INSECURITY AND TERRORISTS’ THREATS OF ATTACKS ON SELECTED NIGERIAN CITIES: IMPLICATIONS ON LAGOS RESIDENTS’ CONCERNS FOR SAFETY AND THE CITY SECURITY PLANNING

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is common but limited to certain towns in Nigeria. However, the nomenclature seems to be changing as security intelligence has it that terrorist groups are planning attacks targeting Lagos, and other notable cities. This study therefore examines concerns for safety among residents and implications on individual and city-level security planning in Lagos. The official wards as demarcated by the Independent National Electoral Commission represent clusters from which at least a respondent was randomly selected. The study’s respondents were selected from 49 (one of every five wards {20%}) wards out of 245 wards in Lagos. In the selected wards, at least two respondents were randomly selected. A total of 288 residents participated in the survey, but, only 134 respondents accurately completed the questionnaire used in this analysis, representing a 58.7% response rate. Results show that 78% of the respondents were concerned about their safety while some 90% took precaution by avoiding certain places and activities. Findings show significant relations between awareness of the planned attacks, concerns for safety, and precautionary behaviour among respondents. Besides, results show that respondents’ socio-economic characteristics, neighbourhood environmental design, and past crime victimisation mediate concerns for safety and security behaviour. The study concludes that the emergence of this security intelligence in the public domain has further contributed to the increasing fear and residents’ mobility change. The study recommends among others policing strategies, a new urbanism, where urban planning and design strategies are applied to make attacks more difficult to carry out in soft spaces and places.

Keywords: Security intelligence, Terrorists’ attack, Fear of violence, Safety behaviour, Lagos

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INTRODUCTION

Nigeria has witnessed a lot of violence crime, conflict threats and unprecedented insecurity in almost all the states, geo-political areas and different zones and locations of the country. The country has experienced extraordinary threats, attacks and different forms of insecurity problems ranging from terrorism and insurgency, kidnapping and abduction, shelling, bloodshed, armed robberies, violent crime and criminality, and cybercrime as well as different forms and magnitude of internal and external challenges bedevilling the country both in the past and present time. All these have hindered businesses and the development of the country in the last decade. In the recent past, more and more cities in Nigeria have been facing terrorist attacks. Festivals, events and outdoor shows were cancelled in many Nigerian cities such as Kaduna, Abuja and Lagos because of the increasing threat of terrorism. On 28th of March, 2022, bandits attacked a Kaduna-bound train in central Nigeria carrying 970 passengers; at least eight people were killed. Consequently, some train stations and bus terminals were evacuated after being warned of further attacks.

The most dangerous so far are the terrorist activities and militia groups of Boko Haram. Since its rise in 2009, the Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency has adversely affected millions of people, and businesses and caused thousands of deaths, and millions of injuries. Boko Haram and its offshoots are responsible for the displacement of 2.5 million Nigerians, with approximately 200,000 seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Due to the brutal tactics deployed by Boko Haram, a group called “Ansaru” broke away in 2012 and 2020, the Ansaru group

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8 O Ojewale, A Badiora, F Onuoha, Kaduna’s train attacks add to Nigeria’s deep security problems, (2022).
10 International Crisis Group, Boko Haram on the Back Foot?
conducted its first attacks in Kaduna state.\textsuperscript{11} The most recent security intelligence has it that the group is planning another attack on Kaduna state, having consolidated their grip on communities in Kaduna with a “parallel” government and “permanent operational base” in the North-western state near Nigeria’s capital, Abuja.\textsuperscript{12} The Ansaru group is broadly aligned with Al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{13} The group has kidnapped many hostages and is believed to have killed several hostages as well. The indiscriminate killing of civilians and, in particular, Muslim faithfuls caused further divisions within the Boko Haram group. In 2016, Boko Haram further split into two factions: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP).\textsuperscript{14}

The JAS is characterised by the use of more violent methods and continues to perpetrate systematic attacks against both Muslims and Christians. Any person who does not support the group is perceived as an ally of the government and may be targeted.\textsuperscript{15} JAS is more active in south-central Borno and along the border of Cameroon. It also has bases in the north-western part of Nigeria. On 19 May, 2021, JAS’s leader and his groups were captured by ISWAP.\textsuperscript{16} ISWAP focuses its attacks on Christians and persons not abiding by Sharia law, military structures, government and security personnel, traditional leaders and contractors, and has tried to gain the support of local communities by providing services. ISWAP’s stronghold lies in Lake Chad. Its influence also extends to Borno, and southwards into Yobe state, up to Adamawa. ISWAP is also building the capacity of radical groups in the north-western part of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{17} The group has become politically

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid
entrenched and seems to pose an even greater challenge to the Nigerian military.\footnote{18,19} ISWAP is affiliated with the ISIS core in Iraq and Syria.

These groups have conducted several attacks in different states and places in Nigeria. Public places where crowds gather have been targeted, including churches, marketplaces, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps, transport terminals (e.g. train networks, bus terminals), government buildings, educational institutions (e.g. colleges and universities), and international organisations (e.g. UN Office).\footnote{20} Thus, from an urban design and planning perspective, this means that terror groups are increasingly aiming at soft targets and crowded places that cannot be altered without radically changing how we experience, plan, and design our cities. Their modus operandi includes coordinated armed assaults, sporadic shooting, assassinations, kidnapping, use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings (including by child and female bombers), and car bombings with which bombers drive into crowds as a tool of terror, among others. They also use military uniforms and vehicles as a tactic to get close to the intended target. In some cases, terrorist groups construct illegal vehicle checkpoints on major roads in Northern Nigeria and attack travelling vehicles.\footnote{21}

In furtherance of these attacks, fresh intelligence has it that terrorist groups of ISWAP and Ansaru are plotting coordinated attacks on Lagos, Abuja and some other important cities with armed fighters and high calibre weapons particularly Rocket-propelled Grenade launchers, Anti-Aircraft guns and General Purpose Machine Guns.\footnote{22} Some recent happenings suggest that this may not be a mere threat. The increasing bandit and terrorists attacks all over the country (including the “peaceful” southwest region); on the country’s security formations; and the fatal (emotional word) assaults on the Presidential Guards in Abuja\footnote{23} are cases in point. A few months later, precisely on the 23rd of October, 2022, the US Embassy

\footnotetext{18}{A Kassim, “Boko Haram Internal Civil War: Stealth Takfir and Jihad as Recipes for Schism” (2018). }
\footnotetext{20}{Oversee Security Advisory Committee [OSAC]. Nigeria 2019 Crime & Safety Report, 2019. }
\footnotetext{21}{O Cyril et al., Violent crimes and insecurity on Nigerian highways, 2023 }
\footnotetext{22}{Vanguard News, Bandits, terrorists planning attacks on Lagos, FCT, Katsina, three others – NSCDC. Available at: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/07/bandits-terrorists-planning-attacks-on-lagos-fct-katsina-three-others-nscdc/ Accessed: 17 August, 2022. }
\footnotetext{23}{Ibid}
issued a security advisory that there could be a possible terrorist attack in Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and the nation's commercial capital, Lagos. Furthermore, on the 22nd of June, 2023, the Department of State Services (DSS) raised the alarm over planned attacks on worship and recreational centres before and during Eid Kabir celebrations.\textsuperscript{24} The recovery of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) from terrorists in joint operations by the DSS, personnel of the Nigerian Army and the Nigeria Police force lent credence to the planned terrorist attack.

Being one of the cities that has consistently been on the terrorists’ directory, this study examines fear and concern for safety among Lagos residents. In this study, the emphasis is on how Lagos residents’ reception of the security intelligence news is associated with their concern for safety, and precautionary behaviours. The study further examines whether this relationship remains when geographical location, age, gender, education, occupation, nationality and ethnic groups, experiential victimization, length of stay in Lagos, and income/economic pressure are adjusted for. The relationship between violence news and concerns for safety on a more general level has received notable attention. But, many of these studies have focused on violent media reportage and not security intelligence. Generally, findings suggest significant links between violent crime and conflict news and fear\textsuperscript{25,26,27,28,29} as well as precautionary behaviour.\textsuperscript{30,31,32} When exploring violent news effects, it is right to know the extent to which this reverberates in people’s

\textsuperscript{24} News Times Nigeria, DSS raises alarm over planned terrorist attacks on religious, recreational centres - NewsTimes.org.ng Accessed, August, 1 2023
\textsuperscript{27} J. Wardman, Nothing to fear but fear itself? Liquid provocations for new media and fear of crime. (2017).
\textsuperscript{29} Näsä, et al., Crime News Consumption and Fear of Violence: The Role of Traditional Media, Social Media, and Alternative. (2020).
\textsuperscript{30} Wilcox, et al., A multidimensional examination of campus safety: Victimization, perceptions of danger, worry about crime, and precautionary behavior among college women in the post-Clery era. (2007).
\textsuperscript{32} Näsä, et al., Crime News Consumption and Fear of Violence: The Role of Traditional Media, Social Media, and Alternative. (2020).
behaviour. That is, what counteractive measures are taken because people are worried? One of such is precautionary behaviour: the decision to circumvent certain areas at certain times.33,34,35,36

The significance of security intelligence could be weightier on residents’ fear and behaviour compared to mere traditional and usual crime incidence news. Thus, this study considers fear, along socio-economic, spatial and temporal lines due to security intelligence information leaked to the general public. The study takes a street politics approach, reflecting residents’ concerns for safety and avoidance behaviour in the stir of security intelligence and some follow-up/matching attacks. The study moves away from discourses of anxiety as control, to an understanding of anxiety according to the daily experience of people on the streets of Lagos. This study contributes towards an exploration of measures that could reduce the prevalence of terrorism, and attempt to address the concerns for safety among residents. Furthermore, we aim to add to prior research by using a Lagos representative sample of residents, and by capturing the fresh security intelligence environment

AN OVERVIEW OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON NIGERIAN CITIES

The history of terrorism in Nigeria can be dated back as far as the days before the country’s civil war. The very first experience was the establishment of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), led by Major Boro. The group then declared the Niger Delta Republic as a revolt against the then military government of General Yakubu Gowon, and to agitate for a more equitable stake of the wealth from the nation’s oil resource. While the group was a brief threat to national peace and the then government, it was later crushed and their leader was arrested. Over the years, other “terrorist groups” like the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOP), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), The Boko Haram, Ansaru, JAS and ISWAP among others have been

34 Badiora, et al., Gender Differences in Risk Perception and Precautionary Behaviour among the Residents of Yoruba Traditional City. (2014).
established. The motives and ideologies that fired up the activities of these groups that have threatened the nation’s peace, safety and security were poverty and socio-economic deprivation, land-use and property rights, inequality, discrimination, political alienation, and ethno-religion.\footnote{J.M Etebom, The Characteristics and Complexity of the Nigerian Security Challenges, (2022).}

The issue of terrorism had increased in 2009, and the security agencies seemed to be helpless in the face of the many successful terror attacks across the nation. Several attacks have been perpetrated by terrorist groups, mostly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States in the country’s North East.\footnote{D Ishaya, National Tragedy and Insecurity Threats in Nigeria: Implications to Security Woes and Challenges in the 21st Century, (2021).} There have also been significant attacks in other states like Gombe, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Bauchi, and Taraba States, among others. The terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for many successful attacks including but not limited to the August 2011 attack, killing twenty-three people in a suicide car bombing outside the United Nations headquarters in Abuja; the attack on July 5, 2022, where the Kuje Prison in the country’s capital was bombed. In addition; the killing of policemen in Suleja, Niger State on May 12 and July 4, 2022; an IED attack on a bar in Kabba, Kogi State on May 29, 2022; IED attack on May 2022 against a military facility in Jalingo; a number of long-range rockets fired into near Maiduguri city Airport on December 23, 2021; the November 28, 2020 killing of at least 70 civilians with several other wounded and abducted in Jere, Borno State. Other attacks include the execution of five aid workers on July 22, 2020; the July 2, 2020 shooting of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flight in Damasak, Borno State; the killing of at least thirty-eight civilians, and targeting the humanitarian hub located in Monguno, Borno State on June 13, 2020, and the June 9, 2020 killing of around eighty-one civilians in Felo village, Gubio, Borno State.\footnote{Oversee Security Advisory Committee [OSAC]. Nigeria 2020 Crime & Safety Report, 2020.}

Between May and August, 2022, ISWAP had conducted a number of attacks in Kogi, Niger, and in FCT. The shameful assaults on the Presidential Guards in Abuja and the Zuma Security formation\footnote{Vanguard News, Bandits, terrorists planning attacks on Lagos, FCT, Katsina, three others – NSCDC. Avail at: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/07/bandits-terrorists-planning-attacks-on-lagos-fct-katsina-three-others-nscdc/ Accessed: 17 August, 2022.} are cases in point.

\footnote{Oversee Security Advisory Committee [OSAC]. Nigeria 2020 Crime & Safety Report, 2020.}
In another instance, within the space of a month, Owo, a town in the country’s southwest, was attacked twice. The latest occurred on July 27, 2022, at the Folahami Junction of the town, where a construction company called Craneburg Construction Company was located. The criminals opened fire on everybody in sight. Some IEDs were also used, this occurred in the evening and left some people killed and scores injured. This came weeks after the attack of June 5, 2022, on people attending worship. The armed men entered Saint Francis Catholic Church and fired gunshots and IEDs at the congregation, killing about 40 parishioners while many others were seriously injured. The Church was attacked in broad daylight at about 11.30a.m. These attacks have been traced to ISWAP. Unlike northern Nigeria which has been battling terrorism and banditry since 2009, the southwest has long been considered the most peaceful area in the country. Although certain crimes (e.g. kidnappings, armed robbery) have become increasingly common in the southwest, terrorist attacks were rare until the recent Owo massacres. Boko Haram and ISWAP were responsible for the death of 272 civilians in the first quarter of 2023.

These attacks are pointers to the need to redefine urban management and policies in order to meet new security requirements and procedures. Owo is about 250km from Lagos. It takes less than 4 hours to arrive at Lagos from Owo by road. Hence, terrorism and insurgency are just a few hours away from Lagos. The insurgence of a potent jihadist force around Lagos means continuous battle for the city and other southwest states, as well as danger for residents caught in the scuffle. The Owo attacks are much more serious and signal a fresh movement of terrorism, targeting cities in southwestern Nigeria. With the security intelligence, Owo’s attacks and assaults on the Presidential Guards, there are no other signals that can prepare Nigeria, particularly, Lagos and Abuja for the tragic crime that these cities could face in the near future. Focusing on Lagos therefore, this study examines concerns for safety and precautionary behaviour, because of the security information disclosed to the general public.


What could have made Lagos to be on the Terrorists’ Target List?

To begin with, Lagos is a city in Nigeria: the most populous country in Africa and a regional economic giant. Lagos is located in the Southwestern part of Nigeria, in West Africa and on the narrow coastal floodplains of the Bight of Benin (See Figure 1). Physically, it lies approximately between longitude 2°42’E and 3°22’E and between latitude 6°22’N and 6°42’ N. Lagos is bounded in the West by the Republic of Benin, and in the South by the Atlantic Ocean (See Figure 1). Territorially, Lagos encompasses an area of 358,862 hectares and over 40% of its total land area is covered by water bodies and wetlands.

Lagos is divided into three broad homogenous geographical divisions: the Mainland, the Island, and the Hinterland. The mainland is the area where a large (approximately 60%) population of Lagos residents live (see Figure 1). It is the centre of Lagos and where most industrial and manufacturing businesses are located. The Island is the geographical term used to define the area of Lagos that is separated from the mainland by the main channel draining the lagoon into the Atlantic Ocean. This part of Lagos is the area where most business and administrative activities take place. It also houses high-class politicians, professionals, executives in the private sector, civil societies, NGOs and government officials, and most of the upscale residential areas. The hinterlands are developed areas which lie beyond the Lagos mainland and island. These are the Lagos periphery zones, outside the main urban area where farming, other agricultural activities, and urban land uses (residential and businesses) are intermixed.

Lagos covers multiple administrative areas. Lagos encompasses the municipality covering the extent of what is present-day Lagos Island Local Government (See Figure 2). This area served as the headquarters of the Lagos Colony and remains the core of the modern metropolis and its central business district. Second is the Lagos Metropolis (See Figure 3), covering 16 LGAs. Third is the Lagos state (see Figure 2), which covers 20 LGAs (16 metropolitan and 4 peri-urban LGAs).

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44 K Aderogba, Global warming and challenges of floods in Lagos metropolis, Nigeria. (2012).
45 L. Oduwayne, Rezoning of residential areas as a strategy for increasing Housing supply in metropolitan Lagos Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. (2013).
Figure 1: Map indicating Lagos major geographical divisions/areas

Source: Badiora (2023)
The choice of Lagos for planned terrorist attacks is likely based on the following:
(1) the Rational Choice Principle (RCP) and (2) the number of successful attacks
recorded in the country in the last 8 years. Regarding RCP, crime is thoughtfully
calculated and deliberate⁴⁶,⁴⁷. All criminals (including terrorists) are rational
actors who practice decision-making making that concurrently work towards
gaining the maximum paybacks for their situation and motivations⁴⁸,⁴⁹. Hence,

⁴⁶ J. Brantingham, & L. Brantingham, Anticipating the displacement of crime using the principles
⁴⁷ W. Einstadter, & S. Henry, Criminological theory: An analysis of its underlying assumptions
⁴⁸ Ibid
Lagos is a location that fits into terrorism motivation and situation for several reasons as follows.

The first explanation is population. Typically, the drive of terrorist groups is to cause mass fatality of innocent people to gain tangible political attention and/or military objectives. According to Phillips, who wrote for Forbes on 17 August 2017, ‘terrorist attacks typically occur in cities due to the density of population’ and Lagos is one of the fastest growing cities in the world today. At present, Lagos is 40 times larger than it was in the 1950s. It has been estimated by the government of Lagos state that eighty-six youth migrants arrive in Lagos every hour with no plans to leave\textsuperscript{50}, representing the highest figure in any city in the world. This high level of migration brings opportunities as well as challenges to the city. While it is hard to come up with the exact number (since most residents live in suburban slums and informal settlements), the projected population of Lagos is about twenty (20) million people\textsuperscript{51}. Thus, any attack on whichever part of the Lagos city system (churches, markets, transport terminals, government and private buildings, educational institutions etc.) is likely to cause mass mortalities of innocent people, military, and security forces as well as injuries and fear among residents.

\textsuperscript{50} A. Ambode, Rapid Urbanization: 86 Migrants Enter Lagos Every Hour https://insidebusiness.ng/18245/rapid-urbanization-86-migrants-enter-lagos-every-hour-ambode/

Another reason is Lagos state's political and economic status. Lagos has strategic political and economic importance in Nigeria and Africa. More than half (about 65%) of the country’s manufacturing, commercial, and financial businesses are located in Lagos. Lagos is the foremost commercial hub of Nigeria, offering a huge and accessible market within the African economic zone. Lagos has the fourth-highest GDP in Africa. The influence of Lagos on the country’s GDP cannot be discounted. At present, Lagos contributes about 30% to Nigeria's GDP.

Source: Badiora (2023)

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53 Ibid
54 Ibid
Hence, the planned attacks are likely to undermine these and hit hard on the nation’s economy, politics, democracy, and governance. Besides, attacks on Lagos could have extended effects on West Africa, and the African continent in general. Besides, such attacks on Lagos could also have global socio-economic impacts as well. Furthermore, Lagos is one of the “heavily protected” metropolises in Nigeria because of its socio-economic and socio-political significance. Likewise, a heavily defended location, like Lagos might become a prime target for a terrorist attack, given the propaganda value that would be achieved if terrorist groups of ISWAP and Ansaru manage to penetrate the supposedly unassailable security arrangement of the city.

Some underlying socio-economic issues, structural drivers, and existing violent crime problems could also have motivated the terrorist groups of ISWAP and Ansaru. For instance, the phenomenon of spatial development with its two distinctions: the political/economic elitist areas and the informal settlements of the poor. This spatial pattern of development became inevitable after years of low-density development created by the Lagos elites and the deprived. This development creates social isolation and segregation of the urban fabric in Lagos. It also creates inequality in access to urban opportunities and services. This, in turn, pushes the disadvantaged segment of the population towards fanaticism in exchange for jobs and money. Furthermore, this spongy Lagos urban fabric has allowed some freedom fighters to have even pushed for ethnic separation between neighborhoods in Lagos. This creates additional tension in the Lagos urban environment, particularly in the public and political realm recently. This porous Lagos urban development fabric provides a fertile atmosphere for terrorist groups of ISWAP and Ansaru to mix with residents of these low-density areas and informal settlements in the core and peripheral areas. At present, Lagos has over 157 slum communities deserving of attention.55

Furthermore, there is low resilience and unregulated growth due to weak control and communications systems as well as a lack of consistent rules for interaction among sections of the city56. This has resulted in widespread youth unemployment, poverty, hunger, inequality, overcrowding, and land deterioration which overstretches the available urban facilities, thereby creating a downward spiral of

55 T Lawanson, Lagos has over 157 slum communities, must address urbanization. Lagos has over 157 slum communities, must address urbanisation -UNILAG don (premiumtimesng.com)
56 US Chief of Staff of the Army, Megacities and the United States Army Preparing For a Complex and Uncertain Future. (2014)
instability.\textsuperscript{57} Lagos is a loosely integrated area; the city lacks many of the formal relationships that keep highly integrated cities stable\textsuperscript{58}. Although “heavy” security governance and structures exist at different levels, their ability to enforce safety and security is problematic. That is why many Lagos residents have been victims of one or more crimes, including armed robbery, burglary, carjacking, rape, and kidnapping among others.\textsuperscript{59} Spatially, the Mainland portion of Lagos has experienced periodic outbreaks of violence, resulting from clashes among localized street gangs known as “area boys” while the hinterland portion is known for cultist violence, which often erupts in supremacy battles between various groups.\textsuperscript{60} In Lagos, smash-and-grab robberies are common, with criminals robbing occupants of stopped vehicles of valuables. House invasions remain a serious threat in Lagos, including guarded buildings and gated communities on the Island.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, armed robbers have invaded waterfront areas by boats and canoes, using waterways as a means to foment troubles and escape. In 2019, Lagos had the highest rate of everyday crime in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{62} To this end, Lagos seems incapable of dealing with its rapid population growth, structural transformation problems and everyday safety and security issues at the moment and thus, the expectation of the city’s ability to prevent planned terrorist attacks is equally slim.

**METHODOLOGY**

The study adopted a quantitative research design\textsuperscript{63} to examine how Lagos residents’ reception of the security intelligence news is associated with their concern for safety, and precautionary behaviours. A quantitative design allows for descriptive and inferential analysis\textsuperscript{64}. Logistic regression models\textsuperscript{65} were used to examine the influence of independent variables (e.g. reception of the security intelligence, experiential fear and residents’ socio-economic grouping) on dependent variables (e.g. perceived fear/concern for safety, precautionary behaviour). Data for this study is based on a survey undertaken between August

\textsuperscript{57} A Badiora, Safety and Security in Urban Africa: The Case of Lagos (2023).

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid

\textsuperscript{59} Overseer Security Advisory Committee ([OSAC], Nigeria 2019 Crime & Safety Report.

\textsuperscript{60} A Badiora, Safety and Security in Urban Africa: The Case of Lagos (2023).

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid


\textsuperscript{64} S Flynn, Research design for the behavioral sciences, (2021).

\textsuperscript{65} D Olive, Linear Regression, (2017).
2022 and December, 2022 after the security intelligence broke out through a leaked memo dated July 25, 2022 and signed by the Deputy Commandant General (DCG), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). Data were collected through semi-structured questionnaire/interview guides. This is because a similar instrument has been used in previous fear and violence victimization studies\textsuperscript{66,67,68}.

The population of this study is residents of Lagos. For the purpose of questionnaire administration, cluster sampling was used. Cluster sampling is a technique where the researchers divide the entire population into sections or clusters that represent a population.\textsuperscript{69} There are 245 wards or micro-communities as demarcated by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Lagos. A ward is a local community or neighbourhood area, typically and officially demarcated for administrative and electoral purposes in Lagos, Nigeria. Thus, each of the wards constitutes a cluster. Furthermore, systematic sampling was used to select one of every five wards from which at least two respondents were randomly selected as participants. Unlike simple random sampling in which each of \( n \) elements is then randomly chosen, in systematic sampling, an element is chosen from the first \( k \) elements (\( k \) is often defined as \( N/n \)), and then every \( k \)th element is chosen until \( n \) elements are selected.\textsuperscript{70} In this study, therefore, systematic sampling is conducted by sampling every \( K \)th ward in the study area after the first ward is selected at random from the list. Thus, every fifth ward (representing 20\% of the population clusters) was systematically selected after the first ward had been selected randomly. Value of \( K \) (at least 3\%) is considered allowable as sample value at 3\% and above had been proposed to adequately represent a homogenous population sample such as this\textsuperscript{71,72}. The value of \( k \) in this study is however 20\%.

Hence, the final number of micro-local communities where at least a respondent was randomly selected was 49 wards.

\textsuperscript{66} Badiora et al., Spatial Analysis of Residents’ Fear and Feeling of Insecurity in Ile-Ife, Nigeria (2013).
\textsuperscript{68} Kujala, et al., Income inequality, poverty, and fear of crime in Europe. (2019).
\textsuperscript{69} S Flynn, Research design for the behavioral sciences, (2021).
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid
\textsuperscript{71} L Oduwayne, Rezoning of residential areas as a strategy for increasing Housing supply in metropolitan Lagos Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria (2013).
\textsuperscript{72} G Sharma, Pros and cons of different sampling techniques (2017).
In these selected wards, a total of 288 residents started to participate in the survey. Because this study upholds informed consent during data collection, respondents were acquainted with the aim of the study, and given an equal chance to partake and withdraw whenever they wanted. Hence, it is important to state that only 134 respondents eventually completed the questionnaire used in this analysis, representing a 58.7% response rate. Consistent with this average response rates for studies at the organization/community level are 37.2% and 52.7% at individual level research. This study upholds avoidance of harm, and confidentiality of respondents’ identity, and personal information supplied. The respondents were adults of age 18 years and above and who had spent at least five years in Lagos. This benchmark is to provide valued information for understanding the extent, trends and patterns of fear among residents in Lagos, and to ensure that such a respondent possesses adequate knowledge and experiences about concern for safety in the study area. The number of years a person has lived in an area will influence his or her opinions and ability to converse about the focus of this study. Furthermore, the selected wards and participants were distributed proportionally based on the geographical coverage of the Mainland, Island and Peri-urban to designate the spatial dimensions of fear and concern for safety to the study.

Before its application, a pilot study was conducted on 15 residents to test the instruments. The rule of thumb is to test the survey on at least 12 to 50 people before full-scale administration. Feedback was obtained and the instrument was revised and further administered to 15 residents. For analysis of the internal reliability, Cronbach’s alpha values were tested with a cut-off value of 0.75. Reliability analysis indicated that the instrument is acceptable (alpha coefficient: 0.82), exceeding the suggested satisfactory level of 0.70. To reduce respondents’ predisposition, closed-ended questions were preferred. Nonetheless, respondents were given opportunities to discuss responses. This study upholds voluntary participation and withdrawal of respondents at any point, avoidance of harm, confidentiality and informed consent during data collection.

76 Ibid
Variables and measurements

Two groups of variables were considered in this study: dependent variables and independent variables.

**Dependent variables**

The variables in this category include perceived fear/concern for safety, precautionary behaviour due to the threat of terrorist attacks, and respondents’ view of the planned attack as a threat to oneself. Regarding fear/concern for safety, it was asked that: “In the past weeks, have you been afraid of becoming a victim of the planned terrorist attack if it happened?” with a response scale from 1 to 2, where 1 = No and, 2 = Yes. The response scale was re-coded into two classes, to make a clear distinction between those who had been afraid and those who had not. In terms of precautionary behaviour, it was asked that: “Is there an area in your community/Lagos, which you avoid because of the threat?” with a response scale from 1 to 2, where 1 = No and, 2 = Yes. This was done in order to scrutinise respondents who avoided certain area(s) from those who did not. A detailed description of the dependent variables is included in Table 1.

**Table 1: Summary of dependent variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N (134)</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>Fear/concern for safety</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>77.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Precautionary behaviour</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>121</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>09.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ Survey (2022)

**Independent variables**

The independent variables were constructed into three groups: reception of the security intelligence, experiential fear, and residents’ socio-economic grouping. Regarding the reception of security intelligence we asked: “Have you heard about the security intelligence on the planned attack on Lagos?” with a response scale from 1 to 2, where 1 = No and threat, 2 = Yes with “No” as the reference variable. The response scale was re-coded into two classes, so as to make a clear distinction between those who had received the news and those who had not. In this study, we are not interested in the sources, comprising traditional media, new and social media, official information channels, and publications among others.
Experiential fear was theorised as past victimisation experience based on three forms: violence against a person, violence against property, and experience of shooting, bombing and/or kidnapping. Information on past violent crimes against persons was gathered through the question: “Have you, your family or any member of your community experienced violent crime (like grievous harm and wounding, sexual violence, or used any other kind of physical violence) in the last five years?” Similarly, past property crime was based on the question: “Has theft of personal property occurred to you or any member of your community in the last five years?” Then, past experience of shootings, bombing, and/or kidnapping was based on the question: “Have you, your family or any member of your community experienced shootings, bombing, and/or kidnapping in the last five years?” In all three cases, the options had the following response options: 1 = No one, 2 = Yes with “No” as the reference variables in all the three experiential fear cases. This was done to separate victims from non-victims.

Table 2a: Summary of independent variables (Security intelligence & Experiential fear)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N (134)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reception of the security intelligence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>08.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against persons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against property</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience in shooting, bombing and/or kidnapping</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ Survey (2022)
The respondents’ socioeconomic status is indicated by gender, nationality, ethnicity, age, occupation, and level of income/financial situation, highest level of education attained, geographical area and number of years already spent in Lagos. Gender was coded into male and female with female as the reference variable. Nationality was coded into Nigerian and non-Nigerian with the former as the reference category. For Nigerians, four different groups were determined: Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani and others with both Hausa/Fulani and others as the reference category. The categories for age were 18–40 years, 41–60 years and those above 60 years, with 18–40 years as the reference category. For the highest level of education attained, options included those with no formal education, basic education, post-basic education, and tertiary education. The combination of no formal education and basic education was used as the reference category. For geographical area, Lagos is coded into three principal geographical areas: the Mainland, Island, and Peri-urban, with the Mainland as the reference category.

For respondents’ occupations, there are four groups: business/professional service owners, civil/public servants, those employed in business/professional services and others with the combination of those employed in business/professional services and others as the reference category. The respondents’ average monthly income/financial situation is coded into three: Less than 1000 USD, between 1000 USD and 1000 USD as well as above 10000 USD with less than 1000 USD as the reference category. The categories for years already spent in Lagos were coded as 5–9 years, 10–14 years, 15–19 years, and more than 19 years with the combination of those who have spent 5–9 years, and 10–14 years as the reference category.

**Table 2b: Summary of independent variables (socio-economic characteristics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N (134)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>58.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Nigerians</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>97.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Nigerians</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerians (n = 130)</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private business/professional service owners</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil/Public servant</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in private business/professional services</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 60 years</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-basic education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1000 USD</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 USD – 10000 USD</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 10000 USD</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 yrs.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 14 yrs.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 19 yrs.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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DATA ANALYSIS

The data analysis was done using the statistical package of SPSS 16.0 [IBM 22]. Descriptive analysis (frequency counts and percentages) was used to summarize the variables. In a few instances where respondents were given opportunities to elaborate their responses, conversations were transcribed, particularly, when respondents gave their opinions or provided important clarification. A narrative technique of reporting was used to analyze the opinions of the respondents regarding both dependent and independent variables.

In terms of exploring the variables, logistic regression was used. The independent variables were used in logistic regression models to predict the following dependent variables: safety concerns; precautionary behaviour of residents, and respondents’ view of the attack as a threat to themselves. Logistic regression was used because it is preferred over others as a suitable method for analyzing dichotomized variables. The results of the logistic regression models were reported using Average Marginal Effects (AME) and Standard Error estimates (SE). As matched with more conventional odds ratios, AMEs are more appropriate for comparing models, and so using AME coefficients allows us to compare the effects of independent variables across models. The AME also

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical area</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinterland (Peri-Urban)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ Survey (2022)

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81 Ibid
82 Ibid
provide statistics that are more straightforward to interpret and make genuine inferences.\(^{83}\)

**Results and discussion**

Survey findings are discussed under various subheadings as follows. Unless otherwise stated, the tables used to summarise the findings are the products of the survey carried out between August, 2022 and January, 2023.

**Descriptive analyses of the variables**

In the final sample (see Table 1), approximately 78% of sample respondents were concerned about their safety and security since the security intelligence got into the public domain. In further discussion with the respondents, one could see a palpable degree of fear among residents of Lagos. One of the sampled respondents spoke as follows:

> …since the information about the planned attack broke out, I can confidently say that everybody in this area is frightened. Throughout the first week when the information got to the public domain, my wife and two daughters could not even have a good sleep. Whereas on this street, we are used to hearing noise even to late in the midnight but now, any little racket on the street looks like a sound of war now…” (Male/45yrs/Civil servant/Peri-urban).

In response to this fear, 90% of respondents adopt precautionary behaviour by avoiding going out at certain times (at night and certain places) in their communities and Lagos at large. These results show that even some residents who were not actually concerned about safety, now observe precautions, nonetheless. In this regard, a respondent spoke thus:

> …there is a Yoruba’ adage that says ‘koju ma ribi, gbogbo ara logun e’. Everyone knows that these bandits always attack public places, so I’ve tried as much as possible to avoid these spaces, particularly, Church. I now attend worship services online. Besides, I do most of my work from home now and have also encouraged many of my staff to do so except on matters of essentials. Of a truth,
my wife and daughters are scared now more than ever before. I may move them out of Nigeria to a safer country in a while. I’m also considering the option of selling off this business to start afresh somewhere else… (Male/57yrs./Entrepreneur/Lagos Island).

In further discussion with the respondents, it was observed that precautionary behaviour also extended to the community/neighbourhood/street level as some communities now intensify security precautions through community joint efforts and government interventions. One of the sampled respondents spoke as follows:

…in the interim, pedestrian and vehicular movements are now restricted to between 5:00 and 23:00 hours. We have instructed and encouraged public places, including churches and bars in this area to close operations by 22:00 hour for the time being. All movements after 23:00 hours are nowadays thoroughly scrutinized by the community security operatives. We now engage the services of “Olodes” (local-watch) to patrol our streets throughout the night. The government prohibition on Okada operations in this community is supportive. Of a truth, a number of past violent crimes in this area are linked to Okada operations. We thank the government for the Neighbourhood Watch and Joint security operations that are now very much noticeable in this area… (Male/62yrs./Retiree/Lagos Mainland).

As shown in Table 2a, despite the hullabaloo of the terror threats intelligence in the last five weeks, it is surprising to see that some 9% of Lagos residents are yet to receive or be aware of the information and the majority of these people are women with a low level of formal education. This unearths some of the problematic issues that growing African megacities like Lagos may be having in terms of communication and prompt information dissemination. One of the sampled respondents spoke as follows:

… for where! This our Lagos? I never hear am. As you can see, I’m always busy with my small business from morning till late in the evening. But that one no fit happen. Na those people from Maiduguri get their wahala. They should not bring that rubbish come here o. I beg, forget am, ‘awa o ni ri ogun ni bi yì, odi o kere
Findings show that prior to the survey, a good number of sampled respondents, their families or members of their community/neighborhood (78%) have experienced victimization including grievous harm and wounding, assaults, sexual violence or any other kind of physical violence. One of the sampled respondents spoke as follows:

…I will say assaults occur here daily and we (women) are mostly affected. We have “area boys and agbero” in pockets of places in this area. There are verbal abuses, body-shaming and unwelcome advances usually directed to girls and ladies walking on their streets, even in broad daylight. They (area boys) can obstruct your movement or grab you, and push you. They even go to the extent of pulling your hair or hitting your buttock with their hand. Just two weeks ago, one of the area touts tried to force a teenage girl into sexual intercourse if not for the quick intervention of a vigilante. It occurred in the night. Of a truth, nighttime is not safe for girls walking alone in this area. Besides, it was on this street that one of the “area boys and agbero” was beaten ruthlessly and almost set ablaze because of conflict which arise among different factions of NURTW … (Female/38yrs./Employee/Lagos Mainland).

The situation was even worse regarding property crime victimization as some 88% of respondents, their families or members of their communities or neighbourhoods have experienced theft of personal property, such as money, wallet, purse, credit card, mobile phone, laptop, and vehicle among others. One of the sampled respondents spoke as follows:

… On this fateful day, it was around 23:00 hours when some criminals entered our premises. That day, they hijacked one of us (residents) at gunpoint and followed him and later subdued our security guards to gain entry into our building. They operated for like 60 minutes and carted away cash, phones, laptops and other valuables from six households that were residing in these premises then. Even after that event, my eyes have seen ‘sege’ (challenges)
in this Lagos! I have personally been robbed. For instance, till today, I never received a product for which I ordered online and had already paid. It was after that I realized it was a fake online outlet. On two occasions, my ATM card (Debit card) was used to steal from my bank account even though the Debit card was with me. I guessed it was a point of sales (POS) machine compromise. So, since then, I’ve stopped using POS services… (Male/51yrs./Civil servant/Lagos Island).

Results show that a significant proportion (37%) of the respondents, their families or community members have experienced shooting, bombing and/or kidnapping. For most respondents, sporadic shootings usually occur when there are clashes among different confraternities and cult groups in Lagos over territorial conquest. For instance, “Aiye” and “Eiye” operate on the Island, “one million boys” have established domain in the Ikorodu axis of the hinterland/peri-urban while “Fadeyi’ boys, “Akala’ boys, Nokia boys, “Awawa” boys and “Koko” groups share territories on the Mainland. On several occasions, transport union (NURTW) riots have led to sporadic shootings among factions leading to the death of innocent residents and anxiety among people. Moreover, kidnapping was particularly emphasised by respondents. One of the respondents spoke on how his colleague, a pastor and a co-resident was abducted and killed as follows:

… Although the event did not occur in Lagos, he was kidnapped sometime in April, 2021 in Ondo state when he was travelling to his hometown to attend to some issues. He was first declared missing when he did not reach his destination as expected. Thereafter, the abductors called and demanded that ten million naira ransom be paid. The family negotiated for two million naira; some of us contributed parts of the money which was delivered to the abductors. But unexpectedly, it was the dead body of “Fredrick” that was recovered where the kidnappers said we would see him. He was just 50 years old then with an aged parent, wife, and four children. It was such an unfortunate event… (Male/52yrs./Civil servant/Lagos Mainland).

There were several other cases mentioned by respondents. For instance, respondents reported that on February 29, 2016, gunmen attacked Babington
Macaulay Junior Seminary in Ikorodu; a peri-urban area of Lagos State, and abducted three schoolgirls. The girls were freed some days later after collecting a ransom. In another conversation, a respondent shared how on January 13, 2017, eight persons, including five students and three staff members from the Turkish International School in Isheri, were kidnapped by gunmen. One of those kidnapped was a Turkish national. The kidnappers gained entrance into the compound through the school’s fence portion that is close to a swamp. The students and staff members were rescued by the police after ten days in the kidnappers’ den, although there were claims that the school and the victims’ families paid millions of naira as ransom. Furthermore, a resident of Aja community in Lagos Island recounted how a retired Nigerian Air Force Marshal was abducted on September 28, 2021, in the area. He narrated that the kidnappers were hooded, and shot sporadically before abducting him and dragged him into the speedboat. These were just a few cases of many kidnapping experiences among residents of Lagos.

Regarding the socio-economic composition of the final sample (See Table 2b), approximately 60% of the respondents were male. The majority (97%) were Nigerian nationals, with Yoruba, Igbo and Huasa/Fulani ethnic groups accounting for 40.8%, 26.1% and 16.2% respectively. Residents who were civil and public servants (36%) were more represented compared with owners of business and professional services as well as those employed in private businesses and professional services. While the majority of respondents (52.2%) were between 41 and 60 years of age, all respondents had formal education, and a significant proportion (96%) had completed tertiary education. The average monthly income of respondents was 950 USD with some 42% earning between 1,000 USD and 10,000 USD monthly. Moreover, 40% of the respondents had been living in Lagos for more than 19 years. Geographically, 50% of the sampled respondents live on the Mainland (where a large population of Lagos residents reside), 20% on the Island, and 30% on the Hinterland or Lagos Peri-urban.

**Multivariate analyses of the variables**

The results of the logistic regression model (see Table 3) show that respondents who are aware of the intelligence regarding planned terrorist attacks were more likely to report fear and concerns for safety, compared with those who have not heard the information. That is, respondents who are aware of the security intelligence were 39% more likely to report fear compared to those who are not aware of the violent crime update. Prior studies have shown a connection between
the reception of violent crime news and fear. In terms of experiential fear, respondents who had experienced and/or witnessed past violence crime victimization were 14% more likely to report fear, compared to those who had not been victims. Similarly, respondents who had experienced and/or witnessed past property crime victimization were 19% more likely to report fear compared to those who had not been victims, while respondents who had experienced and/or witnessed past shooting, bombing, or kidnapping were 31% more likely to report anxiety compared with respondents who had not been victims. All these findings are consistent with prior research which has shown a connection between previous victimization and fear.

It is a common finding that women have been more likely to report fear, and this applies to the current study too as results show females were 23% more likely to report fear than males. In terms of nationality, non-Nigerians were 11% more likely to report fear than Nigerians. Among Nigerians, findings show that both Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups were more likely to report fear than Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups. The situation more than doubled for the Igbos. That is, the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups were 14% and 33% respectively more likely to report fear compared to Hausa-Fulani and others. In terms of occupation, civil and public servants were 5% less likely to report fear, while private business and professional owners were 13% more likely to report fear. In terms of age, the age group (41–60 years old) was 16% more likely to report fear, while the oldest age group (above 60 years old) was 9% less likely to report fear compared to other age groups. These

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89 Ibid
findings deviate from past research\textsuperscript{91,92,93} which indicates that aged people tend to be more likely to report fear compared with younger people. However, the results support\textsuperscript{94} findings that young people tend to be more likely to report fear.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92} R LaGrange, and K Ferraro, The elderly’s fear of crime: A critical examination of the research.

\textsuperscript{93} P Kujala, Gendered feelings of unsafety and avoidance of local central areas in Finland 2001–2016. (2022).

\textsuperscript{94} Z Podaná, and E Krulichová, Victimization experience does matter: Testing the effect of different types of victimization on fear of crime among adolescents. (2021).
Table 3: Logistic regression models of Fear of terror violence and precautionary behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Fear and concern for safety</th>
<th>Precautionary behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ame</td>
<td>s.e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception of security intelligence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.391**</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against person</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.142**</td>
<td>.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against property</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.019**</td>
<td>.367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting, bombing or kidnapping</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.319**</td>
<td>.847</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Nigerians</td>
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<td>Non-Nigerians</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>Hausa/Fulani and others</td>
<td>.334***</td>
<td>.261</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Igbo</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>.149**</td>
<td>.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Employed in private businesses and others</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil/Public servant</td>
<td>-.057*</td>
<td>.389</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Private business/professional service owners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 – 40</td>
<td>.137*</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41 - 60</td>
<td>.169**</td>
<td>.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above 60 years</td>
<td>-.098**</td>
<td>.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Muslim and others</td>
<td>.214**</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>No formal education/Basic Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-basic education</td>
<td>.167*</td>
<td>.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td>.174**</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income</td>
<td>Less than 1000 USD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1000USD – 10000USD</td>
<td>.297**</td>
<td>.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above 10000 USD</td>
<td>.348**</td>
<td>.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay</td>
<td>5-9 yrs./10 – 14 yrs.</td>
<td>15 – 19 yrs.</td>
<td>&gt; 19 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical area</td>
<td>Mainland</td>
<td>Island</td>
<td>Hinterland (Peri-Urban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- .093**</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>-.084**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- .156**</td>
<td>.098</td>
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<td>.196**</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>.158**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.338**</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.169**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001; s.e = standard error; ame = average marginal effect

Source: Authors’ Survey (2022)
In terms of religious affiliation, Christians were 21% more likely to report fear than Muslims and others. This may not be far from the fact that many of the previous attacks of these terrorist groups were targeted at Churches and Christian worshipers. In terms of education, respondents with post-basic education were 16% more likely and respondents with tertiary education were 17% more likely to report fear compared with respondents with no formal education and just basic education. In terms of income, findings show that the level of fear increases as income increases. That is, respondents earning between 1000 USD and 1000 USD as well as those earning more than 10000 USD were 29% and 34% more likely to report fear respectively compared with respondents who earn less. These findings reinforce past research\textsuperscript{95,96,97} which indicates that high-income earners tend to more likely report fear compared with low-income earners.

Findings show that fear decreases as respondents spend more years in Lagos. That is, respondents who had spent 15-19 years as well as those who had spent more than 19 years were 9% and 15% less likely to report fear respectively, compared with respondents who had spent fewer years in Lagos. It is a common finding that newer residents have been more likely to report concern for safety\textsuperscript{98}. In terms of geographical area, concerns for safety vary spatially in the city of Lagos, just as is obtainable in previous studies\textsuperscript{99,100,101,102}. Respondents in the peri-urban and those on the Mainland were 33% and 19% more likely to have anxiety respectively, than those on the Island. The pattern of crime incidences and vulnerability of these areas (\textit{Peri-urban and Mainland}) could be the reasons for this. Residents on the Island are mostly influential with various degrees of power to provide additional security for themselves in the face of threats.

\textsuperscript{95} Badiora, \textit{et al.}, Spatial Analysis of Residents’ Fear and Feeling of Insecurity in Ile-Ife, Nigeria. (2013).
\textsuperscript{96} R LaGrange, and K Ferraro, The elderly’s fear of crime: A critical examination of the research
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Badiora, \textit{et al.}, Spatial Analysis of Residents’ Fear and Feeling of Insecurity in Ile-Ife, Nigeria. (2013).
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid
\textsuperscript{100} V Ceccato, Fear of crime and overall anxieties in rural areas: The case of Sweden. In M. Lee & G. Mythen. (Eds.), The Routledge international handbook on fear of crime (2018).
\textsuperscript{102} A Yates, and V Ceccato, Individual and spatial dimensions of women’s fear of crime: A Scandinavian study case. (2020).
In terms of precautionary behaviour, respondents who were privy to the security intelligence were 33% more likely to engage in precautionary behaviour compared with respondents who were not aware of the security intelligence. Consistent with the literature on experiential victimization, respondents who had experienced and/or witnessed past violent crime victimization, past property crime victimization, and past shooting, bombing or kidnapping were 11%, 13% and 14% respectively more likely to engage in precautionary behaviour compared with those who had not been victims.

Regarding socio-economic characteristics, females were 43% more likely to engage in precautionary behaviour than males. This is persistent with previous findings that women are more likely to engage in avoidance behaviours. In terms of nationality, non-Nigerians were 23% more likely to engage in precautionary behaviour than Nigerians. This is not surprising as prior findings show that non-Nigerians had more concerns for safety than Nigerians. While the Igbos are 23% more likely to engage in precautionary behaviour, Yorubas are 9% less likely to do precautionary behaviour compared to Hausa/Fulani groups. Private business/professional service owners were 16% more likely to engage in precautionary behaviour while civil servants were 5% less likely to engage in precautionary behaviour compared to private sector employees and other occupation groups. In terms of age, the oldest age groups (>60 years old) 25% and 41–60 year-olds (23%) were most likely to report precautionary behavior.

Findings show that Christians were 39% more likely to engage in precautionary behaviour than Muslims. This is expected as prior findings show that Christians had more concerns for safety than Muslim faithful. In terms of education, respondents with tertiary education were most likely to engage in precautionary behaviour, and those with post-basic education were 3% more likely to report avoidance behaviour. This shows that people with higher levels of education are

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103 Badiora, et al., Gender Differences in Risk Perception and Precautionary Behaviour among the Residents of Yoruba Traditional City. (2014).
more sensitive to crime-related threats. Prior research suggests that those with higher levels of education deploy a wider concept of violence, and manifest above-average sensitivity to conflicts and violence. Thus, this may be the case in Lagos as well. In terms of income, high-income respondents (Above 10000 USD monthly) were 31% more likely to report avoidance behaviour compared with low-income respondents. Findings show that respondents who have spent above 19 years and those who have spent between 15–19 years are respectively 9% and 8% less likely to engage in precautionary behaviour. In terms of geographical area, precautionary behaviour is consistent with the pattern of fear as respondents in the Peri-urban and those on the Mainland were 16% and 15% more likely to engage in precautionary behavior respectively than those on the Lagos Island.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study explores the link between the reception of security intelligence about planned terrorists’ attacks on fear and precautionary behaviour in the context of the current security situation in Nigeria. Using Lagos (one of the Nigerian cities under the terrorists’ watch) as a case study, findings show that only a very small proportion of the residents are not aware of the security information. This indicates that the actual societal reach of the news about security intelligence is extensive in the context of this study. Findings go well with past studies that have established a link between the reception of violent crime news and fear, concerns for safety and precautionary behaviour. Nevertheless, this study adds to the previous research by establishing that the emergence of security intelligence in the public domain has very likely further contributed toward the increasing fear, and concern for safety and resident’s mobility, at least in Lagos, Nigeria. In addition, results show that past crime victimization experience was associated with concerns for safety and precautionary behaviour. This could mean that besides awareness of security intelligence and/or consumption of crime news, decisions to avoid certain places because of threats may be determined by real-life perceptions and experiences of the local security situation.

Findings highlight the importance of some socio-economic characteristics as well. For instance, women and older residents were more likely to report concerns for safety and engage in precautionary behaviour. Besides, relatively high income and

high education were also linked to concerns for safety and precautionary behaviour as respondents earning better income and those with post-basic or tertiary education were more likely to have fear and avoid certain areas, than those with just low income and basic education. While it appears that concerns for safety and precautionary behaviour are greatly influenced by the consumption of news about panned threats and past crime victimization experience, the study concludes that concerns for safety and precautionary behaviour cannot be totally explained by a single cause but rather, a summation of diverse contributing factors as shown in this study. As evidenced in this study, there is a palpable level of fear and concern for safety in Lagos: residents’ routine activities and mobility are being altered; business enterprises and social activities are somewhat negatively affected. Hence, investors and residents of Lagos need to be reassured of their safety and security. Nigeria and Lagos city authorities should therefore find integrated and new proactive ways to prevent terrorist attacks.

The Government, particularly, the Lagos State government, should not gaffe by being cool, lethargic or play down the terrorists’ threats. This 28th of March, 2022 attack on a Kaduna-bound train carrying 970 passengers where at least 8 people were killed was attributed to the failure of authorities to act on intelligence reports. It is high time state security forces increased their surveillance and armed themselves with new technology in order to prevent future attacks, hunt down terrorist groups and bring them to face the applicable law of the land. If need be, Nigerian and Lagos city administrators can request foreign support in terms of security aid and forces to prevent these threats and bring perpetrators to justice. The government needs to beef up security and check-points on all roads and waterways leading to Lagos, to fortify the nation’s commercial capital against terrorists. Furthermore, the forest parks in the country’s southwest zone have become the hideout and the operational base for the bandits because the long-standing practice of constantly patrolling and monitoring by forest security guards appeared to have been jettisoned. This practice needs to be reconsidered. There is a need to beef up security around vulnerable public places. The security response should be joint and inter-agency. This could be carried out by a multi-agency task force comprising state and non-state security outfits.

Modern security hardware technology such as drones, cameras and trackers are needed in public places like recreation centres, and religious grounds for prompt detection and prevention. Poverty, hunger and joblessness make people vulnerable to terrorism and violent crime. Lagos State government should therefore work on
a plan to pursue a development agenda for the state. This should include targeted empowerment programmes designed for unemployed youths, to minimise their vulnerability to recruitment by ISWAP, Ansaru, and other emerging criminal groups in the state. While Lagos state could rely on state policing, it should be noted that Nigeria’s security departments are at present overstretched with many security issues ravaging the country’s northern region. Hence, much more needs to be done for the southwest security network known as Amotekun, the Lagos state security outfit, known as Neighbourhood Safety Agency, and other vigilante structures. With this new security dimension, these regional approaches must be reinvigorated with sophisticated equipment and training as effective security forces for the State in this period of uncertainty.

Furthermore, it is evident that heavy spending on security equipment, systems, procedures and investigations has not made cities safer. Boko Haram, ISWAP, and Ansaru attacks continue to occur in many Nigerian cities, despite the heavy budget allocation in the last five years. It is unreasonable to believe that policing measures alone will be able to stop terrorist attacks from occurring in Nigerian cities. There are solutions, however, that complement policing measures. In times like this, cooperation from Lagos residents concerning intelligence gathering is vital. Criminals and crime events should not be covered, intentionally or otherwise, irrespective of where and who is involved. Residents should therefore be more vigilant and report security issues to the police as soon as possible. Reporting crime and suspicious events is considered among citizens’ “civic duties,” just as voting with your PVC. Not reporting crime and wary happenings could create an enabling environment for terrorism to flourish in the city.

This study advocates that further planning of the city of Lagos should balance economic, social, and environmental goals, such that excessive sprawl development does not occur. This would cause less segregation and isolation among the Lagos population. Besides, one regular modus operandi of terrorist attacks in Nigeria is the use of vehicles and motorcycles to attack soft places and targets. Thus, city design could be one of the best ways to ward off the growing threat of terror attacks with the use of cars and motorcycles as weaponries. The urban design approach which splits cars/motorcycles from pedestrians by using physical barriers that are capable of stopping a moving vehicle/motorcycle can also function as environment-enhancing installations that allow the city to protect people/buildings while maintaining and even enhancing the city’s everyday function as a place to live, recreate, and work.
Lagos city planners/designers can primarily accomplish this by putting in place measures that seek to maximize the “standoff” distance between streets/roads and possible target buildings or locations such as churches, schools, and recreational centres. The city planners can also use subtler design alterations that can reduce the speed of vehicles moving to a target location. Small bends, bumps, or turns in roads approaching soft targets and crowded locations (such as sports stadiums, bars and nightclubs, shopping centres and places of worship) could be used as a way to limit the speed at which a vehicle attack can be launched. These design strategies should work parallel with policing and smart monitoring systems, such as smart CCTV and advanced street lighting. Residents of Lagos are likely to like these tactics because they improve the city space without making it feel like a police city. Of course, if design elements are going to be effective, they should be accompanied by preparation for the event of their use. To maximize the effectiveness of Lagos's built-in security features and policing, officials should continue to emphasize preparedness in the face of these shocking planned attacks.

This study offers opportunities for further research. The current study focuses on only one of the Nigerian cities on planned terrorist attacks. Besides, it focuses on the Sub-Saharan context of a rapidly developing Megacity. The findings might be different in other Nigerian cities and countries with similar threats. Hence, a good area to expand this research is the development of more case studies. This single case study does not allow a comparative analysis of issues among residents. The comparison of these cases in other geographical settings will provide a better understanding of this subject matter. As this study only explored the residents’ perspectives, the question of what the government, state, and non-state actors are doing regarding these threats could be explored in future analyses. Moreover, the sample is small compared to the population of the city of Lagos. This may mean that the statistical power may be low (e.g. the capability to detect accurate significant statistics). Future analysis may therefore consider a larger sample and new data collection methods to obtain time-series data on perceived safety, and their influencing factors. The current analysis is basically descriptive. Thus, future studies should consider more robust and serious techniques of analysis. For instance, using z-scores, minimum and/or maximum normalisation (multiplied by 100), validation of the indices and variables using factor analysis, and principal components, among others.
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