu, who was in his late seventies to regularly cover such a distance.[312] The social improvement that the presence of the mission was likely to promote at Adawso through good sanitation, better housing and schools also influenced Abraham Adu's request for a station at Adawso. His wishes were gratified when a station was established there in 1894.

The Basel mission was welcomed in Adawso with great enthusiasm. Within a short time, the entire household and relations of Abraham Adu accepted the gospel and played leading roles in the local church. For instance, Opanin Kwasi Bekoe, a grand nephew of Abraham Adu, became

[310] Interview, A. A. Anti, Okyeame Awuku and Nana Osae Ntow.
[311] Interview with A.A Anti. For more details on Basel mission's activities in Akuapem and the Gold Coast see, Kwamena-Poh, *Vision and Achievement: A Hundred and Fifty Years of the Presbyterian Church in Ghana 1828-1978*, 1980, (an unpublished manuscript); R. Addo-Fening, "Church and State: A Historical Review of Interaction between the Presbyterian Church (Ghana) and Traditional Authority," *Research Review* (IAS, Legon), Vol. 1, No. 2 (1985), pp. 129-151
[312] Interview, Opanin Kwame Date and Samuel Adu Boafo. This was corroborated by Papa Mossi, a descendant of Abraham Adu's sister, Aboraa; and Nana Osae Ntow.

the first senior Presbyter of the church.[313] Rev. Charles Martin Adu, another grand nephew of Abraham Adu, also became the first native of Adawso to be ordained a Presbyterian minister. Other people who were not related to Abraham Adu also joined the church. Since the people enthusiastically accepted the Basel mission, it remained the only church in Adawso until the 1960s.

The Basel Mission responded to the increase in membership by acquiring landed property in Adawso. There are nonetheless two traditions concerning the Mission's land acquisition. One tradition is that, the Basel mission bought the entire area of present day Adawso Township and gave it as a present to Abraham Adu and his people. The other tradition, probably the more authentic, was that the mission bought some parcels of Adawso land, settled its early converts on part of it, and built a chapel and a school on the remaining part.[314] Meanwhile, the Basel mission gave Abraham Adu a linguist staff, a black umbrella and gong-gong to use as his regalia. Beyond that, the church did not interfere with the town's political arrangement as discussed earlier.[315] However, Adawso was designated a Basel mission town; and Abraham Adu, a Christian Chief. Moreover, Abraham Adu's successful reign; and active support for the Basel mission and probably colonial officials was celebrated with a grand monument that bore the citation, "Abraham Adu, the first Christian Chief of Adawso".[316] The monument was located in front of the Adawso palace and as we shall see later, was one of the scenes for the episode under discussion. Meanwhile, Opanin Adu's farming activities and eventual settlement at Adawso was made possible by the availability of water from a near-by river called *Bekyea*. With time, the river's name was changed to *Borebea* -female python. The change was necessitated by a mysterious occurrence at the time when the people of the town were cleaning the river site. According to Adawso traditions, in the course of the work, a strange snake emerged from

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[313] Samuel Adu Boafo is a director at Ghana Post, and the grandson of Rev. Charles Martin Adu (interviewed with Opanin Kwame Date and Samuel Adu Boafo in February, 2001).

[314] Interviewees :(Opanin Nicholas Kesse Atiemo and Rev. T. A Osei). Rev. T.A. Osei was a former Synod Clerk of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana and as would soon emerge, he played a leading role in the Adawso Presbyterian Church-Abraham Adu's family dispute.

[315] Interview with Nicholas Atiemo Manu. Also see letter from District Commissioner, to Commissioner, Eastern Province. PRAAD, Adm. 11/1/110, Accra.

[316] Nicholas Atiemo Papers. The papers, "Chronicle of Events from the Chief's Palace, Adawso" are the undated private collections of Mr. Nicholas Atiemo Kesse, a retired Court Clerk and a descendant of Abraham Adu. Meanwhile, I have deposited a copy of it at the Asafo Documentation Centre. Institute of African Studies. University of Ghana. Legon.

the forest moved towards the direction of the *Odekro* and his elders. For fear of their lives, the elders understandably ordered that the reptile be killed; and it was instantaneously carried out. In an apparent attempt to bury the snake, the people detected that it was a female and with the consent of the Odekro and his elders, it was agreed that they immortalize the incident and also highlight the sustaining motherhood of the river by naming it *Borebea* (a female python). Then after, the people performed a ritual to consummate the change and in the process buried the snake.[317] Later, the community in a clear departure from honoring womanhood appointed a male, Christian Owusu Agyei (Kofi Agyei), a nephew of Opanin Adu, to be responsible for all rituals connected with the river.[318] Their action highlighted gender ambiguities and perpetuated the "error of taking patriarchy as given, or as a paradigm."[319]

In the mean time, the fortunes of river *Borebea* experienced devastating decline in the affairs of the town. The decline was however not related to the characteristic reduction in volume of most water bodies in Ghana in the 1970s (Konye Obaji Ori, 2009).[320] It was due to Adawso's perennial chieftaincy disputes; the 1960s and 1970s being central to this article.

The River Python and Adawso Chieftaincy Dispute

Borebea's problems started when the power nodes in Adawso politics- the family, chieftaincy, the Presbyterian Church and the Ghanaian state engaged each other in a struggle over the control of the town's administration. Adawso as we already know was Basel mission (now Presbyterian) controlled town. This did not change even after the British proclamation of the Gold Coast colony in 1874. For the British authorities continued to recognize the right of the Basel Mission to play a leading role in the affairs of the town. As a result, successive rulers of Adawso were all members of the church and were urged as was the case of Odekro Christian

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[317] Interviews with Nicholas Atiemo Manu, (Yaw Nicho), an elder at Adawso chief's palace (January- June, 2009).

[318] Interview with Opanin Adu Mfum: This was corroborated by several people I interviewed in 2008 as part of efforts to update the data for this paper.

[319] The Adawso situation ran contrary to Ifi Amadiume's argument about the motherhood paradigm and patriarchy. For more on her argument, see, Ifi Amadiume, *Reinventing Africa*, 35.

[320] "Ghana and West Africa to Brace for Mega Draught: A-Hundred-Year-Long Draught Predicted by US Researchers," *Afrik News*, Friday 17 April, 2009 (http://www.afrik-news.com/article15581.html).

Awuku (Kwasi Botwey) to use only the regalia given to his predecessor and founder of Adawso, Abraham Adu by the church.[321]

Initially, the unusual interest shown by the Basel Mission and the colonial government in Adawso chieftaincy did not affect the unity of the people very much. Whatever suspicions and disagreement that emerged between the traditionalists and the Christians remained subdued and did not pose any threat to peace until the era of the government of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP). As it happened, the CPP government in an apparent recognition of the town's agricultural potentialities established a worker's brigade camp to provide employment to the people.[322] However, the well intended project aroused latent antagonisms, inflamed popular feelings and deepened the nascent polarization in Adawso society. It all began with a fight between Mr. Tieku, District Commissioner (DC), and an unnamed camp commander over a woman.[323] The tension between the two was exacerbated when the chief of the town, Odekro Ntow Boafo, unbecoming of a chief bizarrely supported the camp commander.[324] In the heat of events, opponents of Nana Ntow Boafo possibly dissatisfied with his conduct made a serious allegation of embezzlement against him. He was accused of embezzling monies given to him by the government as compensation for people whose lands were taken over for the brigade camp.[325]

As if by design, the young men of the town led by one Kwasi Adu Mfum, a CPP activist and counselor also accused the Odekro of harassment.[326]Faced with mounting pressure from all angles, Odekro Ntow Boafo abdicated the stool. Consequently, Adawso experienced a long interregnum. This was because the Afoa line that was to provide a replacement failed to do so.[327] In the absence of a substantive ruler, the government appointed regents including controversial Adu Mfum to administer the affairs of the town. This was not taken kindly by the Basel mission. Led by its senior presbyter, Opanin Debrah, Opanin Earnest Okraku Manu, Madam Beatrice Asamoah and Madam Aboagye (Maame

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[321] Odekro Christian Awuku succeeded Odekro Solomon Amoah. See letter from District Commissioner to Commissioner, Eastern Province, PRAAD, Adm. 11/1/1102, Accra.

[322]Interview with Ankobea Kwame Fosu. His claim was corroborated by Auntie Mina (Mrs. Obuo Manu). She claimed her ancestral land was also taken for the camp.

[323] According to Ankobea Kwame Fosu and Okyeame Kwame Awuku, the two competed for the heart of the same women.

[324] Interview, Okyeame Awuku and Nana Osae Ntow.

[325] Nana Afari Ntow was a grandnephew of Abraham Adu and rose to office through the Amanimaa line.

[326] Interview, Okyeame Awuku and Nana Osae Ntow.

[327] Meanwhile, no one could tell whether their failure was deliberate or not.

Lawyer), it passed a resolution in which they asserted the right of the church to appoint and install the *Odekro* of Adawso. In their submission, they argued that from its foundation, the town had been successively ruled by a member, usually senior presbyter of and appointed by the church.[328]

The church subsequently installed Opanin Debrah, a grand son of Abraham Adu as the *Odekro of Adawso*. The choice of Opanin Debra violated the Akan customary practice governing succession to the stool. Under the Akan system of inheritance, only brothers or nephews can inherit their brothers or uncles or grand uncles. Abraham Adu's family understandably resented the action of the church.[329] It therefore instructed its representative, A.A. Anti to take action which it won at the Gyaasehene's court at Amanokrom. The church was not satisfied with the ruling and therefore appealed against it at the Omanhene's court at Akropong. In the course of the appeal A.A. Anti testified that Abraham Adu until his conversion occupied a blackened stool which like Akan leaders constituted the chief's source of legitimacy, and ipso facto, authority. He could however not produce the said stool when demanded to do so.[330]The head of the Amoakade clan at Amanokrom whom the former had called as witness could not amid contradictory claims, confirm the existence of the stool.[331] Faced with contradictory testimonies, the Omanhene's court upheld the appeal against the Gyaasehene's ruling.[332] The ruling by the Omanhene's court, to say the least, was unfortunate. The inability of A.A. Anti's party to prove the existence of the blackened stool did not change the fact that Adawso chieftaincy predated the establishment of the church. And for that reason, the pre- existing rules and custom of succession should have been upheld.

Meanwhile, A.A. Anti and his party further appealed against the Omanhene's court ruling at the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs then sitting at Dodowa. At this juncture the case was given a new twist with the dramatic yet conceivable appearance of Rev. T.A. Osei; the Synod Clerk of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana. He came as a representative of the parent church and in support of the local Session at Adawso.[333] By his involvement in a purely local dispute, the Presbyterian Church had declared its intention,

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[328] His claim was confirmed by A.A. Anti and Okyeame Awuku. Interestingly, most recordings in the "The Church Chronicle'- a station diary of the church have been tempered with making it difficult for one to cross check facts available

[329] Interview with Okyeame Awuku, Auntie Mina and Opanin Kwame Doi.

[330] *Ibid.*

[331] *Ibid.*

[332] Interview, Ankobea Kwame Fosu and Opanin Kwame Doi: see also, "The Church Chronicle."

[333] Interview, Rev. T. A. Osei.

albeit tacitly to support claims of its members to stools in areas with a view to influence local politics.[334]

Another twist to the case was the untimely death of Odekro Debrah who was succeeded by his able lieutenant, Opanin Earnest Okraku Manu who revolutionalized the chiefly regalia of Adawso with his adoption of a copy of the Holy Bible as the symbol of authority.[335] Incidentally, Odekro Okraku Manu was a great grand nephew of Abraham Adu. His father was Nana Kwabena Okraku who had earlier ruled Adawso.[336] As the new leader of the church, Odekro Okraku Manu naturally took over the case that had been referred the Judicial Committee of the Eastern Region House of Chiefs, chaired by Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene of the New Juabeng Traditional area. At the end of its deliberations, the committee overturned the ruling of the Omanhene's court (Interview, Opanin Kwame Doi, Ankobea Kwame Fosu and Okyeame Awuku). In giving reasons for its action, the committee convincingly argued that chieftaincy was governed by the customs and traditions of a people; and the church, being an alien institution, had no role in the determination of succession to stools.[337]

The church objected to the ruling and therefore returned the case to the Okuapehene's court, which they perceived to be sympathetic to their cause. Once again their expectation was rewarded with a favorable ruling (interview, Opanin Kwame Doi, Ankobea Kwame Fosu and Rev. T. A. Osei). A.A. Anti and his party in the fashion of the former, appealed against the latest ruling at the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs.[338]

In the course of filling papers politics development in Ghana with far reaching consequence for Adawso chieftaincy took place. A military coup led by Acheampong overthrew the then government of Dr Busia and gave the church a powerful ally. Incidentally, Col. I.K. Acheampong before his rise to power had had children (twins) with a niece of Odekro Okraku Manu. And so when the church eventually lost its case once more at Regional House of Chiefs, it sought and won the support of Col Acheampong. The latter refused to revoke the government's recognition of Nana Manu Okraku as the Odekro of Adawso as demanded by the turn of events.[339]

[334] Similar attempt was made in Akyem Abuakwa. See R. Addo-Fening, chapter. 5: 193-231 for details.

[335] Interview, Rev. T. A. Osei, A. A. Anti and Ankobea Kwame Fosu. Thus the Holy Bible replaced the linguist staff given to Abraham Adu by the Basel Mission.

[336] According to Adawso traditions, Nana Kwabena Okraku came from the Amanimaa line.

[337] Data from the judgment (see, Nicholas Atiemo papers).

[338] Interview, A. A. Anti, Okyeame Awuku and Ankobea Kwame Fosu.

[339] Interviews, Opanin Kwame Doi, Ankobea Kwame Fosu and Okyeame Awuku.

Odekro Manu Okraku thus continued to rule at Adawso in defiance of the ruling of the Regional House. Given the heavy political clout to the case. A. A. Anti and his party had to wait for time and possibly believed in the adage that "no condition is permanent." In the end, they were proved right.[340] They were not long offered a golden opportunity to redeem themselves. This was made possible by the military coup of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that took over the reins of power in 1979. They resurrected the case and won a decisive victory.[341] The A.A. Anti party immediately prayed the ruling family to nominate and install a new Odekro with the probable intent to pre-empt further action by the church. The family nominated, elected and installed one Bekoe Tabiri, a retired Civil Servant, from the Amanimaa line under the stool name Nana Adu Amoah III (1978-1986). He was later elevated to the status of Ohene (Chief) of Adawso by Oyeeman Wereko Ampem III (1975-2005). Chief of Amanokrom and Gyaasehene of Akuapem. Oyeeman's action probably intended to bolster the image and position of the occupant and office of the Akuapem Gyaase stool was pleasantly welcomed by Adawso kingmakers; who used it to "reintroduce" a blackened stool in Adawso. Moreover, they introduced the traditional *adae* calendar and rituals associated with the Akan-type chieftaincy institution. These actions erased whatever relevance the *Borehea* goddess might have left in Adawso. For the stool and the adae rituals took the center stage in the governance of the town. Consequently the office of queenmother was established for the first time in Adawso's history. As a result, they elected and installed Nana Akua Amanimaa (1979-1988) as queenmother.[342] Meanwhile, the restoration of descendants of Opanin Adu as the rulers of Adawso coupled with the "reintroduction" of the stool and the institution of the *adae* rituals were celebrated with pomp and pageantry befitting such an occasion. But the celebrations did not last forever.

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[340] See Mike Oquaye, *Politics in Ghana*, Tornado Pub., Accra, 1980, 72-79; Deborah Pellow, *Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty*, London: West View Press, 1986, chpt. 2: 36-90; Emmanuel Doe Ziorklui, *Ghana: Nkrumah to Rawlings*, EM-ZED Books, Accra, (1988), 199- 224; Vincent Okyere, *Ghana: A Historical Survey*, Cape Coast. Ghana: Catholic Press, 2000, chpt. 12: 179-221.

[341] Interview with Opanin Kwame Doi, Ankobea Kwame Okyeame Awuku, See also, Mike Oquaye, *Politics in Ghana*, 133ff.; Naomi Chazan, "The Rawlings Revolution", in *Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty*, Deborah Pellow, *Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty*, 75ff.; Vincent Okyere, *Ghana: A Historical Survey*, 211ff.

[342] Nana Amanimaa abdicated the stool in 1988 due to ill health grounds and was replaced by Nana Aboraa, a descendant of Aboraa, the exiled sister of Abraham Adu. Nana Abora was at the time of writing this paper litigating with Adawso kingmakers. The dispute is a subject of another forthcoming paper by me, "'She Owes a Fishing Trawler': Bending the Rules in the Name of Development."

Plague of Pebbles: Vengeance by River Goddess

Suddenly, Adawso Township was struck with intermittent dropping of pebbles/stones on houses and compounds for a period of about three months in 1982. The stones fell heavily at isolated places including the chief's palace; Opanin Adu's monument; the area in and around River Borebca. In addition, some of the pebbles fell on the houses of Solomon Amoah (Corner House); ex-Odekro Christian Awuku; and ex-Odekro Afari Ntow. Finally, it also fell on the house of the late Christian Owusu Agyei (Kofi Agyei); and this was believed to be the hardest hit.[343] As it turned out, all these places were revealingly important heritage sites and power nodes in Adawso polity for which reason they became targeted.

Luckily enough, there were no injuries throughout the period; yet the episode caused great consternation and sparked off desperate measures intended to stop it. As a first step, parents were asked to admonish their children who were suspected of throwing the pebbles. In addition, the chief and his elders passed a bye law to check truancy in schools.[344] But none of these produced results. The youth of the town were then mobilized to look out for and report suspicious characters they might see in town. Nothing came out of this either.[345] The local Presbyterian Church on its part invited a soothsayer to help unravel the mystery. This also proved ineffective (Interview, Rev. Johnson Obuo Manu).[346] The local branch of the Church of Pentecost on its part invited its prayer "warriors" from Koforidua to join the local group and organized spirited prayer sessions that ended in near disaster. For their prayer grounds were pounded with hail of pebbles that forced them to flee for safety.[347] The Ghana Police Service eventually sent police contingent to join the youth of the town[348] in an effort to arrest the miscreant; but without success.[349] This compelled Nana Adu Amoah III and his elders to conclude that a calamity had befallen the town. They therefore mobilized the people to perform an ancient spiritual warfare, eradication and purification ritual called *"asera yere"*. In the process, the people moved

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[343] House Number A.E. 18 shared a common boundary with the Adawso Presbyterian Church building.

[344] Generally, school children playing truant were most noted for such mischievous activities. .

[345] This was confirmed by several members of the church.

[346] Rev. Johnson Obuo Manu is the pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Koforidua Nursing Training School; and a Social Science tutor, Koforidua-Ada Senior High School, Koforidua. He is a descendant of Abraham Adu.

[347] Interview, Deaconess Hagar Tandoh and Madam Esther Mantebea.

[348] This was confirmed by Deaconess Yaa Otutuwa, Elders Kwasi Forson and Papa. Donkor (Kofi Goldsmith), leading members of the Adawso Church of Pentecost during interviews to update data for this paper (June 2012).

[349] The police were responding to Nana Adu Amoah III's request to the police to assist the elders of the town to help resolve the crisis.

from one end of the town to the other, singing war songs, drumming, pounding the ground with wooden pestles and sweeping and pouring libation at vantage points.[350] The elders then decided to report the matter to their divisional ruler, Gyaasehene Oyeeman Wereko Ampem III. Consequently, a high powered Adawso delegation led by Nana Adu Amoah III and comprising Okyeame Awuku, Ankobea Kwame Fosu,[351] Paa Joe, and Nicholas Atiemo (Yaw Nicho), went to Amanokrom as planned.[352]

To their unutterable surprise, Oyeeman and his elders did not believe their story. They were of the view that the events in Adawso were the work of some disgruntled youth.[353] They therefore charged them to intensify their search for and bring them to justice. The delegation returned to Adawso profoundly disappointed but did not fail to send reports on deteriorating condition time and time again to the Amanokrom court.[354] Eventually, Oyeeman and his elders visited Adawso to observe events there. Their visit was intentionally planned to coincide with *nvukudae* (*adae* Wednesday) to ostensibly perform and use the *adae* rituals to unravel the mystery behind the episode. Strangely enough, not a single stone fell on that day. Oyeeman Wereko Ampem III and his entourage left the Adawso palace, the venue for the rituals visibly exasperated. But their anger was short lived.

For just as he was leaving House Number A.E. 18 where he had gone to visit his relations, the only pebble for the day fell very close to his left toe.[355] He hurriedly ran to his car; and instructed the elders of Adawso to go wherever possible to look for the cause of the strange happenings; and left Adawso at the bewilderment of Nana Adu Amoah III, his elders and the people of Adawso.

Thereafter, Nana Adu Amoah III persuaded the descendants of Opanin Fuguyaw to use their historic ties with neighboring Larteh to invite

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[350] This was a pre-colonial ritual for warfare and was meant to test the battle readiness of the men-in-arms; and was also used to drive away evil forces in the community.

[351] His claim was corroborated by Okyeame Awuku.

[352] These were key players in the administration of the town. For instance, Okyeame Awuku was the chief spokesperson at the palace. On his part, Paa Joe was the town crier (gong-gong beater) who made public announcement ion behalf of the chief. Nicholas Atiemo was the *ohenekra*, the soul of the chief. For more details on these offices, see, R. S. Rattary, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, Oxford University Press, 1927; Peter Akwasi Sarpong, *Ghana in Retrospect*, Tema: Asempa Publishers, 1976.

[353] Interview, Oyeeman Wereko Ampem, Paa Joe and Nicholas Atiemo Manu (January 2000- May 2001).

[354] Interview, Okyeame Awuku, Paa Joe and Nicholas Atiemo Manu (May 2000).

[355] Interview, Oyeeman Wereko Ampem III, Okyeame Awuku, Paa Joe and Nicholas Atiemo Manu (June 2004).

the Akonodi shrine located in that town to come to their aid.[356] The *Akonodi* shrine was widely known throughout Ghana for its prowess to unravel mysteries like what was happening at Adawso and which they were already aware of.[357] This made the work of the emissaries from Adawso easy. After a brief exchange of protocol and consultation with the Akonodi oracle, Okomfo (priestess) Kyerewaa and two other priests left for Adawso. They were met at the outskirt of the town by an expectant crowd singing a combination of war songs and hymns of the Presbyterian Church amidst drumming and dancing.

And when they arrived at the Adawso palace, an elated Nana Adu Amoah III could not hide his confidence in the ability of the *Akonodi* shrine to unravel the mystery. He declared, "*ne musu yi a ekoso wo oman yi mu to betwamu*"- the ongoing abomination in the town will end today.[358] Without wasting much time, Okomfo Kyerewaa and her team quickly set down to work. For instance, they inspected the houses where the pebbles were dropping. And as it happened on the day of Oyeeman's visit, nothing happened. They finally went to river *Borebea* where they were met with a hail of pebbles; its intensity far heavier than ever.[359] Instantaneously, Okomfo Kyerewaa and her party fell into a prolonged trance during which they claimed the *Borebea* goddess disclosed to them that she was responsible for the calamity in the town. According to Okomfo Kyerewaa, the goddess was using it to register her displeasure conspicuous contempt she had suffered at the hands of chief and people of Adawso.[360] According to the goddess:

1. The elders of the town failed or refused to inform her of their decision to "bring back" the blackened stool to the town. They also failed to inform her when it was finally brought. Her argument was that, she had protected the town and its people since its foundation, warding off evil calamities like accidents, outbreak of diseases, earthquakes and others.

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[356] The delegation was led by Okyeame Awuku.

[357] Since the 1970s, the *Akonodi* had received international attention following the visit of a group of African Americans to the place and the subsequent tour of the United States of America by its High Priestess.

[358] Interview, Nicholas Atiemo Manu (December, 1999).

[359] Interview, Nana Amanimaa, Paa Joe, Okyeame Awuku and Osafohene Kwabena Donkor

[360] Although Adawso did not have an asafo company, the office of *Osafohene* (leader of the Asafo Company) had been created ostensible for the incumbent to mobilize the youth, the backbone of asafo membership for the development of the town; and emergencies including the one under discussion.

2. The elders for over many decades had defaulted in the performance of all rituals and observance of taboos associated with the river which were meant to keep her potency and reverence and most importantly to show the people's appreciation of her motherhood.

The reaction and response from the people gathered to the charges were revealing. For instance, there was unanimity especially among the elderly, in agreement of the goddess' claim of protection. They attested to the fact that Adawso had been spared a number of calamities, including the cholera outbreak of the 1970s in Ghana. They averred that though some deaths occurred during the outbreak, the number of deaths did not reach alarming proportions as it happened elsewhere in Ghana.[361]

On the second allegation, the chorus at the riverside was "*yɔntee saa mpanyinsɛm yi da*" (we have not heard of this tradition before).[362] They were completely dismissive of the charge; arguing that Adawso had since its foundation been a Christian town.[363] The only dissenting voice however, came from one Joseph Wilson (Paa Joe), a septuagenarian. Commenting on it in a whisper, he said he could recollect that during his boyhood days Opanin Kofi Agyei was in charge of the mobilization of the people in clearing bushes around the river. In an apparent confirmation of Paa Joe's "confession," I once overheard my maternal grandmother and her sister attributing the cause of a strange sickness of a great grandson of Kofi Agyei as punishment for the neglect of an ancestral duty by the family.

The doubting and dissenting voices notwithstanding, the day and event was not the time to challenge the goddess. To this end, Nana Adu Amoah III and his elders held an emergency meeting and asked the priestess to intercede on their behalf.[364] As a result, the priestess demanded three sheep, seven fowls, a carton of schnapps, and a bottle of *akpeteshie* (Ghana's version of America's moonshine). The animals were then slaughtered and their blood collected in a big bowl. Entrails and some selected parts of the animals were added to the blood and cooked. In addition, mashed yam, both "plain" and "red" (mixed with palm oil) was prepared. The priestess and her team then constructed an *nsorem* (a platform for sacrifice) at the banks of the river on which they poured libation and offered the food prepared to the goddess to appease her. Some of the food was later sprinkled at the sites of the stone droppings with the exception of

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[361] Interview, Opanin Kwame Doi.
[362] Opanin Kwame Doi was an octogenarian.
[363] Adawso oral traditions.
[364] I participated in the meeting.

the palace which was deferred to the next *adae* celebration.[365] In the case of House Number A.E. 18, stones collected from all sites and heaped under a nearby mango tree. This was after the priestess had poured libation and sprinkled food in and around the house.

After all these, Okomfo Kyerewaa and her party passed onto the people a set of taboos the goddess instituted in the town. These were:

1. no woman in her menstrual cycle should go to the riverside to fetch water; for as pollutant, menstrual blood it would imperil her potency;
2. no one should fetch water from the river with a black pot/pod or any black container;
3. on no account should anybody dip a bucket or big bowl directly into the river to fetch water. They are to use a calabash, cup or a small container to fill the bucket or whichever bigger container one might take to the river;
4. no one should fetch water from the river with a big bowl popularly called *hweaseammo* in Akan or *pan* by Asante people, or *agbaa* by the Ga and Ewe people of Ghana; and commonly used by women in view of its capacity to carry more water and thereby facilitating the speedy delivery of household chores; and,
5. no one should fetch water from the river at night nor go to the riverside with a lantern.

In retrospect, the taboos were designed to consolidate the restoration and ascendancy of the feminine principle in the town's power structure and of *Borebea's* motherhood. But the restoration presents ambiguities considering the fact that Adawso women were the hardest hit if one considers the implications of the injunctions on menstrual cycle, comportment at the riverside; and the prescribed containers. They were at best limitations which could impact negatively on the daily functions of women in the domestic realm. This is especially so considering the fact that Adawso women's menstrual cycle, at a point in time, would become a barrier between them and water from the river, a vital resource without which little or nothing could be done domestically. In short, Adawso women were "seen as polluting objects to be controlled by taboos ..."[366]

Meanwhile, the intercession was completed with the cleansing and purification rites ten days later at the Adawso palace. In the course of the

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[365] It should be remembered that the day was for the *Borebea* goddess angered by the "re-introduction" of the stool whose adae ritual had taken prominence over everything connected with the river.

[366] Ifi Amadiume, 144.

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celebration, a sheep was slaughtered and its blood mixed with water. It was later passed round for Nana Adu Amoah III, Nana Akua Amanimaa and all elders gathered took turns to wash their faces, forearms and feet with the purpose of cleansing and absolving themselves from their sins against the goddess. Later on, Okomfo Kyere used some of the concoction to cleanse stool regalia and paraphernalia; walls, furniture, and entrances and door posts. This was also done at fore court of the palace and on Opanin Adu's monument.[367] All this while, attendants at the palace were cooking a ritual meal with the left-over animal blood and entrails. Later on, a large portion of it was taken into the stool room where libation was poured to inform Opanin Adu and the departed ancestors of Adawso of what had transpired and the solution of the stone dropping episode. They also asked for their continued blessings and protection.[368]

The day's activities were brought to a close after Paa Joe was officially appointed the one responsible for rituals practices connected with river *Borebea*. This was followed by the beating of a gong-gong throughout Adawso to announce the coming into effect of the taboos on river *Borebea*. Nana Adu Amoah III then brought proceedings to an end when he thanked Okomfo Kyerewaa and her party for their triumphant intervention. This was after he had given them an undisclosed sum of money; two sheep in lieu of a bull they had initially demanded; twelve yards of white calico and a carton of schnapps. The thanksgiving exercise was climaxed with a grand thanksgiving service the following Sunday at the Adawso Presbyterian Church.

Gender Politics: Interpreting the Plague of Pebbles

The calamity had come to an end but what is the take on Paa Joe's appointment in relation to the restoration of women playing major roles in the central administration of Adawso? Truth be told, the appointment coupled with the taboos virtually disrupted the balance of power the episode had sought to achieve.

Meanwhile, matters were not helped by the worrying silence of Nana Amanimaa and Adawso womanhood who were active participants the day's deliberations over Paa Joe's appointment. But ingrained in their silence and of interest to this paper was their interpretation of the events. They saw the episode and its resolution as the "true restoration of Adawso womanhood as the pivot around which Adawso's progress and wellbeing would forever revolve".[369] To them, their menstrual cycle and their daily activities in and around the river as regulated by the taboos constituted the protective shield for the town. Moreover, they saw Paa Joe as their son and

[367] Personal observation.

[368] Personal observation.

[369] Interview, Nana Amanimaa, Auntie Mina and Madam Esther Mantebea

brother and by extension, their servant who in the discharge of his duties would serve their interest. Of course, these kinds of analogies cannot be taken literally. Nevertheless, they symbolized a socio-political reality. Predictably, a breach of any of the taboos on the part of the women meant an invitation of the anger and visitation of the goddess; an event too fresh in the minds of the people and yet too terrifying to wish for. To this end, Nana Adu Amoah III and the men of Adawso would recognize the need for moderation in the administration of the town and to accord the womenfolk their rightful place in the socio-political life of the town. Herein lies the truism that women's "values and moral system which generated the concept of love, harmony, peace and cooperation .... imposed a check on excessive and destructive masculinity."[370]

One other important significance of the stone dropping episode was the flexibility of African society in the use of religion to resolve crisis. Adawso generally was considered a Christian town yet the people did not hesitate to "put aside" their Bibles and the veneer of modernity to seek help from the *Akonodi* shrine. They did not see their actions as contradictory as they argued albeit out of contest, that Jesus Christ had demanded that His followers "give to Caesar what is Caesar's.

Conclusion

It was initially thought of as the work of mischievous children. But it was not. It was the work of the river goddess of the town who was pelting the people with stones to register her displeasure of the astonishing contempt she had suffered over the years. At the end of it all, her pre-eminence was restored but only after the people had sought the intervention of the Akonodi shrine. This became necessary when Christian measures proved in effective to resolve the crisis. Meanwhile, the restoration of the goddess' pre-eminence notwithstanding, Adawso women became "victims" of the taboos instituted to forestall a repeat of the disquieting episode.

But the women were undisturbed; they realized the inherent power of the one-sided taboos. The burden of the taboos notwithstanding, it presented them the potential to incur the wrath of the goddess when provoked by their men folk. And should this happen, they would be seen as "wicked" women.

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[370] Ifi Amadiume, 123.

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Colonial Boundaries and the Challenges of Transition to Multi-Party Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

Wilson YAYOH

Abstract

At independence, African countries south of the Sahara were confronted with the problem of national integration. This problem was borne out of the partition of the continent in a manner that brought different ethnic groups together to form artificially created states. This paper argues that the difficulties most African countries faced during the wholesale transition to multi-party rule in the 1990s were traceable to the ethnic diversities of the states. A sense of shared nationality, a pre-requisite for national integration and unity, was weak or was yet to be forged in most countries. This weakness had negative implications for multi-party democracy in Africa, for political pluralism stirred up ethnic conflicts/upheavals which tore countries apart. Pro-democracy movements during the transitional period emboldened the zeal of component ethnic groups to assert their identities on the political scene.

Key words: Democratization, Nation, Nationalism, Irredentism, Secession, State

Introduction

One of the assumptions that underpinned the imposition of multi-party democracy by the West on sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s was that political liberalism would foster peace, stability and national security. As it was during the partition when artificial boundaries were created without regard to the geo-political and social realities of the continent, so it was with the introduction of multi-party democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. The transition to multi-party democracy from 1990 to 2000 was problematic and years on, democracy in sub-Saharan Africa remained fragile. There was an upsurge in ethnic conflicts since the 1990s, even in hitherto peaceful regions. Various countries were confronted with the task of conducting free and fair elections (in every four or five years) and balancing political power. During the transitional period, the problem of forging national integration became hydra-headed. This paper argues that the difficulties sub-Saharan Africa faced in their efforts to democratise in the 1990s were traceable to the partition of the continent in the period 1890 to 1900. Colonial boundaries were part of the imperial design of divide and rule which has had ramifications for the present democratic dispensation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Africa before the Partition

African societies south of the Sahara were generally relatively peaceful before the advent of the colonizers in the later part of the nineteenth century, albeit the centuries of devastation caused by the introduction of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.[371] Alliances were formed between some states for economic, diplomatic and political interests. The inter-state wars that occurred in pre-colonial times were nevertheless necessary for state formation, a phenomenon common the world over. Europe, right from the thirteenth century through to the twentieth century witnessed countless wars, two of which engulfed the whole world. Indeed, before the seventeenth century, Africa's political landscape was fragmented. Small ethnic groups had existed.[372] The seventeenth century, however, saw the expansion and consolidation of large empires or states with well organised internal administrative mechanisms. The West African region witnessed the emergence of Akan polities out of the commercial networks of the lower Volta River and by the eighteenth century, Asante had emerged as a powerful empire ruling 'over a mixture of different provinces and dependencies'.[373] Asante and Dahomey were celebrated for their elaborate and efficient administrative structures. The emergence of the Zulu empire in 1820, the flourishing of Nyamwezi state of Uramba and Ukimbu by the 1850s, the growth of Samori Toure's empire by the 1880s as well as the complex interlacustrine states of Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga and Karagwe, which were at the pick of their glory in the 1860s, attest to this development.[374] So clearly, Africa itself from the seventeenth century evolved its own internal mechanisms for the crystallisation of large political

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[371]For the physical destruction caused by the slave trade, see Philip Curtin, 'The West African Coast in the Era of the Slave Trade' in Philip Curtin et al (eds.), *African History from Earliest Times to Independence* (Edinburgh, 1995), p. 211.

[372] Hizkias Assefa sees ethnic group as a collection of people who share the same primordial characteristics such as common ancestry, language and culture. Therefore ethnicity is the behaviour and feeling that supposedly emanates from members of an ethnic group. In effect, ethnic conflicts refer to cleavages between groups based on differentiations in ethnic identities. See Hizkias Assefa 'Ethnic Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: Myth and Reality', *Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World*, (Tokyo, 1996), p. 33.

[373] Christopher Ehret, *The Civilizations of Africa: A History to 1800* (Oxford, 2002), p. 320.

[374] For Nyamwezi, see Steven Feierman, 'A Century of Irony in East Africa (c. 1780-1890)' in Curtin et al (eds.), *African History*, p. 359. John Hannings, the English explorer who visited the lake region in 1860, described the interlacustrine states as having 'complex political and social systems'. See Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 114. For the growth of Samori Toure's empire, see Philip Curtin et al, *African History from the Earliest Times to Independence* (Edinburgh, 1995), p. 349.

entities or states. Some of these transformations were connected to militarism, but as stated earlier, they were part of the processes of state formation.

The Problem of Shared Nationality

The political processes of large state formation were truncated by the partition of Africa in the period 1890 to 1900, which left the continent divided into some 52 states. African resistance to the partition was forceful but it crushed under the weight of European military might. The artificial boundaries created had no basis whatsoever in the geo-political and social realities of the continent. The territories 'lacked ethnic and linguistic logic as well as historical roots'.[375] The new states were extremely heterogeneous with people of diverse ethnic, linguistic and historical backgrounds. The logical consequence of this phenomenon was the emergence of states rather than nations in Africa – a situation best described as micro-nations within macro-nations. In sub-Saharan Africa, people remained sentimentally attached to their ethnic groups to the extent that they would not sacrifice it for mere cooperation with other groups within the colonial territory. This led some scholars to consider the notions of 'nation' and 'nationalism' as problematic terms in the African context.[376] According to B. J. Berman, African indigenous cultures were difficult to obliterate because of their 'ability to create new identities' and re-order old ones.[377] Contemporary African states governed by nationalist leaders suffered from divided sovereignty because chiefs of the various ethnic groups drew their legitimacy and authority from pre-colonial roots while the new states were created by colonial rule.[378] For example, in Ghana the root cause of tension between the nationalist reformist, Kwame Nkrumah, and the traditional authorities was traceable to the insistence of some chiefs 'that the pre-colonial kingdoms were, in effect, sovereign powers'.[379] This entrenched position of chiefs explains the pervasiveness of ethnic sentiments in the new African states.

Nationalism developed in Western Europe by the seventeenth century through the dissolution of many languages and dialects and the subsequent emergence of fewer languages over a relatively larger

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[375] Richard Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009), p. 256.

[376] *Ibid*, p. 256; John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (New York, 1962), p. 37.

[377] Bruce J. Berman, 'Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism', *African Affairs*, No. 388 (July, 1998), p. 306.

[378] Donal I. Ray, 'Divided Sovereignty in Ghana', *Journal of Legal Pluralism*, 37-38 (1996), p. 198.

[379] Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs*, p. 32.

geographical area. The fewer languages then became vehicles for the spread of cultural elements such as tradition, religion and literature.[380] This was followed by the replacement of feudalism by royal absolutism which saw many more people learning the language of the government in order to be able to engage in commerce, an enterprise which was under the control of the royal governments.[381] In this way, the 'Queen's English' for example, became the dominant language of the UK, with Welsh confined to a smaller area as a remnant language of the era of feudalism. So then, 'nationalism' and 'nation' came to denote a people speaking a common language and having a common culture and government made up of people speaking the same language. Put differently, a defined territory, a government with a common language and culture are crucial elements of nationalism. One will recall how the language factor played out in the unification of Italy and Germany; though other considerations and interests were also important in the creation of those two nations.[382]

A checklist provided by Asiwaju shows the partition of Africa resulted in some 103 boundary lines, and in all these cases ethnic groups were divided, some between two or three countries.[383] The Ewe can be found in Ghana, Togo and Benin, while the Yoruba could be found in Benin and Nigeria. People of Somalia origin could also be found in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The list is endless. There was hardly one of these states that had not had cause to complain about the position of its boundaries vis-a-avis its neighbours. Irredentism and secession were common features of Africa's post-colonial history. Attempts by splinter groups to come together often stirred up trouble in the new states in which the partition located them. The Ewe Unification Movement in the trans-Volta Togoland Region in the 1950s, the attempt by the Shaba province in the former Belgian Congo (Congo Leopoville) to form its own government in the 1960s, the protracted struggle of southern Somalia for independence of northern Somalia, as well as the attempt by the Ibo of Nigeria to do the same in 1967 readily come into focus. Mwesiga Baregu has demonstrated how the 'inherited arbitrary colonial borders' triggered off irredentism and secession in some parts of east and central Africa.[384] All of this is indicative of the pervasiveness of the

[380] Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*, p. 31.

[381] *Ibid.*

[382] Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945* (London, 1968), p. 45; E. Lipson, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914* (London, 1968), p. 162.

[383] A. I. Asiwaju (ed.), *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 -1984* (Lagos, 1984), p. 256-259.

[384] Mwesiga Baregu, "Resources, Interests and Conflicts in the Great Lake Region", in Youssef M. Sawani, *Reflrctions of Scholars on the African Union* (Benghazi, 2005), p. 154.

consequences of the imposition of colonial boundaries on Africa, for as Reid puts it, 'what Africa is today has its roots in that era'.[385]

The nationalist movements that emerged during the colonial era did not and could not change the colonially created boundaries to conform to language and cultural areas. What is often referred to rather confusingly as nationalists movements in sub-Saharan Africa in the post war era were, in fact, anti-colonial movements, for as soon as the common enemy, the colonial power, was removed, the various ethnic groups began jostling for political independence within the colonially created states. Therefore national integration and values such as patriotism (which were necessary for the development of the concept of shared nationality) were difficult to realise in Africa south of the Sahara to this day. Even during the period of the so-called nationalist movements, the development of organic Africa nationalism was problematic due to the existence of multiplicity of identities – ethnicity, language, culture – which were restrictive to the development of territorial nationalism.[386] This was contrary to what happened in Egypt in the later part of the nineteenth century where the territory's history, culture, language and national coherence were responsible for the development of early organic nationalism. It is difficult to give the exact number of languages spoken in Africa, though some linguists suggested that some 1500 languages were spoken across the continent on the eve of the partition.[387] It is fascinating, however, that there were more than 300 languages spoken in Nigeria and more that 200 in Ghana. This explains why the concept of shared nationality was weak in Africa south of the Sahara.[388]

Multi-Party Democracy

Historians would recall the experiments in multi-party democracy in sub-Saharan Africa in the early years of independence. At the end of those experiments, the nationalist leaders found democracy to be incongruous with sub-Saharan Africa's peculiar circumstances borne out of the partition. It was in the light of the arduous task of forging national integration that African nationalist leaders such as Nkrumah of Ghana, Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia abhorred multi-party rule. Multi-party democracy with its concomitant struggle for political power created invigorating conditions for various ethnic groups to strive to legitimize their identity. In the process, nationality bonds remained weak. Interestingly, the colonial powers themselves never practiced multi-party rule. Political expression of any kind was seriously proscribed. Colonial troops were brought in to quell

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[385] Reid, *A History of Modern Africa*, p. 257.

[386] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

[387] Figure taken from John Parker and Richard Rathbone, *African History: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2007), p. 26.

[388] For the figure on Nigeria, see *Ibid.*

any expression of dissatisfaction.[389] In the words of Nelson Kasfir, the colonial state was therefore essentially a military administrative unit whose officers felt that it was only this kind of rule that could hold the various ethnic groups together. The colonial states were therefore 'bureaucratically designed, authoritarian in nature and primarily concerned with issues of domination rather than legitimacy'.[390] Thus the colonial political culture bequeathed to the nationalist leaders contained the notion that authoritarianism was an appropriate mode of rule. This view justifies the nationalist leaders' decision to introduce one-party states during the first decade of independence. It was this which led Mahmood Mamdani to conclude that authoritarian governments of contemporary Africa were products of 'decentralized despotism' created by colonial governments.[391] Analysts observed that free competitive electoral democracy in heterogeneous societies encouraged party leaders to manipulate latent ethnic or religious animosities as a way to win votes.[392]

Ghana's experiment with multi-party democracy in the run-up to independence typified the complexity of the problem. At independence, some of the major ethnic groups which were brought together by the partition to form the Gold Coast, and held together by the colonizing power, sought to assert their identity and independence.[393] This latent desire to break loose of the Gold Coast found expression in the emergence of ethno-political parties. It became obvious therefore that the opposition parties such as the Togoland Congress, the Northern People's Party, and the National

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[389] The French military action against rebellion in Madagascar in 1946 and the *maji maji* revolt in German East Africa (Tanganyika) were examples of many such suppression of descent during the colonial era. See Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, *Africa since 1800* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 265-266; Richard Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009), p. 158-9.

[390] Nelson Kasfir, "*Design and Dilemmas: An Overview*", *Local Government in the Third World: The experience of Tropical Africa* (New York, 1983), p. 34; N. Chazan, R. Mortimer et al, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (London, 1998), p. 4. The point was also made in Baregu, ' Resources, Interests and Conflicts', p. 155.

[391] Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject; Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, 1996), p. 35-109.

[392] Richard Sandbrook, *Closing the Circle: Democratization and Development in Africa* (Toronto, 2000), p. 7. See also Claude Ade, 'Rethinking African Democracy' in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, 1993), p. 72.

[393] Dannis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960* (London, 1964), p. 367. For details about collaborations between the Togoland Congress and the Northern People's Party in the fight for Togoland Unification, see Paul André Landouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians : The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana* (London, 1979), p. 168.

Liberation Movement (NLM), all formed in the 1950s, were breaking up the country into ethnic parties.[394] Disturbances among the Ewe in the central Volta Region were followed by the emergence in Accra of the Ga movement known as *Ga Shifimo Kpee* which posed a threat to the control of the capital city.[395] This development was a recipe for the emergence of 'sub-nationalism'.[396] Some measures taken by Kwame Nkrumah such as the Preventive Detention Act of 1958, which eventually culminated in Ghana becoming a one-party state in 1964, were seen by opposition elements as repressive. The reality though, was the imminent disintegration of the new state bequeathed to Nkrumah by the British colonial government. Obviously, the ruling Convention People's Party of Ghana was distraught by the spectre of 'divided sovereignty' which was very much in evidence throughout the country.[397] This deservedly called for swift and pragmatic measures to nip these divisive tendencies in the bud and uphold the territorial integrity of the new state.[398]

Whatever the criticism against one-party rule, it did sustain the welding of the ethnic groups together. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in following the examples of Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia and Cote d'Ivoire, became one-party states. By the 1980s therefore, only Botswana had maintained an unbroken record of multi-party parliamentary democracy since independence.[399] But Botswana had a relatively low population of about one million people. Admittedly, some presidents under one-party rule lured the military into politics in their bid to personalise and centralise power. Examples were Mobutu of Zaire, Eyadema of Togo and Houphoue Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, all of whom made military power functionally indispensable to their stay in power. This accounted for the many coups d'état that characterised the history of some sub-Saharan African states. But experiment has also shown that it was feasible to observe democratic tenets

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[394] For details on the emergence of unitary state in Ghana, see Raymond Bagulo Benin, *Ghana: Regional Boundaries and National Integration* (Accra, 1999). The Togoland Congress was formed in 1950 while the National Liberation Movement and the Northern People's Party were formed in 1954. According to Biswal, the NLM was not a nationalist party as its name suggests, but it was an Asante movement. See Tapan Prasad Biswal, *Ghana: Political and Constitutional Developments* (New Delhi, 1992), p. 53. For the political parties that contested the 1951 elections see David Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (Princeton, 1972), p. 173-175.
[395] Biswal, *Ghana,* p. 58-59.
[396] *West Africa,* 5 January, 1957, p. 5. See also Austin, *Politics in Ghana,* p. 361; W. K. Yayoh, 'Local Government in Ewedome, British Trust Territory of Togoland (Ghana), 1922-1974', PhD Thesis (University of London, 2010), p. 269.
[397] Ray, 'Divided Soveignty', p. 198.
[398] Austin, *Politics in Ghana,* p. 372.
[399] For details on political legacy of colonial rule, see Kelvin Shillington, *History of Africa* (London,), p. 409.

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even in a one-party state. On the death of Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya in 1970, power was successfully handed over to Arap Moi. Similarly, Julious Nyerere of Tanzania handed over power in 1986. Under Nyerere, unpopular ministers were voted out of office in accordance with the will of the people.

Multi-party democracy became a global phenomenon in 1989 following the demise of the Soviet Union. Proponents espoused the desirability of democracy in promoting development and the benefits to be derived by 'Third World 'countries, particularly south-Saharan Africa from political pluralism.[400] But the geo-political effects of the ending of the Cold War alone could not be responsible for the resurgence of multi-party democracy in south-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. Certainly, the role of the Western powers and their financial institutions was a compelling factor. Under the weight of increased political conditionality so far as aid was concerned, sub-Saharan Africa was forced to implement rapid political change. Aid effectively became a political weapon. Whatever the benefits, it did not mean that competitive electoral democracy was workable everywhere. William Tordoff's dictum is worth quoting here:

> ...western governments must be realistic in the aid conditions which they impose and that while they have every right to deny development aid to flagrantly repressive regime, they are on much shakier ground in seeking to decide the political and economic systems which African states should adopt.[101]

The evidence in sub-Saharan Africa showed clearly that political pluralism heightened ethnic separatism in heterogeneous societies. The super imposition of multi-party democracy on a complex political landscape, such as that in sub-Saharan Africa, without being cognisant of the fragile composition of the various states exacerbated ethnic conflicts during the transition period and made them difficult to resolve. In the early 1990s, Africa was still going through nation building, for the devastating effects of the Cold War in terms of polarisation of societies on ideological grounds and the proliferation of arms made the road to national integration even more tortuous. Ethnic loyalties were still very much alive in many countries because the interest of one ethnic group conflicted with the other. The introduction of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, therefore, stirred up the centrifugal tendencies resulting in ethnic conflicts, most of which were permitted to reach exhausting proportions. The ethnic groups in

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[400] The description 'Third World' is used advisedly here. This description was part of a contrast drawn between the different groups of countries in the world in the twentieth century – First, Second and Third worlds. After the end of the Cold War, this model became less useful in describing the countries of the world.
[401] William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa* (London, 1977), p. 323

the various countries were let loose on one another as they vied for political power. In most cases, these conflicts were not localised; they spilled over to neighbouring countries because the ethnic groups cut across national boundaries.[402] Political parties suddenly sprang up based on ethnic affiliations. Although Claude Ade argues that there was 'nothing inherently conflictual about ethnic differences', he contended that the politicisation of ethnic differences by the elite could incite ethnic conflicts.[403]

To say that the political and economic situation in Cote d'Ivoire from the 1990s was better than the 30 year 'dictatorship' of Houphouet Boigny was to beg the question. Prior to the demise of Houphouet Boigny in 1993 and the introduction of multi-party democracy, Cote d'Ivoire was lauded as a model of success in the turbulent West African region. Until 1990, that country attracted migrant workers from other countries in the sub-region and private investment increased considerably.[404] Houphout Boigny had kept the various ethnic groups together for some 30 years, albeit France providing the supporting prop. But multi-party democracy from 1993 changed all that. The opening of democratic avenues saw the concept of 'Ivoirite' being evoked.[405] In amending the constitution ahead of the 1995 general elections, a clause was inserted by the then President, Henry Konan-Bédié, which stipulated that a presidential candidate should have two Ivorian-born parents. By playing the ethnic card, Alassane Ouatara, a northern Muslim, and a serious contender to the presidency, could be debarred from taking part in the presidential election on the grounds that he had his origin in Burkina Faso; a victim of the partition.[406] The transition to multi-party democracy in Cote d'Ivoire was thus reduced to the issue of northerners versus southerners. A rebel group that emerged in the north of the country, amidst the chaos, demanded a change in the controversial system of deciding who was an Ivorian, and whose right it was to decide who would stand in an election or to vote. The failure to resolve this thorny issue created a situation where the hitherto prosperous multi-cultural Cote

[402] See Mweiga Baregu, 'Resources, Interest and Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region', in Youssef M. Sawani (ed.), *Reflections of African Scholars on the African Union* (Benghazi, 2002), p. 148.

[403] Claude Ade, 'Rethinking African Democracy' in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (London, 1993), p. 72.

[404] Robert Calderisi, *The Trouble with Africa* (Yale, 2007), p. 115-116.

[405] The concept of Ivorité meant 'Ivorianess' which was 'a concept of nationalism that implied that anyone from outside the country's borders was suspect'. This made the northerners targets. See *Ibid*, p. 116. In effect, Ivorité advocated purity of Ivorianess.

[406] Allasane Quattara's mother was alleged to have been born outside the boundaries of the artificially created Ivory Coast. See Erik Gilbert, Jonathan T. Reynolds, *Africa in World History: From Prehistory to the Present* (New Jersey, 2008), p. 402.

d'Ivoire became a pale shadow of its former self, leaving the question as to whether peace could ever return to that country a matter of conjecture.

Similarly, multi-party elections in 1993 following several years of authoritarianism in the Central African Republic set the stage for an ethnic conflict from 1996 to 1997.[407] The election of Ange Felix Patase from the Gbaya ethnic group in the north stirred up ethnic sentiments and set the stage for the rugged road ahead of the Central African Republic. The Yakoma from the south had been in power since independence. The country, since the introduction of democracy, had been rocked by a series of coups d'état. In Kenya, the majority of the members of the opposition who were mostly minority groups in the south were labelled as migrants ahead of the 1992 elections. This provided enough grounds for the supporters of the ruling KANU government, headed by Daniel Arap Moi, to engage in ethnic cleansing on the coast.[408] We also saw how 'vast stretches of Brazzaville were reduced to rubbles' in 1997 after multi-party rule was introduced in that country in 1992.[409]

Multi-party democracy was also partly responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Hutu and Tutsi had been held together by first the German and then the Belgian colonial governments. But both colonial regimes tended to favour the Tutsi who were more educated, due in large part to the colonial arrangement that used Tutsi as part of the colonial administration, and therefore occupied top governmental positions; though the Hutus formed 85 percent of the total population of that country by the 1990 census figures.[410] Both ethnic groups somewhat tried to live with this situation of 'acceptance' of the privileged position of the Tutsi, leading to the development of what is referred to in some anthropological circles as an 'axiom of inequality'.[411] To further diffuse latent tension between Hutu and Tutsi, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana who came to power in 1973 instituted a quota system that sought to ensure proportional representation of all the ethnic groups in that country.[412] This arrangement worked in holding the country together for some 20 years until 1994 when Habyarimana yielded to pressure from the West to lead the country into multi-party democracy. The move was welcomed by the Hutu whose numbers could guarantee them electoral victory. But the policy incurred the wrath of the

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[407] Richard Sandbrook, *Closing the Circle, Democratization and Development in Africa* (Toronto, 2000), p. 7.

[408] *Ibid*, p. 8.

[409] *Ibid*, p. 7

[410] For detail on how Germany and Belgium favoured the Tutsi, see Reid, *A History of Modern Africa*, p. 173.

[411] For details, see J. J. Maquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda: A Study of Political Relations in A Central African Kingdom* (Oxford, 1961).

[412] Gilbert and Reynolds, *Africa in World History*, p. 406.

Tutsi whose privileged position was threatened by multi-party democracy. The shooting down of Habyarimana's plane allegedly by the Tutsi conservatives sparked off mass killing of Tutsis. Hutu moderates were not spared either.[413]

At the Algiers OAU summit in July 1999, African leaders observed that there had been an upsurge of conflicts in Africa. There were 16 conflicts and wars raging among 22 countries in various parts of the continent. The UN Secretary General's statement at the OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, on 2 July 2001 epitomised the failure of Western-style liberal democracy in serving as an antidote to ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. He observed that at the root of these conflicts were prejudices, hatred and ethnic and racial differences which were exploited by leaders for destructive ends. From the genocide in Rwanda and the conflicts in Sudan to the tensions in Burundi, the continent was living with the devastating consequences of racism and intolerance. What the Secretary-General failed to note, however, was that these problems of racism and ethnic divisions were created by the partition of the continent which lumped different ethnic groups together to form artificially created countries.

The crux of the matter is that following the resurgence of multi-partyism, a gradual re-alignment of political forces started to take shape largely on ethnic lines throughout south-Saharan Africa. This accounted for the large number of political parties in most countries. Sandbrook counted 47 political parties in Mali, 70 in Cameroon, 200 in Zaire and 10 in Niger in the early 1990s.[414] The ethnic character of the political parties and their numbers did not only serve to confuse the electorates but also deepened the polarization of the countries, created tension and animosity. In the process, the transitional electoral outcomes in most countries were highly contested. It was in this state of apparent chaos that emerged a paradigm shift in the approach to resolving some of these electoral conflicts. Power sharing became a preferred approach to resolving contested electoral outcome. Classical examples can be found in Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and other conflict zones where power-sharing became a preferred option. The picture discernible from this shift in approach was the failure of multi-party democracy in holding the ethnic groups together in the various countries. In other words, the heterogeneous nature of the various countries made it difficult to see where an acceptable leadership could emerge.

Worst yet, after the elections ruling parties were confronted with the difficulty of ensuring equal representation in government. The selection of ministers, their deputies and other functionaries had to be seen to be

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[413] Reid put the number of Tutsi and Hutu moderates killed between April and July 1994 at 1 million. See Reid, *A History of Modern Africa*, p. 126.
[414] Sandbrook, *Closing the Circle*. p. 35.

representative of all ethnic groups. Achieving equal representation in a heterogeneous country like Ghana with more than 200 ethnic groups was a tall order. It was, therefore, no surprise that in 2006, for example, there were about 70 minister and deputy ministers in the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government. Although it is a truism that political patronage also played a part in the appointment of the abysmally high number of government officials, one could not rule out the fruitless attempt by government to satisfy as many ethnic groups as possible.

Conclusion

Sub-Saharan Africa encountered problems during the transition to multi-party democracy in the 1990s due to the incompatibility of multi-party democracy with the colonially created states. The early 1990s saw the emergence of more political parties than the continent had experienced during the early years of independence. The debilitating factors that made for the failure of earlier experiments in multi-party democracy were still prevalent in the 1990s. The effect of the partition of Africa, far from being a closed matter, is an ongoing process. From purely historical perspective, the introduction of multi-party democracy in south-Saharan Africa represented yet another Western invention superimposed upon entirely different cultural and political structures. The resurgence of multi-party democracy in the 1990s provided fertile ground for African political leaders to change course from any attempt at diffusing ethnic divisions to using ethnic communities to build networks of political patronage. This in effect, provided the ground for ethnic conflicts that became a common feature in sub-Saharan Africa's post-Cold War history.

Traditional Medicine in Nigeria: The Appraisal of an African Cultural Heritage

Abiodun J. OLUWABAMIDE

Abstract

Africa is a culturally heterogeneous continent. It has witnessed changes in virtually all facets of life. Nevertheless, certain traits of African cultures have subsisted despite social and cultural changes. One of such is traditional medicine, which was the earliest means of healthcare delivery in the continent that is still widely practiced today. Its Africanness consists in its uniqueness to Africa, which is inherent in its age-long practice among the peoples and societies of Africa. This paper therefore, examines the nature and common characteristics of traditional medicine in Africa, south of the Sahara using Nigeria as a reference point. It posits that because of its antiquity, traditional medicine is not just a means of solving health problems but also an important, African cultural heritage. Review shows that, traditional medicine is an organized system of healthcare delivery, which cuts across different societies and cultures of Africa. It is recommended that governments of African countries should educate or enlighten their peoples on the need to see traditional medicine not only as a means of healing but also as an important African heritage, which should be appreciated and preserved.

Keywords and phrases: Traditions, cultural history, belief, treatment, cultural change, preserved

Introduction

Anthropological and sociological studies of societies and cultures of Africa have revealed the importance of traditional medicine in the treatment of different kinds of ailments. According to Ogunbodede (1997), traditional healing processes, which developed in African traditional societies over a long period of time, had been transmitted from one generation to another. In other words, African traditional medicine evolved in African societies through time. Generally, traditional medicine is a cultural trait, which originated from the society where it is being practiced. That is, like other aspects of culture it is a product of a people's cultural history. Thus, Oyeneye and and Orubuloye (1985:8) have observed:

> ... traditional medicine is a cultural product and should be seen as part of the indigenous culture of the people that practice and make use of it in finding explanations to the causes of illness and curing them.

The World Health Organization (1976) defines traditional medicine as the sum total of all knowledge and practices, whether explicable or not, used in diagnosis, prevention, and elimination of physical, mental or social imbalance and relying exclusively on practical experience and observation from generation to generation, whether verbally or in writing. Oyeneye and Orubuloye (1985:6) define traditional medicine as "a scientific endeavour which follows definite natural, spiritual, mental, chemical and biological laws for the restoration of health". Traditional medicine is a mechanism designed by the people from their past experience, to cope with the environment (Good, 1987).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, early men lived in harmony with their environments. This entailed the use of herbs to solve health and other related problems. Differing climatic and topographic conditions all over the continent gave rise to different vegetations, leading to the use of different traditional herbs and other materials to treat similar ailments in different parts of Africa. According to Owumi (1996) traditional medicine is a mechanism designed by the people from their past experiences to cope with the environment.

This paper examines traditional medicine in Sub-Saharan Africa drawing with reference to Nigeria. It conceives of traditional medicine as an essential part of African cultural heritage which was transmitted through the ages to the present generation. The paper is anchored on the anthropological theory of historical particularism. The phrases traditional medicine and African medicine are here used interchangeably. The paper is divided into six parts. These are: the theoretical orientation; brief history and nature of Nigeria, philosophy of traditional medicine; causes of diseases in traditional belief; factors responsible for the survival of traditional medicine; methods of healing, and reference to selected Nigerian cultures- Ibibio, Urhobo, and Hausa.

Theoretical Orientation

This paper is written within the framework of an anthropological theory – Historical Particularism. The theory emphasizes the necessity of studying cultural traits in the context of the society in which they appeared. It was a reaction to the predetermined Evolutionism theory in the beginning of the twentieth century when the evidence for unilineal evolution was becoming shaky as data on non-Western cultures were collected and analyzed (Harris, 1968).

The leading proponent of Historical Particularism was the American Anthropologist, Franz Boas. According to Boas, 'specific cultures should be studied in their particular historical contexts. This, he said should be done not only because the search for uniformities in history is futile but because the only way in which the amount and nature of such uniformity

can be appraised is through a programme of inductive historical research (Oke, 2004).

No aspect of African life can be understood except in the context of its cultural history. The continent's cultural, similarities despite ethnic diversities is of great antiquity. Similarly, indigenous means of healthcare delivery had existed in the region for a very long time. It still exists today not only as part of Africa's overall healthcare delivery system but also as an important cultural heritage. Because traditional (or African) medicine is age-long, it is obviously part of Africa's cultural heritage. It is also a heritage because it is an indigenous means of healthcare delivery.

Brief History and Nature of Nigeria

The country known today as Nigeria was created by the British colonialists. Prior to its formation, there were many traditional states existing independently in the territory. It was indeed the colonialists that brought these independent states together to form a single nation state known today as Nigeria. Though the colonialists initially governed the area known as Nigeria as different Protectorates, it could not be said that Nigeria was a single country then. Indeed, what existed was different Protectorates. However, in 1900, the area was sub-divided into three – the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, the Protectorate of northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.

The actual formation of Nigeria was in 1914 when Lord Lugard amalgamated the three protectorates. This action marked the emergence of what was thenceforth called the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. It is obvious therefore, that it was at this point that the country, Nigeria actually came into existence. Lord Lugard was made the first Governor of the then new state/country, Nigeria.

Nigeria was governed by the colonialists till October 1, 1960 when the country gained her independence. Since then, the country has witnessed changes with respect to growth and development. Successive governments have created some transformation and development in the country. Nevertheless, the pace was not as expected. This is because within her fifty-four years of independence, the country has witnessed quite a number of conflicts which often threatened her unity and slowed down her development. Other social problems that constitute hindrances to the country's development include poverty, unemployment, corruption, illiteracy, diseases, crimes etc.

Right from her birth as a country, Nigeria has been a plural society. The country is multi-cultural and by implication, it is a multi-lingual and multi-religious country. There are about 513 languages, spoken in Nigeria (Bamgbose, 1993). Similarly, there are many religions in the country. But the popular ones are Christianity, Islam and traditional religion. While each

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ethnic group has her peculiar traditional belief system known as traditional religion, there are also the foreign religions. That is, religions that originated from outside the country. Prominent among them are Christianity and Islam. The country is made up of three major ethnic groups and many other minority ethnic groups. The major ethnic groups are Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba while the minority ones include Urhobo, Edo, Ibibio, Efik, Tiv, Igala, Ogori, Ijaw, Nupe, Fulani, Kanuri, Gbagyi, etc. The colonialists identified 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria, but some studies put the figure at 376 (Otite, 1990).

Archaeological, historical and anthropological studies have shown that prior to the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914, there existed many culturally distinct societies. Ethnographic data collected by prominent anthropologists from the various societies in Nigeria during the period of colonialism and thereafter have shown that the societies differed from one another. Such ethnographic reports include Nadel's study of the Nupe, Bohanan's study of the Tiv, Meek's study of the Ibo, Lylod's study of the Yoruba, Forde's study of the Yako, Stenning's study of the Fulani and so on and so forth. These descriptions of the ways of life of the various societies in Nigeria have shown that though there are differences among them, yet they have a lot of cultural traits in common. There are differences as well as similarities in their traditional mode of sustenance, religion, political organization, norms and values, medicine, arts, etc.

Philosophy of African Traditional Medicine

The philosophy of traditional medicine is the same in virtually all African societies. However, it cannot be understood without a good understanding of the differences between traditional medicine and witchcraft. This is necessary because quite often many people believe that the two phenomena are the same, whereas they are not. It is therefore, pertinent to make a distinction between traditional medicine and witchcraft before discussing the philosophy of African traditional medicine.

Evans-Pritchard (1937, cited in Onwuejeogwu, 1975) describes witchcraft, as a supposedly psychic emanation from the witchcraft substance which is believed to cause injury to health and prosperity.[1] According to him, the witchcraft substance is a material substance in the bodies of certain persons. From this description it is obvious that witchcraft is mainly meant to do evil, i.e. to harm somebody. Traditional medicine, on the other hand, is meant to do good, that is, to prevent and cure of diseases to enhance good health. Discussing the relation between traditional medicine and witchcraft, Oyeneye and Oribuloye (1985) have observed that because witchcraft is believed to be the cause of some diseases most traditional medicine practitioners need to know how to handle the witchcraft cause though they do not need to be wizards themselves. If a disease is witchcraft-caused, the

traditional practitioner starts by attacking and getting rid of the underlying witchcraft or wizard cast-spells before administering herbal or other medicines.[2] However, treatment involves a variety of methods deemed necessary by the traditional medicine practitioner.

Oyeneye and Onibuloye have posited that the disease-causative-concepts underlie the philosophy of traditional medicine. According to them, African (traditional) medicine follows definite natural laws for the restoration, maintenance and correction of bodily disorders. Drawing from Turner's (1969) social causation theory, they observed that in African traditional settings the cause of any disease is not attributed to germs but to the transgression or violation of natural laws such as adultery and sexual abuse, failure to eat the proper kinds of food from natural sources etc. Obviously therefore, this philosophy guides the orientation of traditional medicine practitioners in Africa.

Although most societies of Africa believe in supernatural causes and seem to deny natural causes of diseases, their belief system is internally consistent (Ogunbodede, 1997:60). Thus, Lambo (1993:151) has noted, "The cause of illnesses are not simply attributed to the unknown or dropped in the laps of the gods. Causes are always linked to the patient's immediate world of social events."

However, in most societies of Nigeria, traditional concepts of health and illness are intertwined. Again according to Lambo, in African traditional societies health is not regarded as an isolated phenomenon but it reflects the integration of the community. Health is not the mere absence of disease but a sign that a person is living in peace and harmony with his neighbours and that he is keeping the laws of the gods and the tribe.

Causes of Diseases: Traditional Belief

Researchers (Erinosho, 1978; Oyebola, 1980; Odebiyi 1980; Oke 1994; Osunwole, 1996) have at different times identified three (3) major causes of diseases in traditional societies. These are natural, supernatural and mystical causes. Their views can be summarized thus: ill-health may be due to a number of sources or causes – natural, supernatural or mystical – considering the fact that ailments in the developing world are magico-religious in nature.

With respect to natural cause, diseases are linked to factors such as poor nutrition, insect bite, bad environment, overcrowded living and lack of exercise. In the traditional system of thought, diseases can occur naturally in the course of human interaction with the physical environment. Thus, Osunwole (1996: 210) has noted:

Naturalistic conception of disease follows the laws of nature which stipulates that as long as human beings comply strictly with

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naturally – ordered health behaviours, their health is not endangered unnecessarily But when such behaviours are in opposition with natural laws, disease or death may follow.

The supernatural causes include diseases, which are otherwise caused by supernatural factors and sorcerers. For example, a snake may be sent to bite somebody. The mystical causes refer to diseases caused by mystical factors such as the neglect of ancestors, breaking of taboos or taking false oaths. Mystical causes are also linked with supernatural forces.

However, there are overlapping areas in the classification especially between the supernatural and mystical causes. Because of the similarities between the two (supernatural and mystical causes) Osunwole (1996) has merged them into one category, which he calls personalistic.[3] Again, (Osunwole, 1996:210) has observed:

Personalistic category of diseases are best understood within their religious or social context, causation is not easily determined by physical examination of the sufferer as signs and symptoms of illness are obscure. Self medication is quite irrelevant as specialist healers and diviners are consulted for therapy management. Diseases in this category are believed to have different causes outside the law of nature... Health problems are often traced to the involvement of neglected ancestors whose devotees have failed to accord necessary rite. Witches also have the capacity to cause affliction. Sorcerers are also human beings with evil intentions whose pre-occupation is to interfere with the well being of innocent people by using bad contagious medicine to harm them. In many traditional societies, breach of cultural norms, envy, quarrels or strife within the family are causes of many health problems.

Why Traditional Medicine Thrives in Africa Despite Rapid Social and Cultural Changes

African medicine has continued to exist despite the on going modernization process in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is no doubt unconnected with the fact that it is efficacious. In contemporary African societies, there is indeed, no doubt about the efficacy of traditional medicine. In fact, it has continued to appeal to the people despite the increasing popularity of Western medicine (Ogunbodede, 1996). The Weekend Pioneer (February 20, 1998) has stated, "Beyond the cloudy specter of skepticism that beclouds traditional medicine, the truth is that an appreciative dawn of increased patronage is hovering today". Similarly, Owumi (1996:225) had earlier observed:

It is against this background of vast array which it caters for in addition to its indigenous ethos that traditional medicine has continued to appeal to the people in spite of the availability of Western (Scientific) medicine.

Still in that regard Owumi and Taiwo (2012:246) have noted:

It has been acclaimed that 70% of the Nigerian population and by extension, Africans utilize the services of traditional medicine ()wumi, 2005). This is quite significant when we consider the fact that the frontier of western health care in our society is highly limited, and so, the underserved in the society are catered for by this health care (traditional health care) in our society.

Studies (Ataudo, 1985, Arubalueze, 1990; Inyarig 1991, Aregbeyen, 1996; Ogunbodede 1996); Owumi; 1996, 2005; Oluwabamide, 2007; Owumi and Taiwo 2012, have shown that in contemporary Afrucan societies (urban and rural) traditional medicine practitioners have been successful in treating various ailments. According to Owumi (2005 cited in Owumi and Taiwo, 2012) the effectiveness of some indigenous healing practices in the management of a variety of ailments is indisputable. This is one of the factors responsible for the increasing patronage of traditional medicine in Africa. Cases which orthodox medicine practitioners have confirmed as hopeless are sometimes taken to traditional medicine practitioners who, in some cases, apply correct remedies. Thus, Oyeneye and Orubuloye (1985:4) have noted

In spite of the restrictions and difficulties imposed on traditional medicine as a result of the introduction of western medicine, traditional medicine practitioners have continued to uphold the dignity of their profession. They have also continued to enjoy the patronage of every segment of the society both high and low income earners in every segment of the society.

Similarly, Owumi and Taiwo (2012:246) have observed:

The strong appeal of traditional medicine to the literate and non-literate in Nigeria and Tropical Africa, despite efforts by the authorities to develop and promote a comprehensive western health care delivery system has been attributed to a no of reasons.

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Owumi and Taiwo (2012) have identified still other factors responsible for the increasing patronage of traditional medicine in Africa. Firstly, traditional medicine practitioners are more accessible to African patients than western medicine practitioners. Secondly, the patient's confidence is greater on the therapeutic skills of the traditional medicine practitioner than in those of the western medicine practitioner. Thirdly, the nature and scope of the therapies which the traditional practitioner administers encourages constant patronage. This involves treating diseases through the use of herbs and other concoctions and initiating social diagnosis as well as integrating symbolic rituals; all of which are familiar to African patients.

Fourthly, there are some areas where traditional medicine is more proficient than western medicine. According to Oyebola (1980) traditional practitioners seem to cater for certain Health needs of patients in the Yoruba cultural milieu in which Western medicine falls short of expectation. Owumi (1993) has supported this by saying that Oyebola's assertion is true for almost every culture in Africa. In fact, Oyebola (1980) observed that in Ibadan and Lagos (both are big cities in South-western Nigeria) where Western medicine facilities are available within easy reach of inhabitants, a large percentage of the people still visit traditional practitioners or have traditional medicine secretly brought to them when they were in the hospital. Thus in this respect Owumi (1993:50) has observed, "The point here is that there are some areas of proficiency where traditional medicine has leverage over Western medicine."

Categories of Traditional Medicine Practitioners

The practitioners of traditional medicine specialize in particular areas of their profession in the same way as western medicine practitioners (Ogunbodede, 1997; Oluwabamide, 2007). There are some who are experts in the use of herbs (herbalists). There are others who are proficient in spiritual healing especially in the use of incantations, while others specialize in both. There are also, traditional Birth Attendants, bone setters and psychiatrists massagers (Owumi, 1996).[4]

(i) **General Practitioners**

These are persons who are capable of handling a variety of health problems. They perform general services. This group of practitioners can also perform the functions of the other categories of practitioners. They are versed in the use of herbs and divination, both of which they combined in handling various health problems.

(ii) Oracle Men/Women

These are practitioners who are highly skilled in of divination. Their healing process involve divining the cause of a health problem and then adopt the most effective method to cure it.

(iii) Traditional Birth Attendants

These are practitioners (mostly women) who are skilled in reproductive health issues. They perform pre-natal and post-natal services for their clients. They handle issues of women during and after birth. They also handle childhood diseases using herbal preparations.

(iv) Psychiatrists

These are practitioners who manage mental problems. How this is done is dependent on the nature of the mental derangement. Usually violent patients are treated with some level of violence, ranging from flogging, chaining, confinement, to the administration of sedatives. Thereafter, the patient is placed on a special treatment.

(v) Bone Setters

Bone setters are traditional practitioners who are skilled in "fixing" fractured hand and leg bones. In doing this, they use herbs, barks and other materials, which they apply to fractured bones after setting them appropriately.

(vi) Massagers

The massagers are practitioners who possess special skill of rubbing the body and dislocated bones. They also render services to expectant mothers in order to facilitate easy delivery, This involved assisting them to put the foetus in its proper position in the womb.

Traditional Methods of Healing

African (traditional) medicine practitioners use a variety of healing methods according to their respective areas of specializations. Sofowora (1984), Oyenenye and Orubuloye (1985) have categorized them as herbalism, faith healing, massage, heat- therapy, hydrotherapy, surgery and divination.

1. Herbalism

Herbalism involves the use of herbal therapies in curing patients of their ailments. Leaves, roots, barks, flowers, juices and

occasionally parts of animals are used in preparing herbal therapies. Herbalism is the most basic of all traditional healing methods. Virtually all categories of practitioners use herbal therapies.

2. Heat Therapy

This involves the use of heat in curing patients. The heat is generated from fire, which is believed to posses some mysterious healing power. There are specific ailments for which this method is used. The method is believed to improve circulation, induce sweating, and destroy dying tissues. It is often prescribed for the aged or feeble patients. It is also said to reduce fever, which often follows fractured bones.

3. Massage

This method involves a methodical manipulation of body's soft tissues to achieve the desired curative objectives. It is usually done with the tip of the fingers and the palm. This involves gently applying pressure to various aching muscles of the body which have been treated with some aromatic, oily dressing. This method (massaging) is used for muscle strains and to improve the general circulation as well as the functioning of the nerves.

4. Hydrotherapy

This method refers to the use of water of different temperatures for the treatment of diseases. This involves the use of water in cold, hot or vapour state with or without other drugs for treatment. A cold bath is sometimes prescribed as an invigorating agent for the weak patient (Sofowora, 1984). According to Sofowora, hot baths (with or without the addition of herbs), are prescribed for fever, rheumatism, headaches, and pain all over the body, as well as for general debility. Hot water or steam is also used for therapeutic purposes.

5. Divination

Although divination is not a healing method, it is an approach towards unveiling the causes of diseases, or misfortunes (Oyeneye and Oribuloye, 1985). It is the most useful preliminary step in every healing process. It guides the traditional practitioner in the process of treating their patients. It involves both magical and mystical manipulations of certain objects to hear from supernatural powers. Divination is central to traditional medicine since it affords the practitioners the

understanding of the underlying causes of diseases as well as the kind of treatment they require.

6. **Faith-Healing**

Faith healing is another branch of traditional medicine in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Nabofa (1996), faith healers are considered as people who are specially called for specific duty of divine healing ministry. A faith healer deals with the spiritual cause and effects of the disease which have manifested in the physical body and/or in the patient's aura. In the thinking of the African faith healers and their patients, the major causes of diseases are of spiritual origin. Thus, Nabofa (1996:239) has observed:

It has been observed that most spiritual therapeutic practices contain the following elements: diagnostic rituals, confession cum mind reading, counselling, atonement, exorcism, fasting, use of symbolic elements, such as oil and water, prayers, dance and drama, giving of testimonies couple with thanksgiving.

The faith healer believes that most diseases are caused by spiritual/psychic agencies. Consequently, he probes the spiritual realm in seeking solution to the problem.

We shall now briefly examine the practice of traditional medicine in selected societies in Nigeria. This shall be done based on relevant literature.

Traditional Medicine among the Ibibio

The Ibibio are the major cultural group in Akwa Ibom State, South-eastern Nigeria. Like other societies and cultures of Nigeria the Ibibio have a traditional medical system. Scholars (Ataudo 1985, 1991, Inyang, 1991, Ogunbodede, 1996, and others) have described aspects of the art of traditional medicine among the Ibibio.

Among the Ibibio, the traditional medical practice was an integral part of the social system during the pre-colonial period. Inyang (1991:126) observes 'The Ibibio belief is that there is a continuity between this physical world and the spiritual world; that it is the human flesh which as it were provides a veil that covers man's eyes from seeing the spiritual world".

Ataudo (1991) posits that the theoretical and conceptual frame of Ibibio cosmology and traditional medicine resembles those of other African societies and those of other developing cultures. The soul as thought of, and believes in, by the average Ibibio is closely examined and related to aetiology and what happens to the soul when a person dies.

Ataudo (1991:399) further notes, "Theories of disease aetiology in traditional medicine practice in Ibibio land were built around applications of more basic beliefs about the nature of man and of the environment in which he lives". The disease aetiology includes soul — loss, spirit intrusion, and breach of taboo, evil age, sorcery and intrusion by disease objects.

Inyang (1991) notes that the Ibibio body of medicine may be broadly divided into two; namely, preventive and curative medicine. The preventive medicine is widely practiced. In it, varieties of natural objects are prepared and deposited in earthenware and calabashes and placed in entrances to houses, compounds and farms for protection against spirit induced diseases, and some of it is smeared on the body. Curative medicine is practiced in every part of Ibibio land. Some of the drugs consist of extracts from animals (e.g. galls of poisonous snakes and leopards), bark of trees, vegetables and mineral matter.

In traditional Ibibio society, medical practice is an integral part of the social system, and is linked with social interaction, values, statuses, and network of reciprocal social relationship. Traditionally among the Ibibio, health decisions are often taken by senior members of the family with due consideration of the level of health information available, such as the location of the healer, his expert knowledge of the ailment, the expenses involved, the belief as to what the cause of the illness is, etc.

Among the Ibibio people, the branches of traditional medicine include general practice, herbalism, trado-psychiatry, trado-surgery, trado-bone setting and traditional midwifery (Ogundodede, 1996). Practitioners of traditional medicine have been efficient in the practice of these branches of medicine. This has been attested to by patients who were successfully treated by traditional medicine practitioners.

Traditional Medicine among the Urhobo

Owumi has described African (traditional) medicine as practiced by the Urhobo people of Delta State, South-western Nigeria in his study of the Okpe. Among the Okpe there are two major groups of traditional medicine practitioners the *Edjele* (witch doctor) and the *Oboh* (the ordinary doctor). The *edjele* addresses problems (ailments) that have witchcraft undertone while the *Oboh* only relies on herbs and barks of plants to handle illnesses.

There are different categories of traditional medicine practitioners among the Urhobo people. These include the general practitioners, the oracle men and women, the Traditional Birth Attendants, the bonesetters, traditional psychiatrists and Masseus.

Among the Urhobo people, traditional medicine practitioners acquire their knowledge either through inheritance or apprenticeship or as a call by one spirit or the other. The traditional healers practice traditional medicine either as a hobby or as a form of communal service with little or

no financial rewards from the people. This non-financial ethos is a major characteristic of the practice of traditional medicine among the Urhobo to-date.

According to Owumi the belief in witchcraft as a potent source of disease/misfortune and consequently illness management is well developed and entrenched in the culture of Urhobo people. Thus, there are traditional practitioners who, in addition to their skills in the natural method of healing, have witchcraft power that they utilize in the management of illnesses.

Traditional Midwifery among the Hausa

Among the Hausa people of Northern Nigeria there are Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) who are generally known as *auguwan zome* (midwives). Alti-Muazu (1992) carried out a study of the TBAs in Zaria Local Government Area and made some revelations on certain features of TBAs among the Hausa.

In the Hausa society the TBAs are all women. This according to Alti-Mu'Azu may be as a result of the religious belief of the Hausa where women are kept apart from men except their husbands. All Hausa TBAs are post-menopausal i.e. over the age of 50 years. Advancement in age is seen as an asset for a midwife because she is thought to have accumulated experience and also because post-menopausal women are past child-bearing and therefore have more free time for midwifery practice. Most of the TBAs are uneducated except a few who have attended Quaranic schools and are able to recite some chapters of the Qu'aran. In terms of religion, most of them are Muslims. Generally, the TBAs are married women or widows.

According to Alti-Mu'Azu the art of midwifery is learnt. That is, the TBAs acquired the knowledge through learning by means of apprenticeship. The process of learning involves observing or understudying an experienced TBA. The remuneration for the TBA could be in cash or kind or both. Most clients can pay the TBA in cash and kind on the seventh day after delivery. However, if a woman cannot pay within the stipulated period, payment could be postponed to a later date. The payment in kind is not fixed.

The major function of the Hausa TBA is to assist during delivery. They also provide antenatal and post-natal care services as well as medicines for some childhood ailments. Most TBAs supply antenatal medicines to their patients from the sixth or seventh month of pregnancy. Most TBAs prohibit patients from taking sweet things such as honey, sugar cane and biscuits since they believe that these are harmful to expectant mothers.

Conclusion

Though orthodox medicine has become popular in Africa, it does not constitute the totality of the continent's healthcare delivery system.

Traditional medicine, the origin of which dates back to the ancient times, is still widely practiced in contemporary African societies. It complements western medicine. In fact, it is an integral part of the healthcare delivery system of most African countries. It is being patronized by people of different socio-economic classes. It is therefore, no gainsaying that African (traditional) medicine satisfies one of the basic human needs – health.

Apart from this obviously important function of traditional medicine to African societies it performs yet another important function which may not be quite obvious. It serves as an African (cultural) heritage. This is because it is not only indigenous to the peoples of Africa but also because it has existed for a very long time. While Africa's cultural history cannot be complete without information on traditional medicine, also no ethnography or description of the social structure of contemporary African societies can be complete without the inclusion of traditional medicine.

Traditional medicine is indeed, a cultural product, an essential part of the African cultural heritage. Its efficacy has long been established. It is relevant to healthcare delivery systems of African countries because it complements their western system component. Many Africans-educated and uneducated- still patronize the practitioners of traditional medicine for care and care. The fact that African traditional medicine thrives in the face of modernization is an assurance that it will continue to exist for ages to come.

Based on the discussions in this paper, a number of recommendations are hereby made. Firstly, the governments of African countries should embark on public enlightenment on the value of traditional medicine not only as an aspect of their health care delivery system but also as an heritage, which should be preserved for future generations. Secondly, traditional medicine should be included in the curricular of schools at various levels. It should be taught not only as medicine but also as part of the courses on African heritage. Thirdly, the governments of African countries should assist traditional medicine practitioners with funds to establish functional healing homes to enhance quality healthcare delivery for the people. Lastly, policy makers in the education sector should encourage interdisciplinary researches on traditional medicine. Their findings should be used to further develop traditional medicine in Sub-Sahara Africa.

End Notes
1.   E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1937), *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*. London: Oxford University Press. His work was the most popular pioneering work on the belief in witchcraft in African societies.
2.   O.Y. Oyeneye and I.O. Orubuloye (1985), *Some Aspects of Traditional Medicine in Bendel State of Nigeria: An Exploratory Study*, Monograph Series No. 4 (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social

and Economic Research). The authors discuss the philosophy of traditional medicine adequately on page 8. They also discuss the categories of healing methods in African medicine on pages 9 and 10.

3. S.A. Osunwole (1966), "Diseases Diagnosis and Etiology as a System of Thought", in E.A. Oke and B.E. Owumi (eds.), *Readings in Medical Sociology* (Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan), pp. 209–222. He identifies a particular category of disease causation as personalistic on page 212.

4. B.E. Owumi (1996), "Traditional Practitioners (Healers and Healing Practices)", in E.A. Oke and B.E. Owumi (eds.), *Readings in Medical Sociology*, pp. 223–233. The author painstakingly categorizes the practitioners of traditional medicine on pages 228–232. He has also written several works on African (traditional) medicine.

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