A SAFETY AND SECURITY AUDIT OF THE KAKUM NATIONAL PARK: OBSERVED REALITY VERSUS MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVES

Poku Getrude¹, Boakye Kwaku A.A.²

Abstract

Although Safety and Security (SnS) is a popular theme in the existing literature, the narrative has mostly focused on the broader destination and relatively, little is known of the SnS situation at the level of the individual components. This paper sought to appraise the safety and security situation at Ghana’s most visited attraction— the Kakum National Park, using a heuristic adaptation of the World Tourism Organization’s safety and security checklist. Through observations and interviews with management, an assessment of the safety and security situation at KNP was undertaken. It was found that even though safety and security measures at the park are generally inadequate, management does not consider the park to be under any real threat. The study also found that the Park management had a deliberative assessment of the security situation which reflected in three mindsets of collective security, passiveness and cautious security. The study recommends a change in philosophical outlook from passiveness to proactivity as an important first step towards making the KNP safer. Along with this philosophy, change would be the specific interventions in the areas of documentation, equipment and training.

Keywords: Kakum National Park, safety, security, risk, ecotourism

INTRODUCTION

Tourism’s heavy reliance on safety and security (SnS) is expressed in both the demand and supply sides of the industry. (Boakye 2012, Tarlow, 2008). From the demand-side, tourism is known to be an extremely sensitive consumption item and is understandably the first to be struck off in times of danger. Safety and security issues remain the most significant consideration by tourists in the trip decision-making process (Enz, 2009; Mansfeld & Pizam, 2006; Reisinger & Mavondo, 2005; Maslow, 1943; Mura, 2010) for obvious reasons. From the supply-end, destinations which are perceived as unsafe have been known to immediately lose their touristic appeal and subsequently, patronage (Cohen, 2019; Lisowska, 2017; Mawby, 2014).

The declines in tourist patronage suffered by Egypt, Tunisia and Cameroon following recent terrorist attacks is ample evidence of tourism’s sensitivity to adverse situations (Hills, 2019; Neagu, 2017). Destinations or attraction sites which are perceived to be insecure tend to lose their allure and lose out to places perceived to be safer.

SnS related issues remain a popular theme in the broader tourism knowledge and the extensive body of literature which has been developed around the tourism-safety security nexus has provided useful insight into the nature of the relationship between the two. However, the literature has tended to view the destination as a unitary whole (e.g. Boakye, 2012; George, 2003; Harper, 2001) and has paid disproportionately little attention to the safety and security issues in its (the destination’s) individual

1. University of Development Studies, Email: getrudeopoku@gmail.com
2. University of Cape Coast, Email: Kwaku.boakye@ucc.edu.gh

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components, namely the attractions, amenities and ancillary services. Yet, from a systems perspective, understanding the dynamics of the individual component of the destination is useful for both theoretical and policy reasons. In the aforementioned studies and many others, conclusions have often been drawn on broader destinations, but, going by the law of averages, such information cannot be a substitute for focused studies on the individual components of the destination. As Boakye (2010) noted, there are different SnS threats at different parts of the destination. It is, therefore, germane to shift the frontiers of the SnS investigations to focus on the situation at the individual disaggregated units of the destination such as amenities, ancillary services, and attractions.

This study therefore seeks to investigate the SnS measures at an attraction. It first conducts a safety audit of the attraction and solicits the reactions of management to the outcomes of the assessment. Secondly, management perceptions on safety and security at the park were also sought. Ghana’s Kakum National Park (KNP) is the study area for this research. With approximately 150,000 visitors a year, it is the country’s most visited attraction (Ghana Tourism Authority, 2020) consisting of its famous canopy walkway suspended forty meters above a lush virgin forest. Other activities at the park are trail walks and overnight walks where a visitor could watch elephants and other animals at a salt lick (Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, 2016). The subsequent section presents a review of the literature on safety and security issues and details the conceptual framework of the study. This is followed by the methodological approach adopted with a graphic view of the KNP. The last sections provide results, analysis and conclusions of the study and bring to focus recommendations and questions that need to be addressed in order to expand on the area of study.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Concept of Safety and Security

In the view of Kovari and Zimanyi (2011), the concept of safety and security, has become a complex multidimensional notion comprising a wide range of components. These include political security, public safety, health and sanitation, personal data safety, legal protection of tourists, disaster protection, environmental security and getting authentic information. Although some studies (George, 2003; Wichasin & Doungphummes, 2012) have used the two concepts interchangeably, safety and security are indeed two different theoretical concepts (Yang & Nair, 2013).

Michelberger and Labodi (2012) defined safety as the minimization of threats/risks factors to protect tourists from injury or death. Safety has increasingly emerged as the basic need of human beings although there are a few who seek thrill and fear (Mura, 2010). Scholars such as Pizam and Mansfeld (2006) have identified a range of tourism activities that are exposed to safety risks. They include wildlife attack, disease infection, natural disasters and unsafe travel conditions. Security, on the other hand, is often defined as freedom from danger, risk or doubt (De Nardi & Wilks, 2007). Pizam and Mansfeld (2006) identified four types of security incidents noted to have impacts on the leisure and travel industry, namely, terrorism, crime, war and civil or political unrest. From the foregoing, a distinction may be drawn between the two distinct but interrelated concepts. Safety is defined generally as protecting people against unintended consequences of any involuntary nature while security is seen as protection against a person or thing that seeks to harm
another. Following the distinctions offered by the experts, this paper treats safety as a particular form of security that focuses on the protection of guests from injuries (whether from accidents or criminal activity). Some examples of known safety risks in national parks include getting lost in the forest, snake or insect bite, injury from falling and the like (Gstatener Lee & Weiler, 2020; Van den Berg & Ter Heijne, 2005).

**Perceptions of Safety and Security**

The literature generally suggests a direct relationship between tourists’ proximity to incidents of insecurity and their perceptions of risk. Tourists are generally likely to develop negative impressions of a destination once they feel threatened (George, 2003) and vice-versa. Leung, Yang and Dubin (2018) found that hotel guests showed a higher fear of crime when it happened inside guest rooms. Moreover, tourists who have first-hand experience with a crime for example or sometimes indirect experience (e.g. learnt from people close to them) tend to be more concerned with risks of similar nature (Brunt et al., 2000; Seabra et al., 2013).

Perceptions of safety and security are shaped by a myriad of factors, these may be categorized into socio-demographic, and travel behaviour and are presented in turn. Socio-demographic variables have been generally known to influence tourists' perceptions of safety and security. Gender, for example, has been found to play a major role in risk perception studies. Authors such as Kozak et al., (2007), Lepp and Gibson (2003), Park and Reisinger (2010), Pizam et al., (2004) as well as Qi et al. (2009) found a relationship between gender and risk perceptions while other studies (e.g. George, 2010; Kozak et al., 2007; Pizam et al., 2004; Quintal et al., 2010; Reisinger and Mavondo, 2006; Seabra et al., 2013) has highlighted the influence of culture and nationality on risk perception and travel intentions. Batra (2008) found for example that European visitors to Thailand were relatively less concerned about security challenges than respondents from other continents. This view is, however, contested by Reisinger and Mavondo (2006) who question the validity of the basis for comparing cultures relative to risk perceptions and argue that such a comparison would have to capture the different list of countries and, more importantly, the various types of risks operationalized for each study.

Travel behaviour-related variables have also been identified in the literature as determining visitor perceptions of safety and security. Key amongst these is the frequency of visit by tourists. Empirical evidence so far has shown that the frequency of visit where tourists become familiar with the tourism environment tend to lower risks perceptions (Kozak et al., 2007). To prevent victimization (or revictimization), tourists have been known to adopt a wide range of strategies. Response to threats varies across different types of tourists. Studies have shown that those who are risk averse tend to be more affected by certain crises while those who are more risk-tolerant tend to be less affected by crises (Schroeder, Pennington-Gray, Kaplanidou, & Zhan, 2013). Leisure tourists are more prone to taking risks while on vacation than local residents and less likely to observe safety precautions. This is due to a lack of understanding and awareness of local risks and as a result of common beliefs that while on vacation nothing bad could happen to them (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006). Information search is also an increasingly important risk reduction strategy adopted by tourists (Pennington-Gray & Schroeder, 2013; Reisinger & Mavondo, 2005; Shin, 2005; Tsaur et al., 2002).
Dangers in National Parks

The literature seems to suggest that natural parks present a relatively more-than- ordinary measure of risk when compared to other genres of attractions (Van den Berg & Ter Heijne, 2005. Parks may be singled out for mention as particularly risk-prone and the literature offers three reasons for such a tag. Firstly, parks may contain some potential dangers like dangerous animals, unseen obstacles, or offenders in hiding and falling branches (Bixler & Floyd, 1997). Secondly, worries about getting lost may cause tourists a sense of fear (Andrews & Gatersleben, 2010; Bixler, Carlisle, Hammitt, & Floyd, 1994; Coble, Selin and Erickson, 2003). Again, visitors may find enclosed, dark and dense wooded forest more intimidating rather than therapeutic (Milligan & Bingley, 2007). Safety and security dangers at natural environments have been classified by Herzog and Smith (1988) into social and physical dangers. In their definition, the social danger is seen as a danger which results from a social source (e.g. being attacked by another person) while physical danger is defined as a danger which stems from the physical structure of the environment such as being attacked by an animal, injury from tripping over obstacles and weather (Coble, et al., 2003; Henderson & Bialeschki, 1993).

Other dangers to visitors have ranged from the threat of being attacked by another person (e.g. Coble et. al., 2003; Henderson and Bialeschki, ,1993) to the fear to step on a snake, trip over a tree, get caught in a thunderstorm or get chased by a swarm of bees (Bixler & Floyd, 1997; Van den Berg & Ter Heijne, 2005). Even the physical layout of natural parks has been flagged (e.g. Herzog and Kirk, 2005) as contributing to tourists’ feelings of danger. National parks are naturally more dangerous than other genres of attractions, thus managerial responses to these perceptions of dangers must be worthy of scholarly attention.

Conceptual Framework

The study is driven by a proposed Attraction Safety and Security Architecture Framework which is a heuristic adaptation gleaned from various measures and standards for safety which have been tendered by the literature (e.g. UNWTO, 1996), Swarbrooke, 2000, Kotler, 1994, Gunn, 1972 and Chen, Ng, Huang and Fang, 2017). It was studied and adapted where necessary to the KNP context.

![Figure 1: Attraction Safety and Security Architecture Framework](image)

The framework arranges the attraction safety and security architecture into four interconnected dimensions: documentation and communication, equipment, facilities and people. These are operationalized in turn. The first is Documentation and Communication. A safe and secure must have both well-documented safety and security policies as well as strong communication to all users. These would also include the provision of signs, orientation of visitors on safety and security tips. In this study, documentation and communication were explored using the following indicators: availability of an accident book, a safety/security policy, information about
evacuation/exit points and safety signs.

Another aspect of the framework pertains to the equipment available. Safety and security cannot be procured without the requisite equipment. For this study, the equipment observed included fire extinguishers, good lighting systems, CCTV cameras, metal detectors at the entrance, ambulance, first aid box, protective equipment for tour guides, and protective equipment for security personnel.

The third dimension of the safety and security architecture relates to facilities. In the case of this study safety and security facilities expected to be present included seating places, sanitary facilities such as washrooms and dustbins, and a clinic.

Finally, the fourth dimension - people are the centre of any safety and security system (Maple, 2017), safety is for, about and relies upon people. To this end, the people dimension was explored using constructs such as availability of well-equipped tour guides, security guards, dedicated safety and security officer on-site and availability of staff with first aid training.

METHODS

Study Area

The famed Kakum National Park was chosen as the site for the study. Located in the Central Region of Ghana near the small village of Abrafo Odumasi, the Kakum National Park (KNP) is considered the best-protected forest in Ghana and the most-visited of the national parks in Ghana (Yiadom, 2015). The Kakum experience essentially revolves around nature tourism and offers activities such as tree-top canopy walk, bird watching, night camping (treehouses) and nature walk (Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust [GHCT], 2015). It is the country’s most visited tourist attraction (Ghana Tourism Authority, 2020)

Figure 2: Map of Kakum National Park
Source: Cartographic and Remote Sensing Unit, Department of Geography and Regional Planning, UCC (2016).
The study adopted the case study design which aims to investigate and analyze particular issues within the boundaries of a specific environment, phenomenon or situation (Dudovskiy, 2018). The case study design was used because it was the aim of the study to appraise the safety and security measures at the Kakum National Park. This design affords the ability to collect and analyze data within the context of the phenomenon. Further consideration was given to the descriptive research design which aimed at interpreting what existed (Payne & Payne, 2004) and why it was happening. The descriptive design was suitable for this study because the design sought to determine the safety and security measures as they existed at the time of the study (Ary, Jacobs & Razavieh, 1990).

Primary data were collected using the direct observation method over two months. An observation checklist was developed from the review of related articles like the UNWTO’s Handbook for Security (1996), Strategies for Safety and Security in Tourism (Chiang, 2000) and a Framework of Spatial Arrangement of a Garden Visitor Attraction developed by Swarbrooke 2002, Kotler (1994) and Gunn (1972) (cited in Page & Connel, 2006). Other relevant information was obtained from GTA, GHCT, and Wildlife Commission (WD)- all of whom are major actors in the tourism regulatory space in the country. Participatory observation was adopted to provide evidence for the items present and reasons for items absent. It again involved participation in activities such as canopy walk, nature walk/hiking (morning and night) and camping at the treehouse. A night stay at the forest further afforded a broader outlook on the safety and security situation at the park. The observation method was deemed appropriate because it provided the researchers with an unadulterated first-hand view of reality (Creswell, 2002).

In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with five senior management staff who were purposively selected out of 21 workers based on their job descriptions. With the use of an interview guide, a face to face interview was carried out with the selected participants. This method enabled the researchers to glean rich narratives in order to offer alternative explanations for the phenomenon which has been mostly dominated by quantitative studies. The managers were engaged on their values, motives and practices relative to providing safety and security at the park. The interviewees were those who either formed or implemented safety and security policies and included the GHCT director, the site manager, head of security, head of tour guide and the visitor relations officer. This technique was useful because the aforementioned were by their scope of work not only privy to information required but were those with the power of agency to make decisions concerning safety and security at the park (McIvor, 2005).

The observation checklist was validated at three levels. First was at the level of fitting into the extant literature. To this end, the UNWTO safety and security guidelines (1996), as well as frameworks developed by Swarbrooke (2000), Kotler (1994) and Gunn (1972) and more recently Chen, Ng, Huang and Fang (2017) were studied and adapted where necessary to the KNP context. At the second level of validation, the instrument was given to local safety and security experts who made input based on their knowledge of the KNP terrain. These experts were from the military, fire service, regional tourism authority and two senior academics in the field of safety and security. The third level involved pretesting and this resulted in a decline of the number of items from 30 to 23, again based on the peculiarities of the attraction in question.
The data gathered from the technical observation was first summarized and analyzed by comparing it to the expected standards outlined by the Framework as stipulated in Table 1. Thematic analysis was useful in organizing and analyzing managements’ perceptions in relation to safety and security measures at the KNP (Willig, 2013). Narratives from the managers were analyzed deductively, by extracting the underlying themes inherent in their responses. In line with Braun and Clarke’s (2013) recommendation, the process involved six stages. The first two phases involved transcription and coding of data analytically. In the 3rd to 5th stages, themes were developed and labelled under a modified scope. The final stage involved telling the story in writing from the research questions which instigated the study.

**RESULTS**

The data is presented in two-fold. At the first layer, the results of the observation are presented within the framework of the proposed Attraction Safety and Security Architecture framework and at the second level, managerial perspectives are reported. On the whole, the safety and security measures at the KNP appear to be generally inadequate. This description is informed by the fact that 12 out of the 23 (52%) required elements for a safe attraction were not available. Even with those considered available, more than half were inadequate (Table 1) either on account of not making the expected numbers or not being sufficient.

There were, however, internal relativities across the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Safety and security measures at KNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criterion and standards</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Documentation and Communication</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written safety and security policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This should be a document that is available in print or at least online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display of policy to visitors and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A well visible policy at the entrance or visitor centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident record book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A dedicated book that contains details of accidents on site and actions taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and security orientation before tour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A comprehensive briefing of what to expect by way of the terrain and potential hazards and the need to hydrate and how to behave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety signs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least six signs advising and cautioning visitors throughout the park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly designated emergency evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 3 emergency evacuation points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly designated emergency exit points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 3 emergency exit points well designated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire extinguishers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 4 fire extinguishers positioned throughout the visitor centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good lighting systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV cameras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one CCTV camera for the general reception area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Table 1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion and standards</th>
<th>Availability/adequacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metal detectors at entrance</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one at the main entrance or before going on tour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one well-equipped ambulance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Aid box</td>
<td>Inadequate -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least two first aid boxes located at the visitor centre and inside the forest.</td>
<td>There was only one first aid box located at the accountant’s office at the visitor centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective equipment for tour guides</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special uniforms, batons, tasers, communication equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective equipment for security personnel</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special uniforms, batons, tasers, communication equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitor sheds</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheds covering all seating areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitor seating</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly designated seating area with good seats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary facilities (washrooms and dustbins)</td>
<td>Adequate -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large washrooms (at least 4 toilets each for male and female)</td>
<td>There were separate well-kept washrooms for both sexes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 5 dustbins</td>
<td>21 dustbins were counted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinic</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small clinic or health post with a qualified nurse to offer preliminary medical treatment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>Inadequate -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of tour guides</td>
<td>There were only 5 tour guides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 10 guides on a daily shift</td>
<td>Inadequate -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security guards</td>
<td>The eight security counted were not well uniformed or equipped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 10 well-uniformed and equipped security guides</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated safety and security officer on site</td>
<td>Inadequate -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A staff/officer with a desk designated for security duties</td>
<td>No designated first aid team. Besides, there had not been formal training in a long time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff with first aid training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least four staff designated as first aid team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Fieldwork (2016)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Various dimensions. While the Park scored high in the area of facilities (available and adequate in 3 out of 4 indicators) its documentation and equipment dimensions were found to be the most inadequate (Table 1). The various dimensions are presented and discussed in turn.

**Documentation and Communication**

The results indicate that the Park performed poorly in the area of documentation and communication of safety and security information to all users (staff and visitors alike).

It was observed that there was no documented safety and security policy, let alone visible enough to be displayed to staff and visitors (Table 1). Neither was there an accident record book which could help monitor incidents over time. The study observed only one accessible entry and exit point at the park. In addition to the above, the few safety signs were mainly concentrated at the visitor reception centre and not in the main park where the aforementioned dangers were more likely to occur.

The available signs were mainly cautionary in nature and warned against running around, littering,
caution on properties and smoking. It was further observed that the tour guides offered some safety and security briefings before the tour and the park had a few safety signs. It was also observed that the safety and security briefings were reserved for moments just before the tour and was focused mainly on the expected nature of the terrain and the need for visitors to drink much water. It was also noticed that the level of detail differed from one tour guide to the other. Some tour guides merely gave announcements for the tour. In these instances, tourists were told to get for themselves water or drinks. Others also went to the extent of assuring tourists of their safety and security, encouraged them to ask questions anytime they had, the dos and don’ts at the park and further inquired if there were any with a special disability like asthma. These more detailed briefings mostly took place on weekdays or weekends where visitor numbers were relatively small, however, on public holidays most group tours were not oriented in any way at all.

While management confirmed the observations, they proffered a few reasons as explanations. On the issue of the absence of a written policy, there was no particular reason but they gave a blanket assurance of their commitment to protecting the visitors as shown in this quote:

*Oh no, we just don’t have these things ... but we make sure that all visitors who visit our site are protected to the best of our ability* (Director, GHCT, Male).

In reaction to the absence of an accident record book, management saw no need for one. This sentiment is captured in the ensuing quote:

*We don’t record frequent or major accidents at the site so the idea of an accident record book has not been given considerable attention. In fact, since its inception, the canopy has never broken down or has there been an accident that required serious hospitalization. It was only one incident where a young guy fell and had some of his teeth removed, it was a terrible incident but it was due to his own carelessness. We always advise them not to run at the park because it's rocky, but they won't listen* (Director, GHCT, Male).

### Equipment

The study also observed a general inadequacy of safety and security-related equipment at the Park. Only two (fire extinguishers and first aid boxes) of the required equipment were available at the time of the study. Notably, the only first aid box sighted was placed in the accountant’s office at the main visitor reception centre—about a kilometre away from the main forest where injuries were more likely to occur. It was found to contain items such as some sachets of paracetamol, a bottle of Gentian Violet, a pack of gloves, a bundle of plaster, a bottle of spirit and one bandage. Visitors who suffered any injury like bruises or dizziness were carried down to the reception to access first aid by any staff available.

Furthermore, there were no other lighting systems at the park except for the bulb found at the TV shed. In the same way, tour guides had no form of equipment for the protection and that of tourists when going on tours. Again, it was observed that the security men had no other equipment except for the triton (bat) used as a weapon in case of attack or to scare off intractable visitors. Management confirmed these observations but provided justifications. Reacting to the inadequacy of equipment and structures, the head of security remarked:

*...we were given only a bat (triton) as a weapon. This was given us to protect ourselves in the case of any attack or to scare off recalcitrant tourists. We don’t have the right to hit any tourists with it. We have also been provided with mobile phones where all the other GHCT workers are connected... We don’t have any other tools or equipment* (Head of security, Male).
When you visit Mole National Park, for example, a tour guide cannot go on a tour without a weapon. But in our case here, it’s like “home to human” (as if we are familiar with each other) and so we don’t have any of such. Sometimes carrying weapons like the gun might scare visitors. The essential thing we do is the dos and don’t’s which we spell out to them… (Senior Tour Guide, Male).

Management upheld the observation about the general lack of equipment. Regarding the observed unavailability of an ambulance, management while confirming its non-existence argued that its absence was not of any great detriment to the operation of the park since it had made alternative arrangements by way of providing a stand-by vehicle for a similar purpose. Although we do not have an ambulance, a pickup vehicle has been made available to send emergencies to the hospital. On busy days also, we arrange for community nurses to come to the park as standby for any eventualities [Site Manager, Male]

However, further probing revealed that the vehicle served multiple purposes as a staff shuttle and convenience car in addition to its designation as an ‘ambulance’.

Facilities
The Park performed at its best in this category (Table 1). Almost all the basic facilities required for safety and security were present and of acceptable quality. The only exception related to a clinic or emergency health facilities. In all, 21 dustbins were found at the car park, general reception area and in the forest itself. Results from the study revealed that there were two (2) sheds and eight (8) benches (under palm trees) at the visitor centre. About thirty (30) more benches were found at the picnic area with an additional two swing chairs at the car park. In terms of sanitary facilities, the park had neat, fully functional separate washrooms for males and females. The washroom had eight (8) cubicles furnished with toilet bowls, toilet rolls, soaps and mirror at each side. The place was usually clean in the mornings from 6:00-10:00 am yet untidy during the day particularly on weekends and public holidays where visitor numbers were high. One could find water and tissue papers on the floor with a bad smell. This condition could be attributed to the presence of many school children visiting on these particular periods. On weekdays, however, the story was quite different and the washrooms were neater.

People
In all, there were eight security personnel, all males. These were not uniformed men from the military or police force but had undergone informal training in the course of their work. It was further observed that the Park did not have any designated official specifically charged with addressing tourists’ safety and security needs. It emerged from interaction with management that the Park’s law enforcement team, focused its activities on warding off poachers. Their activities included clearing of boundary and preventing local residents from encroaching the forest.

Relative to the absence of a dedicated staff for security management indicated that this was so because they believed that the security duty fell equally to all staffs. We attempt to train all our staff on security issues once in a while. So, it should be possible for all of them to act in a security-conscious manner or answer questions on the same [Head of security, male]

DISCUSSION
The framework played a useful role as a guide in helping to assess both the broader safety and security picture and the internal relativities across its different dimensions. It emerged that the KNP performed better in
the facilities and people dimensions of the safety and security architecture framework than in equipment, documentation and communication. Such information provides a basis for providing targeted safety and security solutions.

The differential perspectives of risk between managers and the observation exercise mirrors the tenets of the Risk Perception Theory (Slovic, 1999). The difference in perception has been attributed to the fact that service providers (in this case, the managers) tend to base their risk perceptions on more rigorous evidence such as statistical data and research findings (Paek & Hove, 2017). As has been demonstrated in the findings, management felt the few recorded cases of insecurity did not constitute a blight on their safety record. Such a scenario presents two undesirable extremes: the overly sentimental fear on one hand and, on the other, the false sense of security based on hard, cold but static statistical evidence.

Management’s posturing reflects what Ferrer and Klein (2015:1) term a “deliberative assessment” of risk - an assessment which is described by Ferrer and Klein as systematic, logical and rule-based. The results suggest that such an assessment may be explained by two factors: management’s mentality of security (the logical aspect) and past experience (the systematic/evidence-based dimension). Regarding mentality, three different mindsets on safety and security are revealed from their responses to the queries raised by the researchers. The first is the notion of ‘collective security’ (Sharp, 2013:1) where management seemed to think that all parties were responsible for safety and security. Tourists, in this case, were blamed for their own safety and security misfortunes, especially, once management thought that the measures available at the park are adequate to ensure tourists protection. As observed from the second narrative (on accident record book), management blamed accidents at the park on ‘stubborn’ or ‘careless’ visitors. Such a mindset is not peculiar to the KNP as it is generally known (e.g. Boakye, 2009) that authorities tend to shift the blame for accidents away from themselves. Again, management’s explanation for the absence of a dedicated security desk for the park reflects the idea that security duties are pluralistically shared across staff and points to a hesitancy to accept overall responsibility for security at the park. Yet, the basic common legal canons of duty of care place the overall responsibility squarely on management.

Passiveness was the second mind-set detected from the managerial responses. The blanket assurance given in the first narrative to the specific questions about the unavailability of written documentation such as the safety and security policy and the accident record book reflects an ideological frame which seems to question the relevance of such basic safety and security measures. The response to these questions suggests the adoption of a fire-fighting approach, however, having a readily accessible instructional manual on is mandatory (UNWTO, 1991). Hence, a documented safety and security policy is necessary to guide measures put in place to ensure tourists’ protection at KNP.

A third mindset revealed by management responses is that of ‘cautious security’. This type of security can best be described as being designed to avoid creating fear in the visitors. As noticed from their responses to observations on equipment provision, management appeared hesitant to be overly proactive by arming their tour guides and security men for fear of scaring visitors away. The service and hospitality industry (of which tourist attractions form an integral part) has always faced a fundamental dilemma of balancing the requirements of being warm and hospitable and strict professionalism (Crick, 2011; Kaufman & Ricci, 2014).

One reason the literature proffers for such a mentality is the fear of the negative effect of being overly
security conscious on the tourist. Extensive warnings about insecurity have sometimes tended to have the unintended effect of scaring instead of protecting tourists (Mawby, Jones, & Boakye, 2014; Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006).

The second broad cause of management’s deliberative risk assessment has to do with a reliance on a supposed good past safety record. Management appeared to believe that the park was under no reasonable threat or risk because no ‘major accident’ had been recorded in the past. The fact of not having a major accident all these years as was observed from one of the narratives (page 14) informed their sense of immunity from danger. Hence, they found no justification for providing some of the items listed in Table 1 because they believed that tourists who visited the park caused no threat or harm for which reason there had not been any record of serious crime or terrorism. It is quite intriguing that management could make such an assertion, especially when they did not keep a record of accidents. Such a posture of false security reflects Stanko’s (2000) paradox of fear where genuine fears are ignored and fake ones are entertained and, in the process, takes attention away from the need to maintain and constantly prevent any likely occurrences. It is also an overly simplistic reliance on a so-called undocumented good safety record and fails to consider the fact that security threats are constantly evolving (Sharp, 2013) and increasingly targeting tourism-related destinations and installations (Mawby, Boakye, & Jones, 2014).

But even more unsettling is the fact that management seemed to centre their construction of risk only on happenings around the canopy walkway and in a manner that ignored injuries and accidents at other places in the park. Thus, they tended to pride themselves in the fact that the walkway had not faced any ‘major’ accident since its inception and would prefer to describe some accidents with serious health implications (like the one where a visitor lost the teeth) as “minor and mundane”. This lack of appreciation of the magnitude of danger can be explained by engaging the Cultural Theory of Risk (Tansey & Rayner, 2008) where people of differential backgrounds construct risk differently (McNeely & Lazrus, 2014). In this particular instance, management, based on their expert views may have adopted a more rational and objective outlook (Jasanof, 1998) in their assessment of the risk and tended to classify accidents are ‘minor’ but these are seen differently by other users. Nonetheless, the tourist’s expectation of pleasure while on holiday has no room for injuries—no matter how minor they may be (Jones, Barclay, & Mawby, 2013).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study set out to assess the safety and security measures at the KNP and engage management on their reasons for the status quo. It has emerged that despite the inadequacy of safety and security measures at the Park, management has adopted a deliberative assessment of risk which causes them to see the risk from a collective, passive and cautious mind-set. Management also has a narrow construction of risk which centres mainly on the canopy walkway only.

On the back of these findings, some remedial actions are imminent. The first step would be to cause a change of philosophy by reorienting management to not only broaden their constructions of risk but also to adopt a more proactive mindset towards it. The absence of safety and security necessities like security guards, clinic, CCTV cameras, ambulance and paramedics and emergency entry and evacuation points are fertile grounds for terrorists and other criminals. The onus, therefore, lies on tourism stakeholders like the Ministry of Tourism and GTA in collaboration with attraction management to develop a standard policy that
encompasses the provision of adequate safety and security measures at attraction sites.

It is salutary to indicate that these indicators are by no means exhaustive and though they were gleaned from well-recognized literature and subjected to reviews by security experts, the findings are only limited to the indicators deployed and more studies towards creating generic standards for attraction security are recommended. Also, the results of this study can provide a baseline data for a longitudinal and comparative analysis of the different types of attractions’ safety and security status. Other studies can consider the precautionary measures tourists adopt as they embark on a tour and their adaptive behaviours when they encounter threats at natural parks.

REFERENCES


